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I. Introduction
-a
On the 29 o f May and on the 1 o f June of this year first the French and then the Dutch 
people made a clear choice against the proposed European Union’s (EU) Constitution in their 
referenda. These democratic decisions came as a shock to the established political class. One 
o f the reasons frequently brought forward against the Constitution was the fear o f a globalized 
laissez-faire capitalism lacking social protection and responsibility. The EU was perceived as 
one factor contributing to this unsocial, globalized hypercapitalism.
It is true that the European Community (EC) was founded in 1957 as a European Economic 
Community (EEC). The integration o f the market was given prevalence, since it was supposed 
to facilitate political integration. Market integration was to be achieved by the free movement 
of goods, services, persons and capital in Europe and free competition in the common market. 
Hence the four fundamental freedoms and competition law became the keystone o f  European 
integration. Yet economic integration was not simultaneously accompanied by social 
integration. Marginal elements of social legal integration were only slowly included in the 
Treaty by the treaties o f Maastricht (1992 concluded/1993 came into force), Amsterdam 
(1997/1999) and Nice (2001/2003). The Member States refused to transfer competences in the 
field o f social protection and in the labor market to the Community. Today the major 
competences in the social field still remain in the hands o f the Member States. The 
phenomenon that economic integration moves at a faster pace than social integration is a 
common experience of internationalization and globalization -  and it causes fear. There is a 
widespread impression spread that big multinational enterprises can move relatively freely in
* W. EUCKEN, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik^ 7th ed., Mohr Siebeck, Tubingen 2004, at p. 1. Translation by 
the author: “Social security and social justice are the great concerns of this time. Since the beginning o f 
industrialization the social question has become more and more the central question of human existence. It has 
an eminent historical force. Thinking and acting must be directed above all to its solution.”
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the globalized market and have hence become independent from national labor and social 
laws. The feared consequences are social dumping and the undermining o f national systems 
of social security and workers’ rights. The lack o f governance o f globalization due to the lack 
of social integration has terrified the European population.
The described discrepancy between economic and social integration has led to legal problems 
in the European Community. EC law has primacy over national law, including labor and 
social law. Yet EC law is mainly economic law and it focuses on a common market with free 
competition. Labor law, on the other hand, necessarily involves certain restrictions o f 
competition in order to protect employees -  for example the cartelization o f  supply and 
demand of work in collective bargaining. The same is true for social law: social insurance 
schemes which are based on solidarity can only maintain their financial equilibrium i f  
competition in the market is to a certain extent restricted.
The traditional division between EC competition law on the one hand and national social and 
labor law on the other hand was commonly accepted for a long time -  33 years. However, on 
the 18th of June 1991, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) received a preliminary reference 
from the Tribunal des Affaires de Sécurité Sociale de TH érault asking if  a compulsory social 
insurance scheme was compatible with the Treaty’s competition rules -  the case Poucet et 
Pistre} The Court received those questions shortly before the conclusion o f  the Treaty o f 
Maastricht on the 7th of February 1992 and its declaration o f  the completion o f  the internal 
market. It might have been the Commission’s diligent preparatory work for the formal 
completion o f the internal market which propelled the examination o f social insurance 
schemes under the ambit o f competition law.
In the wake o f  Poucet et Pistre, several social insurance schemes were challenged before the 
Court for infringements o f competition law. In some Member States supplementary social 
insurance schemes are established by collective agreements between employers and trade 
unions, hence collective bargaining also eventually became subject to a competition law 
assessment. The first judgment o f the Court was given in the triplet o f Albany cases in 1999.1 2
1 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Poucet et Pistre, (1993) ECR1-637.
2 Case C-67/96, Albany, (1999) ECR 1-5751; Joined Cases C -l 15/97 to C-l 17/97, Brentjens, (1999) ECR 1-6025; 
Case C-219/97, Drijvende Bokken, (1999) ECR 1-6121.
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Contrary to its jurisdiction in the area o f free movement and social security, the Court did not 
allow competition law to interfere with the national systems of compulsory social insurance 
and collective bargaining. While the Court came up with a  special definition o f  the term 
“undertaking” for social insurance funds which exhibit a certain degree o f solidarity, it 
created a non-statutory labor exemption for collective agreements. These doctrinal ideas 
allowed the Court to immunize social security and collective agreements from EC 
competition law to a certain extent. However this approach has major flaws. The special 
definition of the term “undertaking” in the field o f social insurance is inconsistent with the 
general doctrine o f competition law and might have negative repercussions in other fields of 
competition law, on third parties outside the insurance relationship and on third markets. The 
non-statutory labor exemption unilaterally favors collective agreements and does not take into 
consideration their negative impact on markets other than labor markets.
The following thesis tries to reconcile the three different fields o f law in a way that meets the 
objectives of all fields -  the coverage o f  large parts o f the population with social insurance, 
protecting workers from the power o f  employers through collective bargaining and the 
protection of economic freedom and a free market by competition law, which is the basis of 
material prosperity in Europe. In order to find a balanced approach, the different fields o f law 
and their objectives as well as their legal rank will be described first. The case-law o f the 
European courts will then be analyzed and its weaknesses will be pointed out. Finally, a 
possible solution of the conflict which meets the interests and objectives o f the different fields 
will be presented. From this solution a general approach o f how to deal with the clash of 
competition law with other fields of law will be derived.
In finding the solution, special attention will also be paid to the Constitutional Treaty. Even 
though the future o f the Constitution is uncertain after the negative referenda in France and 
the Netherlands, this thesis takes an optimistic view with regard to its future role and tries to 
prove that the Constitution will contribute to social integration and improve the position of 
social and labor law against unbound capitalism. Hence this thesis can be read as a plea for 
the Constitution and as an attempt to address people’s fears o f an unbound laissez-faire 
capitalism at European level.
3 See for example Case C -l29/95, Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés^ (1998) ECRI-187I; Case 
C-158/96, Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie, (1998) ECR 1-1935.
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II. The colliding fields of law
In order to deal with the relation between EC competition law and national collective 
bargaining law and social insurance law, it is necessary to first identify the different fields of 
law i.e. their objectives and the legal rank they occupy. While this thesis deals with EC 
competition law established by Art. 81 EC seq., the collective bargaining and social insurance 
laws are national. This makes it difficult to identify the objectives of the latter, taking into 
consideration the diversity o f the different national systems. Some tools that will be used to 
accomplish this task are: definitions from European and international law; a comparison of 
different national laws, and a historical overview o f the development of the different fields in 
Europe.
1. Competition Law
a) Objectives
Agreeing upon the objectives of competition law is fraught with controversy. In this context, 
it suffices to provide a small summary o f the different objectives that are discussed. It is 
submitted that these different objectives do not preclude each other, but rather that they 
complement each other and form a bundle of objectives.4
According to the ordoliberal doctrine, based on the thoughts developed by the Freiburg 
School of Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm  and Hans Grofimann-Doerth, the main objective of 
competition law is to protect and enable of individual economic freedom in a market 
economy.5 Economic freedom is freedom to engage in competition and it is the prerequisite of 
the very existence o f competition.6 The ordoliberals assume that every market has to be 
considered in the social and legal framework which governs it, the so-called 
Wirtschaftsverfassung (economic constitution).7 This is not a constitution in a strict legal
4 J. DREXL, “Wettbewerbsverfassung -  Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht als materielles Verfassungsrecht”, in A. 
VON BOGDANDY (ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht-Theoretische und dogmatische Grundzüge, Springer- 
Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York 2003, p. 747, at p. 769 speaks of a pluralism of purposes.
5 For an overview of the ordoliberal ideas, see DREXL, supra note 4 , at pp. 753-758.
6 E.-J, MESTMACKER, H. SCHWEITZER, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd ed., C.H. Beck, München 
2004, at § 2, recital 73 seq.
7 F. BÖHM, Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung, Heft 1 in 
F. BÖHM, W. EUCKEN, H. GROßMANN-DOERTH (eds.), Ordnung der Wirtschcft — Schriftenreihe, Verlag
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4sense, but rather a set o f norms and customs which embodies the decision for a certain 
economic order.8 The ordoliberals make a distinction between two poles of economic order: a 
command economy and a free transaction economy,9 and take a clear position in favor o f the 
latter. This market system is not only more effective,10 but it also guarantees individual 
freedom i f  it is based on full competition.11 12The role o f the state in this economy is to 
safeguard the principles it is based upon, i.e. above all freedom to compete. However, the 
state is not supposed to intervene in the economy for political reasons or to itself act 
economically.13 It only has to protect and implement the W irtschaftsverfassung (economic 
constitution) o f a competitive market order.14 The state is not supposed to direct the economic 
process, but only to establish and safeguard the forms in which this process can function 
effectively.15 Thus the state enforces the Wirtschqftverfassung and is at the same time 
constrained by the principles o f a free, competitive Wirtschaftsverfassung}6 Since economic 
freedom, the fundamental principle o f the market economy, is constantly threatened by 
private actors who try to monopolize the market,17 18there is a  need for a strong, politically 
neutral and independent competition authority, which protects this freedom against privately 
imposed restrictions. The policy o f keeping the market in accordance with its legal and 
social framework of the Wirtschaftverfassung is called Ordnungspolitik (“policy o f  order” - a  
term that is not translatable).19 Yet ordoliberalism  is not restricted to the idea o f  individual, 
economic freedom in the market. Rather, the ordoliberals assumed that there is an
von W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart und Berlin 1937, at pp, 54-58 and see D, J. GERBER, Law and Competition in 
Twentieth Century Europe -  Protecting Prometheus, OUP, Oxford 1998, at p. 245 seq.
* BÖHM, Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft, supra note 7, at pp. 58-61; W. EUCKEN, Grundlagen der 
Nationalökonomie, 7th ed., Springer Verlag, Berlin, Gottingen, Heidelberg 1959, at p. 52; DREXL, supra note 
4, at pp. 748 seq. describes it as a normative-economic concept of constitution.
9 EUCKEN, Grundlagen, supra note 8, at pp. 78 seq.
10 EUCKEN, Grundlagen,, supra note 8, at p. 80.
11 EUCKEN, Grundlagen, supra note 8, at pp. 198-202 and id. Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, 7th ed,, Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen 2004, at pp. 246-250 proposes the model of full competition, in which the single market 
actor cannot influence the data o f the market. See also GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 240; MESTMÄCKER, 
SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 2, recital 80 seq.
12 W. EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung”, (1949) 2 ORDO 1, at 22 seq.
13 EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung”, supra note 12, at 92 seq.
14 According to EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung”, supra note 12, at 32-84 and id. Grundsätze der 
Wirtschaftspolitik, supra note 11, at pp. 254-304 this market order is to be achieved by constituting principles 
(primacy o f monetary policy, principle o f  open markets, consistency o f economic policy, private property, 
freedom of contract, liability), which create a competitive order, and regulating principles (income policy, 
economic calculation ( Wirtschaftsrechnung), measures against countercyclical behavior (anomal supply function 
in the labor market), monetary policy based on stability and, above all, cartel and monopoly control), which 
safeguard the functioning o f this competitive order.
15 EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung”, supra note 12, at 92 seq.; id., Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik supra 
note 11, at pp. 336-338. See also GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 248.
16 See GERBER, supra note 7, at pp. 246-248.
17 EUCKEN. Grundlagen, supra note 8, at pp. 199-201; id., “Die Wettbewerbsordnung ”, supra note 12 , at 4 
seq. See also GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 250 seq.
18 GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 254 seq.
19 See GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 246.
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interdependence between the different orders (political, social and economic).20 This means 
that the economic order is related to the political order and that they function according fo the 
same principles.21 Thus the economic order in a democratic state under the rule o f  law also 
has to obey the primacy of human dignity.22 23This leads to a social perspective o f  competition 
law, as Franz Bohm  put it: “Because not only the level of efficiency depends on 
competition, which is - well comprehensible - closest to the heart o f growth policy makers, 
but also the freedom, equity and justice content of the system of a  market economy 
(translation by the author).”24 The interdependence o f orders also means that the society under 
private law (Privatrechtsgesellschaft) and the competition order are interdependent. The state 
creates a private law with property rights and freedom o f trade which are prerequisites for 
competition, while competition controls freedom o f trade.25 26But competition itself has to be 
protected and guaranteed by a strong state, because private market actors tend to abuse the 
freedom given to them in order to monopolize the market and to restrict their own freedom 
and the freedom o f third parties, including the demand-side o f  the market. This also implies 
that competition law serves as a device to prevent and control private power.27 28As Franz 
Bohm put it: “Competition is the most remarkable and ingenious instrument for reducing 
power known in history”. From an ordoliberal point o f view, private and public economic 
power are major obstacles to social justice and social integration. Competition law is 
considered as a tool to avoid the accumulation and abuse o f  private economic power in order 
to create a social market order 29 If a firm has already attained a dominant position in the 
market and hence the prevention of private power has become impossible, competition law is
20 BÖHM, Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft, supra note 7, at p. 60; EUCKEN, Grundsätze, supra note 11, at pp. 332- 
334. See also H.-G. KRÜSSELBERG, “Zur Interdependenz von Wirtschaftsordnung und Gesellschaftsordnung: 
Euckens Plädoyer für ein umfassendes Denken in Ordnungen”, (1989) 40 ORDO 223.
21 EUCKEN, Grundsätze, supra note 11, pp. 332-334. See also DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 751 and at pp. 755 
seq.
22 See EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung”, supra note 12, at 7. See also GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 239 
seq.
23 See DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 757.
24 F. BÖHM, “Freiheit und Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft”, (1971) 22 ORDO 11, at 20: “Denn vom 
Wettbewerb hängt nicht nur der Leistungspegel ab, der den Wachstumspolitikem verständlicherweise zunächst 
am Herzen liegt, sondern auch der Freiheits-, Gleichgewichtigkeits- und Gerechtigkeitsgehalt des 
marktwirtschaftlichen Systems."
25 F. BÖHM, “Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft”, (1966) 17 ORDO 75; idL, “Freiheit und Ordnung”, 
supra note 24, at 21. See also DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 757.
26 See EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung”, supra note 12, at 4 seq.
27 See BÖHM, Die Ordnung der Wirtschafte supra note 7, at pp. 155-160; GERBER, supra note 7, at pp. 235, 
240.
28 F. BÖHM, “Democracy and Economic Power”, in: Institut für ausländisches und internationales 
Wirtschaftrecht an der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt a.M. and Institute for International and 
Foreign Trade Law o f the Georgetown University Law Center Washington D.C. (eds.), Cartel and Monopoly in 
Modern Law -  Reports on supranational and national European and American Law /, C. F. Müller, Karlsruhe 
1961,atp. 42.
29 EUCKEN, Grundsätze, supra note 11, at pp. 185-193,312-318; See also GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 241.
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at least supposed to control the behavior of this dominant undertaking and prevent it from 
abusing its power, which would be detrimental to the freedom o f other market actors, 
including consumers. Thus the mam objective o f competition law is, according to the 
ordoliberal doctrine, the protection o f  economic freedom, which facilitates a  democratic,30 1 
functional, social and humane market order.32 These ordoliberal thoughts strongly influenced 
the idea o f a social market economy in Germany by Arm in MuHer-Armack.33
Closely related to the ordoliberal point of view is the identification o f competition as a 
learning process (or a process o f discovery) which has to be protected.34 35This idea can be 
traced to the work of F. A. von Hayek, It implies that the function o f competition can be 
recognized (the learning process), whereas the realization and results o f this function remain 
contingent.36 37This also implies that the objective o f  competition law can only be the protection 
of the preconditions of competition (i.e. freedom to compete) and not the attainment of certain 
results o f the competitive process (for example, public welfare), because they have to be left 
to the market and cannot be predicted by the undertakings themselves nor by authorities or 
courts. Von Hayek does not view the market as a static order, but rather as a dynamic, 
evolutionary process of learning, which creates so-called “spontaneous orders”.38 Yet the 
precondition for the creation of spontaneous orders is free economic action according to the 
legal rules o f  competition law.39 The law has to create a framework which guarantees 
individual freedom by abstract rules.40
The ordoliberal school has had a decisive influence on the development o f  EC competition 
law. The drafting of the competition rules was mainly based on the ordoliberal theory and the 
ordoliberal thinkers also had an enormous influence on the implementation of European
30 See GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 252 seq.
31 See BÖHM, “Privatrechtsgesellschaft”, supra note 25, at 92.
32 EUCKEN, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung”, supra note 12, at 7 and id. Grundsätze, supra note 11, at pp. 312-324.
33 A. MÜLLER-ARMACK, “Die Wirtschaftsordnungen sozial gesehen”, (1948) I ORDO 125. See also 
GERBER, supra note 7, at p. 237.
34 F. A. VON HAYEK, “Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren”, in M. E. STREIT (ed.), Rechtsordnung und 
Handelnsordnung: Aufsätze zur Ordnungsökonomik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2003, p. 132.
35 In 1962 von Hayek succeded Eucken as the chair of economics in Freiburg. Nevertheless, he cannot be 
ascribed to the ordoliberal school, but rather has to be considered liberal, especially because his later works 
denied the role o f the state in protecting competition. See DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 761; GERBER, supra note 
7, at p. 237.^
36 MESTMACKER, SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 2, recital 75.
37 MESTMACKER, SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 2, recital 86, 90, 95.
j8 F. A. VON HAYEK, Individualismus und wirtschaftliche Ordnung, Wolfgang Neugebauer, Salzburg 1976, at 
pp. 49-77; F. A. VON HAYEK, “Wahrer und falscher Individualismus”, (1948) 1 ORDO 19. See also E.-J. 
MESTMACKER, Organisationen in spontanen Ordnungen, Rudolf Haufe Verlag, Freiburg 1992.
39 MESTMACKER, SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 2, recital 93.
| 40 MESTMACKER, SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 2, recital 93 seq.
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competition law. The first President o f the Commission, Walter Hallstein, as well as one of 
the principal drafters of the “Spaak Report” (the document on which the Rome Treaty was 
based), and later first Commissioner for Competition Policy, Hans von der Groeben were 
strongly influenced by ordoliberal thoughts.41 Even today, the interpretation of Art. 81(1) EC 
by the ECJ clearly reveals an ordoliberal tradition.42 Having due regard to the protection of 
economic freedom as the main objective of competition law, the Court in defining a 
restriction of competition in the sense o f Art. 81(1) EC, ruled that “each economic operator 
must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market 
including the choice o f the persons and undertakings to which he makes offers or sells.”43 The 
principle o f economic freedom and self-determination has been constant in the case-law ever 
since.44 However, as well as protecting the economic freedom of parties to a restrictive 
agreement, the ECJ has also interpreted competition law to protect the freedom of third 
parties45 and of the opposite side o f the market.46 The idea o f  competition as a process of 
discovery is reflected in the fact that the ECJ regards the uncertainty o f the market 
development as a prerequisite for competition.47 48Furthermore Art. 82 EC, which deals with 
the abuse of a dominant position, is clearly based on the ordoliberal idea o f controlling 
private power.
Another objective which plays a  major role in EC competition law is market integration and
ia
the protection of the single market. EC competition law is very keen on agreements, which 
lead to national market separation and prevent parallel trade between Member States.49 Since
41 See DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 767; GERBER, supra note 7, at pp. 263-265.
42 See G. MONTI, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy”, (2002) 39 CML Rev 1057, at 1061 seq.
43 Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56,111, 113 and 114/73, Suiker Unie and others v Commission, (1975) ECR 1663, 
para. 173.
44 See, for example, Case 172/80, Züchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank, (1981) ECR 2021, para. 13 seq,; Case C- 
393/92, Almelo, (1994) ECR 1-1477, para. 34 seq.; Case 309/99, Wouters and Others, (2002) ECR 1-1577, para. 
97.
45 With regard to market access of third parties, see Case C-234/89, Delimits, (1991) ECR 1-935, para. 13-23.
46 This is achieved by the requirement of a “significant effect on the market”, whereby the German expression 
“spürbare Marktbeeinträchtigung” describes more appropriately the relation to third market actors. See, for 
example, Case C-7/95 P, Deere v Commission, (1998) ECR 1-3111, para. 77; joined Cases C-215,216/96, 
Bagnasco and Others v BPN and Carige, (1999) ECR I-I35, para. 34 and MESTMÄCKER, SCHWEITZER, 
supra note 6, at § 10, recital 23; contra R. WESSELING, The Modernisation o f  EC Antitrust Law, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2000, at p. 90 seq., who regards this test as the introduction of an efficiency test 
into Art 81(1) EC.
47 See, for example, Case 8/72, Cementhandelaren v Commission, (1972) ECR 977, para. 18-21.
48 Commission of the European Communities, XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995, COM(96) 126 final, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Brussels, Luxembourg 1996, at p. 15, para. 2; id., 
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999, SEC(2000) 720 final, Office for Official Publications o f the 
European Communities, Brussels, Luxembourg 2000, at p. 19, para. 3.
49 Commission of the European Communities, XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999, supra note 48, at p. 
19, para. 3. From the case-law, see, for example, Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm,
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EC competition law is intended to serve the purpose o f flanking and supplementing the
fundamental freedoms, especially the free movement o f  goods Art. 28 EC and the free
movement o f  services Art. 49 EC, whose objectives are market integration and the protection
of the single market (i.e. originally the creation o f an internal market), it follows that market
integration is also one of the main objectives o f EC competition law.50 While the fundamental
freedoms guarantee the opening up of national boundaries between Member States,
. i
competition law  has the objective o f  preventing the recreation of these boundaries by private |
actors.51 This also implies that one of the main objectives of EC competition law is to
eliminate national discrimination in the European market.52
Another approach, nowadays favored by many economists in the field o f industrial 
organization and which derives from the teachings of the so-called Chicago School, focuses 
on welfare maximization by the means of efficiencies. The efficiency doctrine is not mainly 
concerned with competition as a process, but rather with the results that may be obtained from 
it. As Richard A . Posner, one o f  the leading scholars of the Chicago School, states: 
“Efficiency is the ultimate goal o f antitrust, but competition a mediate goal that will often be 
close enough to the ultimate goal to allow the courts to look no further.”53 Economic welfare 
is thereby defined as total surplus, i.e. consumer surplus and producer surplus in a given 
industry. W hile consumer surplus is the aggregate surplus o f individual consumers and 
individual consumer surplus is the difference between the consumer’s valuation for the good 
considered (the willingness to pay for it) and the price he has to pay for it, producer surplus is 
the sum o f  the profits the producers in a given industry make by selling the respective 
goods.54 W ithin the efficiency doctrine it is disputed i f  the main objective o f  competition law 
is total surplus (i.e. the sum of consumer and producer surplus) or rather consumer surplus, 
because it might be the case that total surplus is increased to the prejudice o f  consumers.55 
The device to maximize welfare is deemed to be efficiency. Here a distinction is made 
between allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency, while allocative efficiency is clearly 
given a prerogative. Allocative efficiency is defined as charging a certain price for a given
(1966) ECR 235,249; joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, (1966) ECR 291, 340;
Case 19/77, Miller v Commission, (1978) ECR 131, para. 7.
50 See MESTMÄCKER, SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 10, recital 8; WESSELING, supra note 46, at p. 97.
51 DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 760; Commission of the European Communities, XXIXth Report on Competition 
Policy 1999, supra note 48, at p. 19, para. 3; S. GRAF VON WALL WITZ, Tarifverträge und die 
Wettbewerbsordnung des EG-Vertrages, Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. and others 1997, at p. 76 seq.;
WESSELING, supra note 46, at pp. 85, 97.
52 M. MOTTA, Competition Policy -  Theory and Practice, CUP, Cambridge 2004, at p. 14.
53 R. A. POSNER, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed., The University o f Chicago Press, Chicago 2001, at p. 29.
54 MOTT A, supra note 52, at p. 18.
55 MOTT A, supra note 52, at pp. 19 seq.
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product, which yields the highest welfare gains in overall terms (this is usually the price that 
equals marginal costs of production)*56 Productive efficiency is the production o f goods and 
services at optimal costs, using the most efficient technology for production and the highest 
managerial and labor effort. It thus directly affects allocative efficiency, since higher marginal 
production costs push the prices o f products without raising the profit o f producers, hence 
causing welfare loss. While allocative and productive efficiency have a static dimension, 
dynamic efficiency relates to innovation, i.e. the introduction o f new and better technologies
CÔ
and products. Dynamic efficiency affects directly productive and allocative efficiency. 
While the introduction of better technologies facilitates production at lower marginal costs, 
thus enhancing welfare, the introduction o f new products not only opens up new markets to 
derive welfare from, but also contributes in the case of product improvement to the utility the 
consumer derives from a certain product, thus raising consumer and total welfare. Dynamic 
efficiency therefore creates future welfare.59 A monopolistic market is detrimental to 
allocative efficiency (welfare is lowest when the market price equals the monopoly price and 
highest when it equals marginal costs o f production in a highly competitive market)60 and also 
has negative repercussions on productive61 and dynamic efficiency,62 hence monopolistic 
structures have to be prevented by competition law.
Art. 81(3) EC shows that allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency is one of the 
objectives of EC competition law, because such restrictive agreements can be exempted from 
the prohibition o f Art. 81(1) EC “which contribute ( ...)  to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”. Yet EC competition 
law also makes a clear decision against the promotion of total surplus and in favor of 
consumer surplus, by making the exemption conditional on “allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit”. From this provision, Jo se f Drexl draws the conclusion that it leads to 
a distribution o f  wealth to the advantage of consumers, thus including social elements and 
elements o f solidarity in the concept o f  competition law. The Commission also emphasizes 
the role of efficiency in EC competition law by stating that one o f the purposes of its
56 For an explanation see MOTTA, supra note 52, at pp. 40-45.
57 MOTTA, supra note 52, at pp. 45 seq.
58 MOTTA, supra note 52, at p, 55.
59 MOTTA, supra note 52, at p. 19.
60 MOTTA, supra note 52, at p. 18.
61 MOTTA, supra note 52, at pp. 46-51.
62 MOTTA, supra note 52, at pp. 56 seq.
63 DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 781. See also MONTI, supra note 42, at 1061.
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competition policy is ‘"to encourage industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation o f resources, 
technical progress and the flexibility to adjust to‘a changing environment”64
Finally there are also other policy considerations that find their way into competition law. 
Usually a  broad interpretation o f  Art. 81(3) EC is used to take account o f  other policy 
objectives.65 Thus the Commission and the Court have considered social and environmental 
issues (especially with regard to employment) in the exemption o f restrictive agreements and 
practices under Art. 81(3) EC. In Ford/Volkswagen the Commission exempted a joint venture 
according to Art. 81(3) EC, because, among other reasons, it led to the creation of jobs in 
Portugal, a  structurally underdeveloped Member State.66 Similarly the ECJ ruled in the Metro 
and Remia cases that an agreement’s beneficial effect on employment can constitute an 
improvement o f  the general conditions o f production in the sense o f  Art. 81(3) EC.67 68From 
today’s perspective, these decisions are in accordance with Art. 127(2) EC: “The objective o f 
a high level employment shall be taken into consideration in the formulation and 
implementation of Community policies and activities.” With regard to environmental 
considerations, the Commission exempted restrictive agreements because (among other 
reasons) they gave “direct practical effects to environmental objectives” o f secondary 
Community law or because the reduction o f pollution caused by an agreement was deemed 
to contribute to economic efficiency69.70 This corresponds to Art. 6 EC which demands the 
integration o f  environmental protection requirements with a view to sustainable development 
when implementing the Community’s policies and activities as referred to in Art. 3, including 
competition policy in Art. 3(1 )(g) EC. The Commission also took into consideration industrial 
policy concerns, for example in the exemption o f  “crisis-cartels”, which were deemed 
necessary to recover certain industrial sectors, especially the synthetic fibre and petro­
chemical sector, that suffered from severe economic crises in the aftermath o f the oil crises in 
the 1970s.71 This corresponds to Art. 157(3) EC. The consideration o f the Community
64 Commission o f the European Communities, XXDCth Report on Competition Policy 1999, supra note 48, at p. 
19, para. 2. See also Commission o f the European Communities, XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995, 
supra note 48, at p. 15, para. 1.
63 WESSELING, supra note 46, at pp. 109-111.
66 Commission Decision o f23.12.1992, Ford/Volkswagen, (1993) OJ L20/14, para. 36.
67 Case 26/76, Metro v Commission, (1977) ECR 1875, para. 43; Case 42/84, Remia v Commission, (1985) ECR 
2545, para. 42.
68 Commission Decision of 17.09.2001, DSD, (2001) OJ L319/1, para. 142-146.
69 Commission Decision o f24.01.1999, CECED, (2000) OJ LI 87/47, para. 48.
70 MONTI, supra note 42, at 1075 and 1078 draws from these decisions the questionable conclusion that the 
protection o f the environment is close to becoming a core objective of EC competition law.
71 Commission Decision o f4.07.1984, Synthetic Fibres, (1984) OJ L207/17, para. 28-52; Commission Decision 
of 4.12.1986, ENl/Montedison, (1987) OJ L5/13, para. 26-41; Commission Decision o f22.12.1987,
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policies and objectives o f Articles 2 and 3 EC when applying Art. 81 seq., was also 
acknowledged by the ECJ: % ..)  the restraints on competition which the Treaty allows under 
certain conditions because o f the need to harmonize the various objectives of the Treaty, are 
limited by the requirements of Articles 2 and 3.”
Outside the framework o f Art. 81(3) EC, other (national) policy objectives have been taken 
into account in the application of Art. 81(1) and 82 EC. Thus the ECJ decided that a 
regulation of the Netherlands Bar Association prohibiting lawyers from entering into multi­
disciplinary partnerships with accountants did not infringe Art. 81(1) EC, because the 
restrictions o f competition were deemed necessary to ensure the proper practice o f  the legal 
profession. It also declared the competition rules inapplicable to collective agreements in the 
labor market and to certain kinds o f  national social insurance schemes, which will be analyzed 
in detail below.74
The consideration of policies, which do not relate to the protection o f competition itself, is 
actually foreign to competition law. Even though Articles 6, 127(2) and 157(3) EC provide 
for the consideration of certain non-competition policy objectives and the Court argues that 
the objectives o f Articles 2 and 3 EC should be taken into account when applying Art. 81 seq., 
these additional considerations should be dealt with very carefully. A balanced trade-off must 
be found, because the consideration o f non-competition objectives might interfere with the 
actual goals and objectives of competition law and lead to additional distortions of 
competition.75 In general, competition law should not be the policy tool to achieve objectives 
that are not related to competition. Other policies might be much more effective in achieving 
these aims, without producing detrimental effects on competition. The consideration of other 
policy objectives, for example with regard to “crisis cartels”, might even contravene the actual 
goal o f competition law, the protection of competition, and reflect a critical attitude towards a
Enichem/ICl, (1988) OJ L 50/18, para. 31-50, where the Commission took issue with the concept of “workable 
competition”. For a discussion of these decisions see WESSELING, supra note 46, at pp. 36-39.
72 Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission, (1973) ECR 215, para. 24. See also Case 
14/68, Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, (1969) ECR 1, para. 5.
73 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 97-110; MONTI, supra note 42, at 1086-1090. This author considers 
this decision as a landmark case which transfers the Cassis de Dijon jurisdiction to the field of competition law. 
He calls it a “European style rule of reason”.
74 See below III. Critique of the cunent case-law of the ECJ and the C FI, at pp. 41-78.
75 See also the argument of MOTTA, supra note 52, at p. 28, who points out that these objectives might well be 
attained by other policy tools.
76 See also MOTTA, supra note 52, atp. 30 and MONTI, supra note 42, at 1092.
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competitive market in general.77 This is not to say that other policy objectives should not have 
any influence on the applicability and application o f competition law.78 If the application of 
competition law unavoidably clashes with other fundamental policies of the EC, a balanced 
and fair trade-off between the colliding fields must be established. It is the main task o f this 
thesis to find a way o f reconciling competition law with other policy considerations in the 
social field, yet it must be clear that those considerations are not an integral part o f 
competition law and do not constitute objectives o f competition law.
In summary it can be said that the objectives of EC competition law are above all the 
protection o f  economic freedom, the integration o f the market, the promotion of public 
welfare, in particular consumer welfare and the protection of competition as a learning 
process. Competition law thus serves freedom, the restriction of power, the unification o f 
Europe in  market terms, innovation and progress, the effective allocation of goods and 
allocative as well as distributive justice with a  view to consumers.
b) Legal ra n k
Competition law and the fundamental freedoms constitute the keystone of economic 
integration in the EC. Since the EC was originally founded as an economic community 
(EEC), mainly focusing on the creation of the internal market, competition law had and still 
retains a  most prominent place in EC law. It can be considered as part o f the material 
“constitutional” law o f the EC.79 Art. 2 EC states that the establishment o f a common m arket 
and an economic and monetary union with a high degree o f competitiveness is one goal o f  the 
Community. Art. 3(g) EC describes as one o f the activities o f the Community a system 
ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted. Furthermore Art. 3(c) 
establishes as a policy objective an internal market characterized by the abolition, between 
Member States, of obstacles to the free movement o f goods, persons, services and capital, 
which is — as seen above -  one o f  the core objectives o f  EC competition law. Art. 4 EC finally 
declares the principle o f an open market economy with free competition, thus embodying the
77 Thus the Commission defended the consideration o f industrial policy objectives with regard to economic 
crises, stating that “In current circumstances in particular, the Commission’s competition policy not only has to 
sustain effective competition; it has to support an economic policy which promotes the necessary restructuring” , 
Commission o f the European Communities, Xth Report on Competition Policy 1980, Office for Official 
Publications o f the European Communities, Brussels, Luxembourg 1981, at p. 9.
78 Thus MONTI, supra note 42, at 1070 seq. suggests that other policy objectives should be taken into account 
when exempting an agreement under Art. 81(3) EC, as long as the core objectives o f competition law (economic 
freedom, market integration and efficiency) are not undermined.
79 DREXL, supra note 4, at pp. 747-750.
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constitutional choice for a transfer economy based on competition. The EC Treaty hereby 
establishes a Wirtschaftsverfassung o f  a competitive market order.80 812
Articles 81 and 82 EC, which lie at the heart of EC competition law, are primary EC law. 
They are superior to national law and directly applicable to private undertakings. The 
importance of the cartel prohibition is underlined by Art. 81(2) EC, which declares that every 
agreement infringing Art. 81 is automatically void. In order to support the effet utile o f EC 
competition law, the ECJ even derived an individual right from Art. 81 EC, whose breach can 
lead to a claim for damages under national law. Hence competition law is at the heart of the 
Community legal order.
With regard to the proposed EU Constitution,83 84the decision for a free, competitive market 
order will be embodied in Art. 1-3(2), which declares that one of the objectives o f  the Union is 
an internal market where competition is free and undistorted. In an ordoliberal tradition, Art. 
1-3(3) declares a highly competitive social market economy. Primary competition law itself 
will be contained in Part III, Section 5 of the Constitution.
2. Social Insurance
a) Objectives
Before addressing the objectives o f social insurance, it is necessary to define this term. The 
function of social insurance is to provide social security}4 The term social security is used in 
different international and European legal norms which can be employed to define its 
meaning. It is frequently used in the EC Treaty, as for example in Articles 42, 137(l)(c) and 
(4) and 140 EC. Social Security is not defined in these provisions, but ILO Convention No. 
102, which served as a model for the coordination of social security in the EC according to
80 DREXL, supra note 4, at p. 759; see also VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 82-89.
81 Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, (2001) ECR 1-6297, para. 23-29. See DREXL, supra note 4, at pp. 769- 
777.
82 See also VON WALLWITZ, supra note 5 1, at pp, 75-80.
83 As a consequence o f the results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands, it has become very doubtful if 
the proposed Constitution will ever become valid law.
84 G. WANNAGAT, Lehrbuch des Soziaiversicherungsrechts, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tiibingen 1965, at pp. 
33-35.
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Regulation 1408/71,85 defines the term social security as the provision o f benefits with respect 
to medical care (Part II), sickness/incapacity o f work benefit (Part III), unemployment benefit 
(Part IV), old-age benefit (Part V), employment injury benefit (Part VI), family benefit (Part 
VII), maternity benefit (Part VIII), invalidity benefit (Part IX) and survivor’s benefit (Part X). 
Regulation 1408/71, which coordinates social security schemes for the free movement of 
workers according to Art. 42 EC, does not provide a proper definition of social security, but 
its Art. 4(1) o f  the regulation at least lists the areas it applies to and exhibits a high degree of 
accordance with ILO Convention No. 102, on which it is based.86 The material scope o f  the 
regulation extends to: sickness and maternity benefits, invalidity benefits, old-age benefits, 
survivors’ benefits, benefits in respect o f accidents at work and occupational diseases, death 
grants, unemployment benefits and family benefits. Art. 34 of the Charter o f Fundamental 
Rights o f  the European Union also lists as examples o f cases that trigger social security 
benefits and social services: maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency, old age and 
loss o f employment.
The emergence o f national social security schemes in Europe took place at the end of the 19th 
century. Germany was the first state to introduce compulsory social insurance: in 1883 against 
sickness, in 1884 against work injuries and in 1889 against accidents at work. The last country 
in Europe to introduce compulsory social insurance was Belgium, which introduced 
compulsory pension insurance as late as 1924.87 From a sociological point o f  view, all social 
security schemes served the establishment o f political integration and nation building in times 
of social tension caused by an unbound capitalism.88 89
There are different ways o f providing (financial) security against the social risks listed above. 
Thus the ILO states: “There is no single right model for social security. It grows and evolves 
over time. There are schemes o f  social assistance, universal schemes, social insurance and 
public or private provisions. Each society must determine how best to ensure income security 
and access to health care. These choices will reflect their social and cultural values, their 
history, their institutions and their level o f economic development.” It must be noted that the
85 U. BECKER in J. SCHWARZE (ed.), El)-Kommentar, Baden-Baden 2000, Art. 42 EGV, recital 4.
86 BECKER, supra note 85, recital 4.
87 M. FERRERA, “European Integration and National Social Citizenship -  Changing Boundaries, New 
Structuring?”, (2003) 36 Comparative Political Studies 611,622 seq.; J. ALBER, Vom Armenhaus zum 
Wohlfahrtsstaat, 2nd ed., Campus Verlag, Frankfurt a.M./New York 1987, at pp. 24-40,48-56.
88 FERRERA, supra note 87, at 621 and 625. For the different sociological explanations and theories see 
ALBER, supra note 87, at pp. 73-92.
89 ILO, Social Security: A new consensus, International Labour Office, Geneva 2001, at p. 2.
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ILO uses a broad definition o f social security, which includes all different ways o f financing 
and organization, whereas the EC Treaty makes a distinction between social security and 
social protection , whereby the former does not include social assistance.90 In the following, 
the terms of the EC Treaty will be employed.
The question arises as to which way of providing social security can be defined as social 
insurance. The term includes the word insurance as a special system of bearing and financing 
risks. The random risks of life are for the individual not assessable, incalculable and hence not 
financeable. Yet the pooling o f the risks allows an estimation of the probability and probable 
time o f its statistical occurrence and hence provision for its financing.91 The more risks of the 
same kind are pooled together, the better their average rate and time of occurrence can be 
estimated, i.e. the better they can be financed (this is one o f the arguments for making social 
insurance compulsory for large parts o f the population).92 934Hence insurance can be described 
as a pooling o f risks o f the same kind to make them assessable.93 94 Insurance is financed by 
contributions or premiums, which every insurance holder has to pay. In return he or another 
beneficiary receives a legal claim for benefits where the risk occurs.95 The sum of 
contributions on an aggregate level should suffice to cover the expected expenses for benefits 
and administration (principle of actuarial equivalence).96 In the case o f social insurance, 
however, this equilibrium is not sustained in many European countries, so that tax subsidies 
have become necessary (in many Member States, however, there have always been financial 
subsidies for social insurance for political reasons, e.g. in order to establish stronger bounds 
between the State and its citizens -  this was one of the main incentives for Bismarck’s
90 T. KING REEN, Das Sozialstaatsprinzip im europäischen Verfassungsverbund, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
Tubingen 2003, at p. 297, Fn. 8. See for example the wording of Art. 137 0X C) EC. This peculiar distinction 
between social security and social protection is probably due to Art. 4(4) Regulation 1408/71, which excludes 
social assistance from the scope of the regulation. A similar distinction is also made in Articles 12 and 13 ESC.
91 See H. BLEY (founder), R. KREIKEBOHM, A. MARSCHNER, Sozialrecht, 8th ed., Luchterhand, Neuwied 
und Kriftel 2001, recital 276; KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 177; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 2.
92 WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 2.
93 KINGREEN, supra note 90, at pp. 177 seq.
94 Since the risk o f unemployment is usually not assessable - it depends on random factors like economic cycles, 
the behavior of the employee and the employer, a strong argument can be made that unemployment insurance is 
no real insurance, but rather social provision. See R. GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol und EG-Vertrag -  
Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der gesetzlichen Unfallversicherung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1995, at p. 125, Fn. 149; contra WANNAGAT, supra note 84, atp. 
13.
95 BLEY, KREIKEBOHM, MARSCHNER, supra note 91, recital 278; KINGREEN, supra note 90, at pp. 177 
seq.; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 5.
96 BLEY, KREIKEBOHM, MARSCHNER, supra note 91, recital 279; KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 178; 
WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 2 seq.
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reforms in Germany)97.98 9Nevertheless, the term insurance implies that social security 
schemes which are entirely financed by the state, i.e. by tax money and not by contributions, 
cannot be considered social insurance. "
The next word in the term social insurance is social. First o f all, this term describes the scope 
o f the insurance, i.e. the social risks listed above. These risks all share the common feature 
that they destroy or impede the workforce of the individual as his source o f  income, be it for 
physical or, as in the case of unemployment, other external reasons.100 Yet the word has an 
additional meaning, which constitutes the decisive difference between social insurance and 
other forms o f insurance. The aim of social insurance is to provide large parts o f the 
population,101 especially employees,102 with insurance from social risks under socially 
acceptable conditions for the individual.103 This means, as the term social also indicates, that 
there m ust be certain aspects o f  solidarity involved in the scheme, so that everybody eligible 
can be covered and the scheme can be financed.104
There are different types o f solidarity and redistribution that can be distinguished. These types 
can be roughly divided into four groups: 1. solidarity between risks, 2. solidarity between 
different income groups, 3. solidarity between the community and the individual, 4. 
intergenerational redistribution. Solidarity between risks, i.e. the first group, can take the 
following forms: no or only restricted risk selection,105 independence o f  contributions from
97 In Germany pension schemes for workers have been subsidized by the state since the introduction of 
compulsory insurance in 1889; see WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 18. It was part o f Bismarck ’s policy to 
make social insurance dependent on state subsidies in order to establish bonds o f loyalty between the State and 
workers and the cooperative social insurance as a controllable medium of voice articulation in rivalry with the 
Reichstag (in order to weaken the parliament), see KfNGREEN, supra note 90, at pp. 170-176.
98 Thus VAT and petroleum taxes in Germany (so-called “ecological taxes”) subsidize the pension schemes, see 
H. GÔBEL, “Der Griff zur Mehrwertsteuer”, FAZ 01.06.2005 No. 124, p. 9 and BLEY, KREIKEBOHM, 
MARSCHNER, supra note 91, recital 284.
99 WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 7 seq.; GIESEN, supra note 94, at p. 125 calls tax-financed social schemes 
insurance, because he considers the taxes as a remuneration for the benefits of insurance. This is very 
questionable, because the financing by contributions is one of the defining features of insurance as opposed to 
social provision. The actual question he deals with in this context is whether social insurance can be considered 
an economic activity. This problem will be dealt with below at pp. 55-66.
100 WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp. 1,20.
101 It depends on the national framework if  the entire population, only employees or only employees up to a 
certain amount of income are covered by the different kinds of social insurance.
102 For Germany: BVerfG judgment o f 10.05.1960 BVerfGE 11, 105; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 21.
103 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 9; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp. 1,23-25.
104 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 9-13; GIESEN, supra note 94, at p. 154 seq., on the other hand, considers 
solidarity and social balance as an end in itself and not as a means to the end of attaining the coverage of large 
parts of the population with insurance.
105 KIN G RE EN, supra note 90, at p. 179; BLEY, KREIKEBOHM, MARSCHNER, supra note 91, recital 283. 
See for example the schemes in Case C-244/94, Fédération Française, (1995) E C R 1-4013, para. 9; Albany, 
supra note 2, para. 74.
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risks106 and redistribution of costs and profits between different funds (the funds with good 
risks subsidize the funds with bad risks).107 The second group of solidarity, solidarity between 
income groups, includes the following types: independence of benefits from contributions 
with calculation o f contributions according to income,108 and obligation of the employer to 
pay at least part o f  the contributions.109 The third group, solidarity between the community 
and the individual, occurs as, for example, independence of payment o f benefits from 
payment of contributions (in case the employer failed to pay the contributions for the 
employee),110 suspension of payment of contributions in the case of incapacity o f work or 
other economic hardship o f the insured,111 free insurance for unemployed family members of 
the insured,112 and subsidies by the state financed by tax money.113 The last group is 
intergenerational redistribution, which is relevant in pension schemes. There are two different 
methods of financing pension schemes: the redistribution method114 156{pay-as-you-go)115 and 
capitalization116 (or funding) 117 *. Redistribution method or pay-as-you-go means that the
I 1 A
working population directly pays the pensions o f the retired. This is a method o f financing 
different from the method o f capitalization (or funding). Capitalization (or funding) is a 
financing method in which a capital stock is created by the contributions. The existing capital 
is invested in capital markets in order to produce revenues. The benefits are paid from the 
capital stock and the additional revenues.119 Pay-as-you-go does not necessarily include more
106 BLEY, KREIKEBOHM, MARSCHNER, supra note 91, recital 283; KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 179; 
WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 27 seq. See for example Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 19; 
Albany, supra note 2, para. 74; Case C-218/00, Cisal, (2002) ECR1-691, para. 39.
107 As for example in Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 12 and the Risikostrukturausgleich in the German 
statutory health insurance, see joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/0I, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK-Bundesverband, 
(2004) ECR 1-2493, para. 10.
108 KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 179; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 28. For example the schemes in 
Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 10 seq.; Cisal, supra note 106, para. 40-42; A OK-Bundesverband, supra 
note 107, para. 7 ,9 .
109 As for example in the German social insurance schemes, see BVerfG supra note 102; KINGREEN, supra 
note 90, at p. 180; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp, 21, 150-153. See also AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 
107, para. 7.
1.0 KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 180 seq.; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 13. See for example Albany, 
supra note 2, para. 74,
1.1 As for example in Poucet et Pistre, supra note I, para. 10; Albany, supra note 2, para. 74.
112 As for example in the German statutory health insurance, see Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, 
supra note 107, para. 5.
113 KINGREEN, supra note 90, at pp. 180 seq.; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp. 150-153, 155 seq.
114 This term is used by AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Albany, supra note 2, para. 338 and his Opinion in Cisal, 
supra note 106, para. 20.
115 This term is used by economic writers, see N. BARR, The Economics o f the Welfare State, 4th ed., OUP, 
Oxford and others 2004, at p. 189.
116 The term capitalization is used by the ECJ, see for example Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 17; 
Albany, supra note 2, para. 81.
117 This term is used by economic writers, see BARR, supra note 115, at p. 189.
1.8 See BARR, supra note 115, at pp. 90 seq. See also the examples in Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 11; 
Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 10.
1.9 See BARR, supra note 115, at pp. 189 seq.
19
or less solidarity than the capitalization principle, because there may be a clear link between 
contributions and benefits for subsequent generations in a pay-as-you-go scheme that involves 
little redistribution. Furthermore, there are pension schemes based on capitalization, where 
the working generation subsidizes the retired generation in times o f low investment returns by 
higher contributions, while in times o f good investment returns profits can be passed on to the 
next generation.120 Both a scheme based on the pay-as-you-go principle and a scheme based 
on capitalization can include elements of solidarity o f the other groups.121 12
Without elements of solidarity, high risks or risks that have already realized would not be 
covered by the insurance; the sick and poor would be excluded because o f  their inability to 
pay the (higher) contributions; the pensions o f old people with low incomes would be 
insufficient to afford them a decent standard o f living,123 and employees would be excluded 
from benefits if  employers failed to pay the contributions. This means that the healthy must 
subsidize the sick, the rich must subsidize the poor and the community must subsidize the 
individual.124 Solidarity is essential to facilitate (and finance) the coverage o f large parts o f  
the population with insurance under socially acceptable conditions for the individual. The 
word social distinguishes social insurance from private, optional and individual insurance. 
Since social insurance schemes can take many different forms in the different Member States, 
here the distinction between social and private-individual insurance shall be made according 
to the purpose of social insurance to insure large parts o f the population against social risks 
under socially acceptable conditions. This necessarily means that at least a minimum degree 
of solidarity must be involved in the schemes, so that they can be financed. Thus earning- 
related compulsory schemes, occupational schemes and even compulsory private schemes 
without risk selection are included in this definition. This is admittedly a very broad definition
120 See Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, 
Adequate and sustainable pensions -  Joint report by the Commission and the Council, Office for Official 
Publications o f the European Communities, Luxembourg 2003, at p. 35.
121 For example in Albany, supra note 2, a pension scheme based on capitalization exhibited the following 
features o f  solidarity: no risk selection, independence o f contributions from risks, only limited relation between 
contributions and benefits, payment by the employer o f part o f the contributions, discharge o f arrears of 
contributions in case of the employers’ insolvency.
122 See WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 18.
123 For solidarity among the elderly in pension schemes, see Commission of the European Communities, 
Adequate and sustainable pensions, supra note 120, at p. 35 seq.
124 See WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp. 28, 157 seq.
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of the term, which also deviates from the definition in certain Member States,125 yet it is 
appropriate to cover national differences.126 1278
As evident from the discussion above, social insurance automatically implies solidarity and 
thus a certain extent of redistribution of wealth in the society. In order to facilitate 
redistribution and solidarity and to guarantee the financial equilibrium of the schemes, it is 
indispensable to either make affiliation with the schemes compulsory or to regulate the 
market for social insurance to a certain extent (a system o f redistribution between the insurers, 
limiting the number o f insurance suppliers, obligations to contract). This necessarily collides 
with the idea o f free competition and free economic action.
Yet it must be observed that social insurance in Europe is currently undergoing dramatic 
changes. The inefficiency o f compulsory insurance schemes (the simple reason for this is the 
monopoly effect) -  especially in the health sector - has forced many European legislatures to 
introduce elements of competition in the market without, on the other hand, endangering the 
underlying principle of solidarity. Pension schemes constitute a special problem in Europe. 
Many pension schemes are exclusively based on the pay-as-you-go principle. This financing 
scheme is based on an intergenerational contract.129 Yet the demographic development o f 
Europe, particularly its decreasing birthrates no longer supports this method o f financing 
pensions and necessitates new ways of financing, for example supplementary pension
125 In Germany, for example, only eaming-related compulsory and statutory schemes (the first pillar) are 
considered Sozialversicherung. See BLEY, KRE1KEBOHM, MARSCHNER, supra note 91, recital 288; 
WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp. 25-31.
126 This is also in line with secondary Community legislation. Thus Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life 
assurance is according to its Art. 2(3) applicable to the taking-up and pursuit of the self-employed activity of 
operations relating to the length of human life which are prescribed by or provided for in social insurance 
legislation, when they are effected or managed at their own risk by assurance undertakings in accordance with 
the laws of a Member State. On the other hand, Art. 3(4) excludes from the application of the directive, subject 
to the application of Art. 2(3), insurance forming part of a statutory system o f  social security. Hence there can be 
certain schemes o f social insurance which are considered similar to private insurance. In the same vein,
GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at p. 110 points out that private insurance against 
accidents at work in Belgium and Denmark is subject to both the third non-life insurance directive 92/49/EEC 
(recital 26 and Art. 37) and to the coordination of social security in the Community according to Art. 4(2) 
Regulation 1408/71 and Annex 2 Regulation 574/72.
127 Poucet et Pistre, supra note I, para. 13; WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at pp. 18,29.
128 See for example the Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (law concerning the structure of health insurance) in Germany 
which introduced, in order to promote efficiency, certain elements of competition between the statutory sickness 
funds. The so-called Risikostrukturausgleich -  a system of financial redistribution between the different funds -  
guarantees a level playing field between the funds and the principle o f solidarity in the health insurance sector. 
See for an overview on the Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz J. KRUSE, A. HÄNLEIN, Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung -  Lehr- und Praxiskommentar (LPK - SGB V), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 
2003, Einleitung, recital 4-6; Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung (ed.), Übersicht über das 
Sozialrecht, 2nd ed., BW Bildung und Wissen Verlag und Software GmbH, Nürnberg 2005, at pp. 139-141.
129 See, for example, GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopoly supra note 94, at p. 122.
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schemes, which are based on the principle o f funding and capitalization. It must be 
emphasized, as the Council and the Commission noted in their report on sustainable pensions, 
that pay-as-you-go does not necessarily involve intergenerational solidarity, nor does 
capitalization necessarily lack this kind o f solidarity. Capitalization and pay-as-you-go are 
simply different financing methods. The Council and the Commission make a distinction 
between public earning-related schemes (first pillar), private occupational schemes (second 
pillar) and individual retirement provision (third pillar).130 31 The idea of the three pillars is 
essential for the comprehension o f pension schemes. It is remarkable that some of the 
strategies named by the Council and the Commission and pursued by some Member States to 
face the challenge o f  an ageing population involve strengthening the importance o f second 
and third pillar funded schemes and the establishment o f a closer link between contributions 
and benefits in the first pillar without erasing solidarity in the schemes.132
In summary it can be said that the objective of social insurance is to insure large parts of the 
population against social risks under socially acceptable conditions. This necessarily involves 
a certain degree o f  solidarity among the affiliated and eventually leads to social peace.133 It is 
thus an important factor of distributive justice, as expressed in the papal encyclical Mater et 
Magistral “Systems o f social insurance and social security can make a most effective 
contribution to the overall distribution o f  national income in accordance with the principles of 
justice and equity. They can therefore be instrumental in reducing imbalances between the 
different classes o f citizens.”134
b) Legal ran k
The Community’s activities in the field o f  social security are still restricted to coordination 
and basic harmonization. In the wake o f  market integration, Regulations 1612/68 and 1408/71 
in connection with Regulation 574/72, which were based on Articles 49 and 51 ECT 
(nowadays Articles 40 and 42 EC), facilitated the free movement o f workers within the 
internal market by coordinating the different national schemes o f  social security and enabling
130 Commission of the European Communities, Adequate and sustainable pensions, supra note 120, at pp. 34 
seq.
131 Commission o f the European Communities, Adequate and sustainable pensions, supra note 120, at p. 6.
132 Commission o f the European Communities, Adequate and sustainable pensions, supra note 120, Luxembourg 
2003, at pp. 70-79.
133 See also WANNAGAT, supra note 84, at p. 27.
134 POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra — Encyclical o f Pope JohnX X lll on Christianity and Social Progress, 
May 15 1961, recital 136.
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the transfer and recognition of social security claims as well as the equal treatment o f workers
with regard to social security. Coordination is still the main focus of Community social
law.135 With regard to harmonization, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a genuine
Community competence for social issues in Art. 137 EC.136 Thus the Council may adopt,
according to Art. 137(l)(c), (2)(b) EC, by means o f directives, minimum requirements for
gradual implementation in the field o f social security and social protection o f workers, while
having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States.
According to Art. 137(2)(b) EC, the Council has to act unanimously in the field o f  social
security and social protection. Art. 137(1) EC points out that the Community measures only
serve to support and complement the activities of the Member States. At the same time, Art.
137(4) EC, introduced by the Nice Treaty, makes clear that those minimum standards “shall
not affect the right o f  Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social
security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof* and “shall
not prevent any Member State from maintaining and introducing more stringent protection
compatible with this Treaty”. Thus the Court’s constant case-law that “Community law does
not detract from the powers o f Member States to organize their social security systems”137 is
still valid. As the Community is only competent to set minimum standards, the organization
o f  social security and insurance remains in the hands o f the Member States. Social insurance
1^ 0
law is a genuine national competence.
The question arises if  there is a fundamental right o f access to social security schemes at the 
Community level. The Court generally recognizes fundamental rights at the Community level: 
“Furthermore, it is well settled that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general 
principles o f law whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws 
inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the 
guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection o f human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or o f which they are signatories. In that regard, the Court
135 KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 289.
136 R. REBHAHN in SCHWARZE, supra note 85, Art. 136 EGV, recital 5.
137 For example: Case 238/82 Duphar v Netherlands, (1984) ECR 523, para. 16 ; Poucet et Pis tre, supra note 1, 
para. 6; Case C-70/95, Sodemare and Others, (1997) ECR 1-3395, para. 27 ; Kohil, supra note 3, para. 17. The 
Court also held up this case-law after the Amsterdam Treaty, see Case C -157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, 
(2001) ECR 1-5473, para. 44.
138 R. GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages fü r  das Internationale Sozialrecht, Heymanns, Köln and others 
1999, at p. 20; KINGREEN, supra note 90, at pp. 297-303.
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has stated that the Convention (the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) -  added 
by the author) has special significance*” 139
With regard to the constitutional traditions of the member states, the situation is very 
heterogeneous. Some constitutions, especially newer ones, contain subjective fundamental 
rights o f access to social security: for example Art. 63 of the Portuguese constitution, Art. 41 
o f  the Spanish constitution, Art. 20 o f the Dutch constitution and Art. 23 No. 2 o f  the Belgian 
constitution (special social rights are also guaranteed in Articles 21 and 22 o f  the Greek 
constitution). The French and the Irish constitution guarantee appropriate support to ensure a 
decent standard o f  living. Other constitutions, like the Danish, the Finnish and the German 
ones (principle o f the welfare state in connection with the right of human dignity), only 
provide for a guarantee o f the subsistence level. Furthermore, many constitutions restrict 
themselves to the declaration o f a social welfare state, for example the Italian, the Swedish 
and the Luxembourg constitution.140 In summary it can be said that a right o f access to social 
security cannot be derived from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States.
With regard to international treaties and covenants, the Court’s main source o f inspiration is 
the ECHR, which does not contain any reference to social security. Articles 22 and 25 of the 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights of 1948 declare rights of access to social security, 
social services and social assistance. Art. 9 o f the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights also declares a right o f access to social security, including social 
insurance. Furthermore the ILO Convention 102 imposes a  duty upon the signatory parties to 
provide social security for large parts of the population, but only for employees. The 
European Social Charter, which has little legal effect and only obliges the signatory states to 
aim at establishing conditions for the effective exercise o f certain rights, declares a  right to 
social security in Art. 12 and a right to social assistance in Art. 13.141 The Community Charter
I
o f the Fundamental Rights o f Workers, a declaratory document without legal effect,142 jj
contains a right to adequate social protection and adequate social security benefits143 for
f
workers and a  general right to social assistance in No. 10. Finally, the Charter o f Fundamental !
Rights o f the European Union recognizes the entitlement to social security benefits and social j
139 Opinion 2/94, Opinion pursuant to Article 228(6) o f  the EC Treaty, (1996) ECRI-1759, para. 33; joined 
Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture, (2003) ECR 1-7411, para. 65.
140 For a summary o f  the different constitutional provisions see E. RIEDEL in J. MEYER (ed.), Kommentar zur 
Charta der Grundrechte der Europäische Union, Baden-Baden 2003, Art. 34 recital 5.
141 Compare the narrow and broad definition o f social security above at pp. 16 seq. and note 90.
142 See also below at p. 36.
143 Here, again, in the narrow sense, see above at pp. 16 seq. and note 90.
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services in Art. 34(1) and the right to social assistance in Art. 34(3). The current legal status 
o f this Charter is not clear. It was drafted at the Cologne Summit in 1999, with a view to 
becoming part o f  the future European Constitution, yet the Member States did not agree to 
confer it with any legal effect.144 Even though some Advocate Generals145 as well as the Court 
o f First Instance,146 have frequently referred to the Charter for the observance of fundamental
rights at the Community level, the European Court of Justice has so far refrained from 
expressly deriving fundamental rights from the Charter.147 148 Thus the Charter has only 
declaratory status and is not legally binding. It can only be employed as a subsidiary help 
for orientation.149 Yet a closer look should be taken at the provisions o f the Charter, because it 
is part of the Constitutional Treaty and might gain high legal importance in the future.
The wording o f  Art. 34(1) of the Charter is problematic. As opposed to the formulation 
“everybody has the right of...” to be found in other fundamental rights provisions, Art. 34 
merely states that “the Union recognizes and respects the entitlement to social security 
benefits and social services (...) in accordance with the rules laid down in Community law 
and national laws and practices.” One reason for this formulation is that the competence for 
social security is a clear competence o f  the Member States; hence the Community must not 
interfere with this competence, but rather respect the right to social security in accordance 
with the respective provisions o f the Member States.150 Thus Art. 34(1) is formulated as a 
negative right against Community interference and not as a positive right providing the
144 See C. COSTELLO, “The Legal Status and Legal Effect of the Charter o f Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union”, in C. COSTELLO, Fundamental Social Rights -  Current European Legal Protection & the 
Challenge o f  the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, Conference Proceedings September 2000 Trinity College 
Dublin, p. 125, atpp. 125-130.
145 For example: Opinion of AG Alber in Case C-340/99, TNT Traco, (2001) ECR1-4109, para. 94; Opinion of 
AG Ceelhoed in Case C-413/99, Baumbast, (2002) ECR 1-7091, para. 59, 110; Opinion of AG Mischo in Booker 
Aquaculture, supra note 139, para. 125; Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-173/99, BECTU, (2001) ECR 1-4881, 
para 26 seq.; AG Leger in his Opinion in Case C-353/99, Heidi Hautala, (2001) ECR 1-9565, para. 51,73-83, 
even claims that “the nature of the rights set down in the Charter o f Fundamental Rights precludes it from being 
regarded as a mere list of purely moral principles without any consequences.(...)... the Charter was intended to 
constitute a privileged instrument for identifying fundamental rights. It is a source of guidance as to the true 
nature of the Community rules of positive law.”
146 Case T-54/99, max.mobil, (2002) ECR II-313, para. 48,57; Case T-177/01, Jego-Quere et Cie SA, (2002) 
ECR 11-2365, para. 42,47; joined Case T-377/00-380/00, T- 260/01 and T-272/01, Philip Morris, (2003) ECR 
II-1, para. 122, where the CFI admits that the Charter does not have legally binding force, but nevertheless uses 
it as an aid for interpretation.
147 See T. SCHMITZ, “Die Grundrechtscharta als Teil der Verfassung der Europäischen Union”, (2004) EuR 
691, at 696 seq.
148 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Baumbast, supra note 145, para. 59; J. STEINER, L. WOODS, Textbook on EC 
Law, 8th ed., OUP, Oxford 2003, at p. 165.
149 SCHMITZ, supra note 147, at 696 seq.
150 For the discussion at the Cologne summit see RIEDEL in MEYER, supra note 140, Art. 34 recital 12 seq. R. 
C. A. WHITE, “Social Security”, in S. PEERS, A. WARD (eds.), The European Union Charter o f  Fundamental 
Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2004, p. 309, at p. 318 interprets this formulation as a reference to 
the ESC and hence assumes that it expresses Art. 34(1 )’s purely promotional character.
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individual with claims against the Community or the Member States.151 With regard to the 
amendment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the Working Group II of the Convention 
on the Charter, it might be more appropriate to speak o f a principle, as opposed to a  subjective 
right. Art. 52(5) o f the amended Charter states that: “The provisions of this Charter which 
contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies o f the Union, and by acts o f  Member States when they are 
implementing Union law, in the exercise o f  their respective powers. They shall be judicially 
cognisable only in the interpretation o f  such acts and in the ruling on their legality”. The 
Explanation to Art. 34(1) in Declaration 12 Concerning Provisions of the Constitution,152 
which has to be given due regard by the courts o f the Union and the Member States according 
to the new Art. 52(7) o f the Charter, describes Art. 34(1) o f  the Charter as a principle. The 
exact legal meaning o f principle in the Charter o f Fundamental Rights is unclear.153 Art. 51(1) 
and the Explanation to Art. 52(5) state that the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union must respect (subjective) rights and observe principles when they are implementing 
Union Law. The Explanation to Art. 52(5) sheds a little bit more light on the opaque meaning 
o f principle. It says that principles must be observed, but do not give rise to direct claims for 
positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member State authorities.154 This Explanation 
approximates the meaning o f principle with what has been called a negative fundamental right 
above. On the other hand, Art. 52(5) clearly states that principles can only be taken into 
account by the courts when interpreting or reviewing acts that implement the principles in | 
question. Yet this is obviously not enough and would deprive Art. 51(1) of its meaning.155 
Principles also have to be observed if  the application o f Community law would infringe them. 
Thus the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights correctly points out:
151 RIEDEL in MEYER, supra note 140, Art. 34 recital 15-17. See also Explanation to Art. 34 o f Declaration 12 
concerning the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights OJ 2004 C310/420, at p. 444: “The 
reference to social services relates to cases in which such services have been introduced to provide certain 
advantages but does not imply that such services must be created where they do not exist.”
152 Declarations Concerning Provisions of the Constitution OJ 2004 C310/420, at p. 444.
153 P. ALSTON, “The Contribution o f the EU Fundamental Rights Agency to the Realization o f Economic and 
Social Rights”, in P. ALSTON, O. DE SCHUTTER (eds.), Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the E U -  The 
Contribution o f  the Fundamental Rights Agency, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2005, p. 159, at pp. 162- 
165 rejects the distinction between “principles” and “subjective rights” entirely and proposes to assume that 
every right in the Charter is simply a fundamental right. Examples of the lack of clarity of the distinction 
between “principles” and “rights” are provided by G. DE BÚRCA, “Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement Has 
Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the European Union”, (2004) 27 Fordham International Law Journal 679, 
at 693 seq. In favor o f a clear restriction o f social and economic rights to principles, see the argument of LORD 
GOLDSMITH Q.C., “A Charter o f Rights, Freedoms and Principles”, (2001) 38 CML Rev. 1201, at 1212 seq. 
See also P. LORBER, “Labour Law”, in S. PEERS, A. WARD (eds.), The European Union Charter o f  
Fundamental Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland 2004, p. 211, at pp. 227 seq.
154 For the legal status o f social fundamental righst lacking a “positive status”, see also LORBER, supra note 
153, atpp. 227 seq.
155 For a criticism o f the constraints Art. 52(5) imposes on the justiciability o f social rights, see DE BÚRCA, 
supra note 153, at 690 seq.
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“Despite the ambiguity of the formula adopted by the drafters o f Art. 52 § 5 of the Charter 
(...), the “principles” set forth by the Charter (...) cannot be relied upon solely for the purpose 
o f interpreting and reviewing the legality of acts that are intended to implement those 
principles; on the contrary, the recognition of those principles by the founding authority is 
helpful where, instead of implementing them, the European legislator or executive commit a 
sufficiently obvious infringement of those principles to justify an annulment by the court.”156 
It must be added that the courts, as well as the legislator and the executive, should take the 
principle o f Art. 34 of the Charter into consideration, at least de lege ferenda , when 
interpreting Community law, for example in the application o f competition law to social 
insurance schemes. Hence it can be said that Art. 34(1) of the Charter (not yet legally binding) 
will contain a fundamental principle (negative fundamental right) o f access to social 
insurance.
Because o f the lack of a right to social security in the ECHR and the different constitutional 
traditions in the Member States, it is difficult to establish a fundamental right to social 
security (be it in the form of a “principle” rather than a “subjective right”) at the Community 
level. Yet taking seriously the Court’s position that it draws inspiration, among others, 
“ ...from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection o f  human rights on 
which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories”157, there are 
strong arguments in favor of a right to social security, especially with regard to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, ILO Convention 102 and an at least implicit effect o f the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The fundamental importance o f  these international norms leads to the conclusion that 
there must be a fundamental right/principle of access to social security at the Community 
level. However, it has to be observed, as evident above,158 that a recognition o f this 
fundamental right must not interfere with the Member States’ competence in the field of 
social security. The limits set by the social security legislation o f the Member States have to 
be respected. Thus the fundamental right o f access to social security can only be a  negative 
fundamental right. It does not provide for positive claims o f social security benefits, but only 
prevents interference of the Community with existing access to social security. In summary, it
156 EU Network o f Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Report on the Situation o f  Fundamental Rights 
in the European Union in 2003, CFR-CDF.repEU.2003.en (Jan 2004), at p. 123. Contra DE BURCA, supra note 
153, at 690 seq., who doubts the justiciability o f social and economic rights beyond implementing acts. In favor 
o f restricting the justiciability of social and economic rights to implementing acts: LORD GOLDSMITH Q.C., 
supra note 153, at 1212 seq.
151 Opinion 2/94, supra note 139, para. 33; Booker Aquaculture^ supra note 139, para. 65.
158 See above at pp. 25 seq.
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can be assumed that there is a negative fundamental right (or, in the language o f the revised 
Charter o f  Fundamental Rights, a fundamental principie) o f access to social security in the 
framework set by the social security schemes o f the Member States.
Apart from the existence of a fundamental right o f access to social security at the Community 
level, several provisions of the EC Treaty clearly recognize social security. Thus Art. 2 EC 
declares the promotion of a high level o f social protection as one of the tasks o f the 
Community. Similarly Art. 3(j) EC declares a Community policy in the social sphere as one 
o f its activities. Art. 136 EC repeats that the Community and the Member States shall have as 
their objectives the promotion o f proper social protection. Furthermore Art. 137(l)(c) and (k) 
EC states that the Community shall support and complement the activities o f the Member 
States in the field o f social security and social protection o f  workers and in the field of the 
modernization o f social protection systems. According to Art. 140 EC, the Commission shall 
encourage cooperation between the Member States and facilitate the coordination of their 
action in matters relating to social security. Lastly, Art. 143 EC provides for an annual report 
o f the Commission on, among other matters, social protection and Art. 144 EC provides for 
the establishment o f a Social Protection Committee with advisory status to promote 
cooperation on social protection policies between Member States and with the Commission.
De lege ferenda  the negative fundamental right to/principle o f  social security will become part 
o f the primary law o f the Community as Art. 11-94 o f  the new Constitution. The promotion of 
social protection will become a main objective o f the Union as declared in Art. 1-3(3) of the 
Constitutional Treaty. The cross-sectional clause o f Art. III-l 17 will oblige the Union to take 
into account the guarantee o f adequate social protection in defining and implementing the 
policies referred to in Part III o f the Constitution, among them competition law (Section 
Five).
In summary it can be said that the EC Treaty attaches great importance to social security and 
social insurance and that it has a constitutional rank in the Treaty. Furthermore, a coherent 
interpretation o f the different international and European treaties and declarations for the 
protection of human rights leads to the result that there is a (negative) fundamental 
right/fundamental principle o f access to social security at the Community level.
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3. Collective Bargaining
a) Objectives
Collective bargaining means that employees do not negotiate individually, but collectively 
with the employees). They associate, usually in a trade union, to bargain either with a single 
employer or an employers* association.159 ILO Convention 98 defines collective bargaining as 
“voluntary negotiations between employers or employers’ organizations and workers* 
organizations, with a view to the regulation o f terms and conditions of employment by 
collective agreements”. One can distinguish between collective bargaining in a broad and in a 
narrow sense. The broad definition covers all sorts o f bipartite or tripartite discussions 
concerning labor problems. The narrow meaning focuses on discussions leading to binding 
agreements - either de facto , morally or legally binding -  and usually confined to both sides of 
the industry (bipartite).160 In the following section collective bargaining is to be understood in 
the narrower sense, because the issue in question is not collective bargaining itself, but its 
results, i.e. the collective agreements.
The bargaining procedure can take place at national, sectoral or company level. Usually, 
collective bargaining occurs on different levels in the Member States.161 1623Collective bargaining 
is supposed to eventually lead to the conclusion of collective agreements. The contents of 
these agreements are diverse, depending on the national law. The COLCOM-project, a
study conducted in 1999/2000 to assess the relationship between competition law and 
collective agreements at the European and national level after the Albarty-cases, has 
compared the legally possible contents of collective agreements in ten Member States. 
National reports by different scholars served as a basis for the comparative overview. The 
study found that there is a wide scope o f  different possible contents of collective agreements
159 F. GAMILLSCHHG, Kollektives Arbeitsrecht: ein Lehrbuch, Band /, C.H. Beck, Miinchen 1997, a tp . 1.
160 For the distinction between the broad and narrow term “collective bargaining” see G. J. BAMBER, P. 
SHELDON, “Collective Bargaining” in R. BLANPAIN, C. ENGELS (eds.), Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in Industrialized Markets Economies, 5* ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague and 
others 2001, Chapter 22, p. 549, at p. 550.
161 For an overview o f the different procedures and levels in the Member States, see European Foundation for the 
Improvement o f Living and Working Conditions, Industrial relations developments in Europe 2003, Office for 
Official Publications o f the European Communities, Luxembourg 2004, at pp. 34-39. This publication can be 
found on the internet at http://www.eurofound.eu.int/publications/files/EF0477EN.pdf. See also Commission of 
the European Communities, Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2004, Office for Official Publications o f the European Communities, Luxembourg 2004, at pp. 29-50.
162 N. BRUUN, J. HELLSTEN (eds.), Collective agreements and competition law in the EU: the report o f  the 
C OL COM- Project, Iustus Fbrlag, Uppsala 2001.
163 Albany, Brentjens, and Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2.
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in the various Member States, ranging from a relatively narrow enumeration o f employment 
conditions in section 178(2) TULCRA in the UK164 to a  rather broad competence o f the 
parties to collective agreements. In Germany the constitutional fundamental right o f  collective 
bargaining in Art. 9 III GG covers “conditions o f work and economy”, whereby collective 
agreements themselves are actually restricted to conditions o f  work and it is controversial 
whether the term “conditions o f economy” has a separate meaning. I f  so, this term is restricted 
to the possibility o f widening the scope of the rights o f work councils by collective 
agreements and to anti-rationalization clauses in collective agreements.165 In France, in 
addition to regular working conditions, supplementary social security is covered by collective 
agreements;166 in Belgium the term employment conditions is widely interpreted and includes 
regulation of recruitment and selection o f  employees;167 and in Spain even economic matters 
can be covered, but there are many restrictions to collective agreements and they can be 
challenged because o f  damage to a third party.168 Probably the widest scope o f  collective 
agreements exists in Greece, where even the reorganization o f  production, changing the object 
o f an enterprise and the general perspectives of production can be included in collective 
agreements.169 Yet all the different national systems have one common denominator: all 
collective agreements deal with the individual and/or collective relationship between 
employers and employees -  all of them have as their objective the regulation o f  employment 
conditions.170
There are different purposes o f collective bargaining. In order to better understand these 
purposes, it is helpful to examine the history o f collective bargaining. The beginning o f  
collective bargaining in the modem sense took place in the 19th century. The invention of the 
steam engine and the building of railroads in England resulted in a division o f  labor at the 
machine. This division o f labor led to an alienation o f worker and product; the worker, being 
only part o f a production process, could not identify with the final product. The alienation was 
furthered by delocalization. While in medieval times the apprentices and craftsmen lived in 
the building where the master lived and where the workshop was situated, the factory and the
164 See B. BERCUSSON in BRUUN, HELLSTEN, supra note 162, at p. 213.
165 See T. BLANKE in BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, at pp.l 51 seq.; G. SCHAUB, U. KOCH, R. 
LrNCK, Arbeitsrechts-Handbuch -  Systematische Darstellung und Nachschlagewerk fü r die Praxis, 11* ed., 
C.H. Beck, München 2005, at § 200, recital 3-9.
166 C. VIGNEAU in BRUUN, HELLSTEN (ed.), supra note 162, at p. 141.
167 P. HUMBLET and M. RIGAUX in BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, at pp. 99 seq.
16S A. OJEDA AVILES in BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, pp. 178 seq.
169 VON WALL WITZ, supra note 51, at p. 130.
170 See the overview table in BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, p. 221 seq. and the general definition 
of collective bargaining as well as a comparative (historical) overview in BAMBER, SHELDON, supra note
160, at p. 549 and at pp. 570-573.
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home became two different sites in the age of industrialization. Industrialization was 
supported by urbanization, the poor peasants streaming into the towns looking for industrial 
labor. The philosophical response to this development was provided by the emergence of 
liberalism. All these factors led to a capitalist, laissez-faire industrial society. The legal, 
formal equality o f  employer and employee was de facto  contradicted by a huge imbalance of 
economic power. This imbalance o f power eventually led to the exploitation and 
pauperization of workers. Competition between workers caused wage dumping, so that wages 
did not suffice to lead a dignified life. In order to survive, the entire family, including the 
children, were forced to work. One response to this unbearable situation was the foundation of 
trade unions and the emergence o f collective bargaining to counterbalance the power o f  the 
employers.171 The first European state which allowed the foundation of trade unions was the 
UK in 1824,172 on the continent the first association was not allowed until the revolution in 
1848 in France and Germany.173
Thus the main reason to bargain collectively was the imbalance of power between the 
employer and the employee, and this holds true today. The employer owns the means of 
production and thus has the power to distribute the profits and to give orders, whereas the 
employee depends on his employment to lead a dignified life, to nourish himself and his 
family.174 175This is not to deny that there are highly-qualified workers who are economically 
independent and can use their skills as investment capital. Yet the overwhelming majority of 
workers depend economically on the employers. Once the employee is integrated in the 
company, this economic dependence is enhanced by institutional dependence.176 Almost 
every democratic legal order acknowledges this economic imbalance o f power and provides 
legal means, for example collective bargaining, to mitigate the results o f this inequality.177 178
17ftThe coalition of workers forms a counterbalance to the power o f the employers.
171 Regarding social development in the 19th century see GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at pp. 83-94 and 
BAMBER, SHELDON, supra note 160, at pp. 550 seq. For a description of the situation o f the working class in 
England see F. ENGELS, Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England: nach eigener Anschauung und 
authentischen Quellen, O. Wigand, Leipzig 1845.
172 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 89, K  W. WEDDERBURN, The Worker and The Law, 3rd edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 1986, at pp. 515 seq.
173 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 9 1.
174 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, atp. 3 seq.; H. WIEDEMANN in H. WIEDEMANN (ed.), 
Tarifvertragsgesetz: mit Durchfuhrungs- und Nebenvorschriften: Kommentar, 6th ed., C.H. Beck, München 
1999, Einl. recital 3.
175 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 4.
176 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, atp. 6; D. REUTER, “Betriebsverfassung und Privatautonomie“, (1975) 
ZfA. 85, at 86 seq.
177 For examples, see GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 4 seq..
178 WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 3.
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From an economic perspective, collective bargaining means founding a workforce cartel and 
erasing competition between the workers to a certain extent. This cartel raises wages (labor 
prices) and shortens working time (supply) by setting minimum standards. The necessity of 
the workforce cartel can be explained by the imperfection o f the labor market. While in usual 
markets for goods and services the decrease of price under marginal costs o f production leads 
to a shortage of supply (in order to raise prices again) or the exit o f  market actors, the opposite 
is the case in the labor market. The individual depends on his employment and the wages to 
lead a dignified life, hence a decrease in wages leads to an increase in supply, i.e. working 
time (the so-called anomalous curve o f  supply on the labor market).* 180 This is even the case if 
wages fall under marginal costs, i.e. the amount o f money a  worker needs to have a decent 
standard o f living. In a normal market for goods and services, the entrepreneur would leave 
the market if  prices were lower than his marginal costs o f production. This exit option is very 
limited for the worker,181 who depends on offering his work in the relevant labor market he is 
qualified for.182
The possibility that wages are pushed under marginal costs o f  living is particularly strong in 
labor markets, where a large number o f employees face a relatively small number o f 
employers, leading to a high elasticity o f demand for labor. Competition would cause a 
decrease o f wages and quality o f working conditions combined with an additional supply o f 
work, which would cause an even greater lowering o f employment standards, hence a race to 
the bottom.183 This is especially true in times of high unemployment184 and for lowly qualified 
workers. Of course there are also other means to prevent a race to the bottom, for example 
social assistance. Yet social assistance only covers, depending on the national system, the 
essential costs o f living, which often do not correspond to the individual marginal costs o f
,79 WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 34 seq.
180 W. DÄUBLER, Tarifvertragsrecht-Ein Handbuch, 3rd ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1993, 
recital 27; This special feature of the labor market was also recognized by ordoliberal scholars, see EUCKEN, 
Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, supra note 11, at pp. 303 seq.
181 An employee usually lacks the capital to enter the markets for goods and services as an alternative.
182 G. KORDEL, Arbeitsmarkt und Europäisches Kartellrecht, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln and others 2004, at 
p. 55 actually states that the exit of inefficient workers into unemployment is efficient and hence positive, 
because their marginal costs are too high. This example illustrates how inhuman and immoral a neo-classical 
perception of the market can be, which does not care about the well-being o f people, but only worships an 
abstract idol called “efficiency”.
183 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, atp. 496; W. MÖSCHEL, “Tarifautonomie-ein überholtes 
Ordnungsmodell?”, (1995) WuW 704, at 709 claims that this model is unrealistic, because it considers workers as 
a homogeneous group, not taking into account the differences between different professions; in the same vein 
also see KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 53-55.
184 See GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 496.
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living. It is socially stigmatized and means social descent for the employee. Dependence on 
social assistance often causes low self-esteem and mental health problems, because the 
employee cannot find fulfillment in a job. Hence social assistance should be regarded as a 
supplement to collective bargaining, not as a  substitute.
As opposed to undertakings, which own real capital, employees only own human capital, 
which is inseparably connected to their person and much more immobile and difficult to 
transfer.185 This means that the relevant geographic labor market is relatively limited and an 
efficient allocation o f  the human capital o f  workforce is much more difficult to attain than an 
efficient allocation o f  real capital. This also limits the exit options of the employee and puts 
him at a competitive disadvantage compared to the employer. The structural imbalance on the 
labor market, the dependence and immobility of the workers, makes this market imperfect. 
Competition would not yield the most effective results; wages and labor conditions would not 
represent the competitive price for work under equal conditions between supply and 
demand.186 The prevention of competition, caused by collective agreements at the sectoral and 
national level, also prevents the employers from competing on the cost factor labor, thus 
enabling them to offer better working conditions without the risk of becoming 
uncompetitive.187 Historical evidence from the period before the legalization of collective 
bargaining shows how the lack of collective bargaining in the labor market causes 
exploitation and pauperization of workers.188 The function of collective agreements to prevent 
this exploitation and pauperization can be called the protection function for the employees.189
Yet collective bargaining not only serves the interest o f the workers. It saves the employer 
transaction costs that would occur if he was to negotiate every employment condition 
individually.190 19Throughout the duration o f the collective agreement, the employer benefits 
from the peace effect on labor relations {peace function)}91 Furthermore collective bargaining
185 WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 77.
186 This is not to say that the wages attained by collective agreements represent competitive wages. Often they 
may range over the competitive level.
187 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 499 seq.; WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 35.
188 Contra KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 54 and MÔSCHEL, supra note 183, at 709, who deny any empirical 
evidence for the “race to the bottom” hypothesis. It must be conceded that the situation before the legalization of 
collective bargaining cannot be compared to a competitive market order, because the laissez-faire capitalism of 
the 19th century lacked competition law and thus allowed employers to form demand cartels for labor.
189 R. J. VAN DEN BERGH, P. D. CAMESASCA, “Irreconcilable Principles? The Court o f Justice Exempts 
Collective Labour Agreements from the Wrath o f Antitrust”, (2000) 25 E.L Rev. 492, at 502; WIEDEMANN, 
supra note 174, Einl. recital 3.
190 WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 15.
191 GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 500.
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fulfills an order function  in the labor market by regulating labor relations. It has a 
rationalizing and a rulemaking effect in the field of industrial relations.192 Additionally, it 
creates a  fair distribution of wages and a basic equality of wages and it influences, where the 
collective agreement is concluded at sectoral or national level, the overall structure o f wages 
{distribution function).193 Yet it is still controversial whether collective bargaining actually 
leads to a redistribution o f the gross national product in favor o f the employees.194 195Collective 
agreements cause social justice and social peace as well as a certain level of equality for the 
employees and they contribute to general economic welfare by avoiding costly industrial 
conflicts.
In summary, collective agreements developed from the misery o f  the working class in the 19th 
century. Workers had to establish cartels o f labor to strengthen their bargaining position 
against employers. A core objective o f  collective bargaining is hence the collective 
negotiation o f employment conditions, as could also be seen from the comparative overview. 
Next to its main functions of protection o f  employees and social peace, collective agreements 
-  at least at a sectoral and national level - also fulfill functions o f redistribution and order o f  
industrial relations. They are thus an important factor in the establishment o f  distributive 
justice.
b) Legal ran k
Collective bargaining is still restricted to a national level in Europe and hence mainly 
regulated by national law. Even though certain collective agreements at Community level 
exist within the framework o f the social dialogue according to Art. 138 seq. EC196 and the 
European Work Council according to Council Directive 94/45/EC197 and workers’ 
participation might lead to collective agreements in the European Company according to
192 BAMBER, SHELDON, supra note 160, at p. 564; GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, at p. 498 seq.; 
WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 13-19.
193 BAMBER, SHELDON, supra note 160, at p. 563; WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 7, 8.
194 WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 9-11.
195 BAMBER, SHELDON, supra note 160, at p. 563; GAMILLSCHEG, supra note 159, atpp. 500 seq.; O. 
VON NELL-BREUNING, “Wilhelm Herschel zum 90. Geburtstag“, (1985) AuR 297; VAN DEN BERGH, 
CAMESASCA, supra note 189, at 502; WIEDEMANN, supra note 174, Einl. recital 27-29.
196 See M. E. BLAS LOPEZ, La mutation des partenaires sociaux en Europe en réponse à la globalisation de 
l'économie, EUI Working Paper, RSC 2005/_ (forthcoming), at pp. 15 seq.; regarding the limited scope of 
European collective agreements see Commission o f the European Communities, Industrial Relations in Europe 
2004, supra note 161, at pp. 71-108.
197 See BLAS LOPEZ, supra note 196, at pp. 18-21; L. TURNER, “The Europeanization of Labour: Structure 
before action”, ( 1996) EJIR 325, at 332-337.
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Council Directive 2001/86/EC,198 19 the range and coverage o f  these forms of collective 
bargaining is still very restricted and negligible compared to the importance of national 
collective bargaining. A Community framework for transnational collective bargaining 
about core subjects like wages has not yet developed.200
The next question is what rank collective bargaining occupies in the hierarchy o f legal norms 
in the EC. First the question arises whether there is a fundamental right to collective 
bargaining at the Community level. Again, it must be noticed that in establishing fundamental 
Community rights “ ...the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the 
protection o f human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or o f which they 
are signatories. In that regard, the Court has stated that the Convention (the ECHR -  added by 
the author) has special significance.”201 203
Firstly, it can be observed that there is a constitutional guarantee o f collective bargaining or 
anchoring via an expressed right to strike only in some Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden). In the ECHR, to which the Court attaches great 
importance when defining fundamental Community rights, Art. 11 guarantees the right of 
association and to form and join trade unions. The European Court of Human Rights also 
derived the right to certain collective actions of trade unions from Art. 11 (1) ECHR, but 
did not recognize the right to strike.204 It must be noted that neither the right o f  association nor 
the right to collective action derived from the ECHR necessarily include a right to collective 
bargaining. The same is true o f the right o f  association agreed upon by the Member States in 
the ILO Conventions 87 and 98, whereby Art. 4 of ILO Convention 98 does not declare a 
right to collective bargaining, but only asks the signatory parties to encourage and promote 
collective negotiations. Similarly, Art. 8 o f  the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights establishes a right to form and join trade unions and to strike, but no 
expressive right to collective bargaining. The same is the case with Art. 22 o f  the International
198 See BLAS LOPEZ, supra note 196, at pp. 23-31.
199 See R. BLANPAIN, European Labour Law, 9th ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague and others 2003, 
recital 965-974.
200 BLANPAIN, supra note 199, recital 1013. For the limited scope of European collective agreements see 
Commission o f the European Communities, Industrial Relations in Europe 2004, supra note 161, atpp. 35 seq.
201 Opinion 2/94, supra note 139, para. 33; Booker Aquaculture, supra note 139, para. 65.
202 Case C-260/89, ERTy (1991) ECR 1-2925, para. 41; Opinion 2/94, supra note 139, para. 33.
203 National Union o f  Belgian Police v Belgium, 27 October 1975, Eur. Court HR Rep., Series A, 19 (1975), 
para. 40.
04 Schmidt and Dahlstrdm v Sweden, 6 February 1976, Eur. Court HR Rep., Series A, 21 (1976), para. 36.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. At the European level (Council o f Europe), there 
exists Art. 6 o f the European Social Charter, in which the parties to the Charter recognized 
“the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively”. At the Community level, No. 12 of 
the Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers declared: “Employers or 
employers’ organisations, on the one hand, and workers’ organisations, on the other, shall 
have the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements under the conditions laid down 
by national legislation and practice”.
In his 1999 opinion in the Albany-cascs, AG Jacobs came to the controversial and heavily I
i
cnticized conclusion that the above quoted provisions did not suffice to establish a 
fundamental right o f  collective bargaining at the Community level.205 06 2078 He drew a distinction 
between: a) the right o f association, b) the right to collective action and c) the right to 
collective bargaining. With regard to the Community Charter o f  the Fundamental Rights o f 
Workers, the Advocate General pointed out that this Charter had little legal effect. It was not a 
legal act o f the Community, but only a  political declaration o f eleven o f the then twelve 
Member States. Jacobs admitted that Art. 6 ESC contained a provision concerning 
collective bargaining, yet he did not consider this provision to constitute an enforceable 
fundamental right, but rather a  policy goal. With regard to the other international norms and 
treaties mentioned above, especially Art. 11 ECHR, he stated that they included a right o f  
association and a right to collective action, yet no right to collective bargaining. He 
furthermore pointed out the absence o f the recognition o f a right to collective bargaining in 
the case-law o f  the European Court o f Human Rights, referring to the judgment in 
Gustafsson208 The Advocate General concluded that there was no commonly accepted 
fundamental right o f collective bargaining in the international agreements or the constitutions 
o f the Member States and thus no fundamental right o f collective bargaining at the 
Community level.209 The Court avoided this topic by the creation of the non-statutory labor 
exemption and thus failed to establish an explicit fundamental right to collective bargaining.
However, it might be necessary to revise this conclusion with regard to recent legal 
developments. The Amsterdam Treaty inserted in Art. 136 EC an explicit reference to
205 See, for example, B. BERCUSSON, “Freedom of Association and Fundamental Trade Union Rights”, Annex 
2, in ETUI (ed.), A Legal Framework fo r  European Industrial Relations, Brussels 1999, p. 7, at pp. 29-38; T. 
BLANKE, “Anmerkung zu EuGH Urt. v. 21.9.1999 -  Rs. C-67/96”, (2000) AuR 28, at 29.
206 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 132-161.
207 See also KINGREEN, supra note 90, at p. 291.
208 Gustafsson v Sweden, 25 April 1996, R.J.D., 1996-11, No. 9.
209 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, (1999) ECR-5751, 5787 seq., para. 132-161.
36
“fundamental social rights as those set out in the European Social Charter (...)  and in the 
1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights o f Workers”, hence, at least indirectly, 
referring to the fundamental right to collective bargaining in Art. 6 ESC and No. 12 CCFRW. 
Yet it must be noticed that this reference does not establish any subjective rights, nor does it 
make any o f  the Charters in question an integral part o f Community law and it remains 
doubtful if the Charters can serve as guidelines for the interpretation of Community law.210 
The 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work expressly 
recognizes the right to collective bargaining in Art. 2(a). Though this declaration only 
includes soft-law,211 21* the ILO Member States are obliged to comply with the declared 
standards, even if  they have not ratified the respective Conventions (Art. 2 o f  the 
Declaration). Thus the 1998 ILO Declaration is directly legally binding for all Member States 
o f  the ILO. The EC is not itself a member o f the ILO, but its Member States are. It must be 
noted that so far the ECJ, when establishing fundamental rights at the Community level, has 
never referred to the Constitution o f the ILO, the Philadelphia Declaration, the ILO 
Conventions or the 1998 Declaration. Its main reference has been the ECHR. In the same 
vein, Art. 6(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU) refers only to the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States as sources o f inspiration for 
fundamental Community rights. Yet taking into account that one source of fundamental rights 
in the EC is, according to the case-law, “the guidelines supplied by international treaties for 
the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or o f which 
they are signatories” and that Art. 6(2) TEU has not altered this jurisprudence, there is no
reason not to derive fundamental rights from the core labor rights declared in the 1998 ILO 
Declaration, which is binding for all Member States.214
Furthermore, Art. 28 o f the Charter o f Fundamental Rights o f the European Union now 
declares a fundamental right o f workers or employers, or their respective organizations, to 
“negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels”. Since Art. 28 clearly 
declares a fundamental right and not a principle, -  “workers and employers, or their 
respective organisations, have ( ...)  the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements”
210 R. REBHAHN in SCHWARZE, supra note 85, Artikel 136, recital 10 seq.
211 For a critique of this new soft-law approach see P. ALSTON,“ “Core Labour Standards” and the
Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime”, (2004) 15 EJIL 457.
212 Opinion 2/94, supra note 139, para. 33.
213 Booker Aquaculture^ supra note 139, para. 65 seq.; COSTELLO, supra note 144, at pp. 135 seq.
2,4 P. O’HIGGINS, “The interaction of the ILO, the Council of Europe and European Union labor standards” in
B. HEPPLE (ed.), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context, CUP, Cambridge 2002, p. 55, at p. 63.
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iitiiiiii ------*
(Italics added by the author)- the debate concerning the legal meaning o f principle is not 
relevant in this context.215
Taking into account: the 1998 ILO Declaration o f Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work; the importance the Amsterdam Treaty attached to the European Social Charter and the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights o f Workers; and the at least implicit effect of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on the interpretation o f Community 
law,216 an overall view of these provisions leads to the conclusion that there is a fundamental 
right to collective bargaining at the Community level. In particular the impact o f  the 1998 j 
ILO Declaration o f  Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work leads to the result that there is 
nowadays a fundamental Community right to collective bargaining.217 
De lege ferenda it is clear that Art. 11-88 o f the European Constitution will contain a 
fundamental right o f  collective bargaining.
Apart from the existence of a fundamental right o f collective bargaining, there are other 
provisions in the EC Treaty which make it clear that the EC accepts and respects collective 
bargaining both at national and European level. As will be seen below,218 both AG Jacobs219 
and the Court220 could refer in the Albany cases to Articles 2, 3(1)0), 136, 138-140 EC (as 
they are now numbered) to show the importance Community law attaches to collective 
bargaining and to create a non-statutory exemption for collective agreements from 
competition law.221 With the emergence o f  a  fundamental right to collective bargaining at the 
Community level, the reference to those general provisions has become superfluous and only
2.5 See for this discussion above at pp. 26 seq. For an overview o f labor rights in the context of the Charter see 
LORBER, supra note 153, p. 211, especially at pp. 220 seq.
2.6 B. FITZGERALD, “European Union Law and the Council o f  Europe Conventions”, in C. COSTELLO (ed.), 
Fundamental Social Rights-  Current European Legal Protection & the Challenge o f the E V  Charter on 
Fundamental Rights, Conference Proceedings September 2000 Trinity College Dublin, p. 95, atp. 103 states: “It 
is difficult to imagine either an Advocate General or the Court refusing to acknowledge a right to bargain 
collectively once it is included in the EU Charter.”
217 Von Wallwitz arrived at the same conclusion for the period before 1998, see VON WALLWITZ, supra note 
51, atpp. 127-132.
2.8 See below at pp. 71 seq.
2.9 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 165-194. The AG states at para. 179 that the provisions 
promoting collective bargaining have the same rank as Art. 81 seq.
220 Albany, supra note 2, para. 54-60.
221 The Court has been criticized for having used the European Social Dialogue, among others, to exempt 
national collective agreements from Community competition law, see S. SCI ARRA, “Market freedom and 
fundamental social rights”, in B. HEPPLE(ed.), Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context, CUP, Cambridge 
2002, p. 95, atp. 107; S. VOUSDEN, “Albany, Market Law and Social Exclusion”, (2000) IL J 181, at 188.Yet 
the European Social Dialogue is only one example to demonstrate that the EC recognizes collective bargaining 
as a legitimate regulatory tool.
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serves as an additional argument to emphasize the legal importance o f collective bargaining 
within the Community.
4. Summary
Competition law, collective bargaining and social insurance have a prominent legal rank in 
Community law. While competition law is a keystone of the Community’s economic 
constitution and legal order, collective bargaining and social insurance also have a 
constitutional rank in the EC Treaty. It is submitted that there is both a fundamental right to 
collective bargaining and a (negative) fundamental right/principle of access to social 
insurance at the Community level.
Competition law serves to protect economic freedom, the process of competition, market 
integration and efficiency. These objectives are to be achieved by, among other means, the 
prevention and/or control of monopolies and the prohibition o f  cartels. Social insurance aims 
to provide large parts o f the population with insurance against the social risks o f life by 
mechanisms o f solidarity and redistribution o f wealth. Social insurance can only maintain 
financial equilibrium by monopolization and/or the introduction o f  anticompetitive measures 
that ensure solidarity. Collective bargaining protects workers in the labor market and 
fulfills the functions o f creation o f social peace, redistribution and ensuring order in industrial 
relations. In order to achieve its aims, collective bargaining necessarily involves the creation 
o f  cartels of workers in the labor market. Thus there seems to be an inherent contradiction 
between competition law on the one hand and collective bargaining as well as social 
insurance on the other hand.
Yet this is not necessarily the case. From an ordoliberal and social market economy point of 
view, competition law serves as a tool to create a humane market, which is based on 
economic freedom. This freedom should not be understood as an unrestricted laissez-faire 
freedom, but rather as a material freedom that provides equal opportunities for all. Social 
insurance provides the necessary material background for exercising freedom. Without 2
222 For the theory of the downward spiral that would occur, if social insurance was subject to competition, see 
below at pp. 88 seq.
39
insurance against social risks, the very existence o f human beings would be constantly 
threatened by contingent externalities. Undeiprivileged groups o f society are in particular 
need o f a system o f social insurance, which protects them against these negative externalities 
and hence provides them with the indispensable material base for exercising their (economic) 
freedom.
The labor market, as illustrated above, involves a structural disadvantage for the workers, 
which can be mitigated by collective bargaining. Thus collective bargaining can serve as a 
means to create material freedom and independence o f  workers from their employers.
The question at stake here is how a possible legal collision between competition law, 
collective bargaining and social insurance can be dealt with. The following part o f  this thesis 
shall discuss the European Courts’ approach to the relation between competition law, 
collective bargaining and social insurance in the Community’s legal framework. Afterwards 
an original solution o f how to solve this problem will be provided.
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III. Critique of the current case-law of the ECJ and the CFI
Having identified the objectives o f the different fields of law and the rank they have in EC 
law, it is now necessary to analyze and critique the case-law of the ECJ and the CFI 
concerning the collision between these fields o f law.
1. The case-law in the field of social insurance and competition law
The two Courts sought to resolve the collision between social insurance law and competition 
law  with a new definition of the term “undertaking” in the field of social security. The 
following section shall present an overview of the case-law, and then examine the problems of 
the approach taken by the Courts.
a) T he relationship between the social insurance fund and the insured
There have been a number of cases dealing with the relationship between the insurance fund 
and the insured since 1993. The starting point of the case-law was the case Poucet et Pistre. 
Mr. Poucet and Mr. Pistre objected to a demand to pay obligatory contributions to a sickness 
and maternity insurance fund and to the National Independent Old-Age Insurance Fund for 
Craftsmen. They did not challenge compulsory insurance per se, but they did challenge the 
monopoly position o f  the funds in question. Both plaintiffs claimed that the funds held a 
dominant position enabling them to prevent other insurance companies from offering the 
insurance contracts in question in France, thus infringing Art. 82 EC. The national court 
referred the question to the ECJ of whether the funds could be considered undertakings for the 
purposes o f EC competition law.23 24 * In its findings the Court firstly emphasized that 
Community law did not detract from the powers of the Member States to organize their social 
security systems, referring to the case Duphar v Netherlands?25 The Court then referred to 
different features o f  the social insurance schemes in question:
223 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1.
224 Report of the Hearing in Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1,638 seq. and judgment 666 seq., para. 1-4.
223 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 6; Duphar v Netherlands, supra note 137, para. 16.
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1. The schemes pursued a social objective, i.e. they were intended to provide cover for all the 
insured against different risks, regardless of the financial situation and the state o f health of 
the insured at the time of affiliation.226 27
2. They embodied the principle of solidarity. In the sickness and maternity scheme, the 
contributions were proportional to a person’s income or retirement pensions. The benefits, on 
the other hand, were identical for all those who received them. In the old age insurance 
scheme, the solidarity was embodied in the fact that active workers financed the pensions o f 
the retired by their contributions. Furthermore pensions were granted even in cases where no 
contributions had been made and pension rights were not proportional to the contributions 
paid. Additionally there was solidarity between the different funds, those in surplus 
contributed to the financing o f those in difficulties.
3. The compulsory contributions and affiliation were indispensable for the application of the 
principle o f  solidarity.228
4. The management o f the schemes was entrusted by statute to social insurance funds, which 
were controlled by the state.229 2301
5. In fulfilling their obligations, the funds merely applied the law. They could not influence 
the amount o f the contributions, the use o f assets and the fixing o f  the level o f benefits.
The Court defined the term “undertaking” according to the case Hôfner v Riser as “every 
entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status and the way it is 
financed.” Paying attention to the features described above, the Court came to the 
conclusion that the social insurance funds in this case could not be considered 
undertakings.232 The ECJ claimed that the activity o f the funds was not an economic activity, 
because they a) fulfilled an exclusively social function, b) the activity was based on the 
principle o f national solidarity, c) the activity was entirely non-profit making and d) the 
benefits were statutory and had no relation to the amount o f contributions (combining the 
feature o f solidarity and of mere fulfilment o f the law).233
226 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 8 seq.
227 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 10-12.
22S r  rPoucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 13.
229 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 14.
230 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 15.
231 Case C-41/90 Hôfner v Elser, (1991) ECR 1-1979, para. 21; Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 17.
232 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 19 seq.
233 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 18 seq. For a deeper analysis o f  this case, see P. LAIGRE, “Les 
organismes de Sécurité sociale sont-ils des entreprises?”, (1993) Droit Social 488.
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It should be noted that the pension scheme in Poucet et Pistre was a statutory basic scheme 
and can thus be considered to belong to the first pillar o f pension insurance. It was financed 
by the pay-as-you-go method and not by capitalization.
The next case in which the Court had to deal with competition law and social insurance was 
Fédération Française234 The old-age insurance funds for farmers in question in this case 
differed in decisive points from those in Poucet et Pistre. The funds provided supplementary, 
optional insurance services and operated according to the principle o f capitalization (second 
pillar scheme). The insured could choose to pay contribution rates o f either 4.5% or 7.0% of 
their earned income. The benefits depended on these contribution rates. On the other hand, the 
funds were, like those in Poucet et Pistre, non-profit making and their management was 
subject to state control. Membership was regulated by law and independent from risks. The 
investment decisions o f the fund were regulated by ministerial decision and were subject to 
supervision by the Cour des Comptes. Furthermore, the scheme exhibited additional features 
o f  solidarity: in the case of illness of more than six months duration, an exemption from or 
reduction o f contributions could be granted, which was financed by a levy on the 
contributions. The payment of contributions could be suspended because o f the economic 
situation o f the insured’s agricultural enterprise. The contributions were not linked to the 
different insured risks and in case o f an early death of an insured his entitlements were placed 
at the disposal of the scheme.
The Court had to again address the question of whether the fund in question was an 
undertaking in the sense of Art. 81 seq. EC. Referring to the definition in Hefner v Eisner234 536 
and to its judgment in Poucet et Pistre,237 238the Court held in this case that the fund had to be 
considered an undertaking. It stressed that membership was optional, the scheme was based 
on capitalization and the benefits depended on the contributions paid by the insured and the 
results of the investments made by the fund. This placed the fund in (at least potential) 
competition with private life insurance companies and showed that the fund was engaged in 
an economic activity.239 The above-mentioned elements of solidarity in the scheme did not 
suffice for the Court to come to a different conclusion, because the optional character o f the
234 Fédération Française, supra note 105.
235 For the different features of the fiind, see in detail Opinion of AG Tesauro in Fédération Française, supra 
note 105, para. 6-9; Judgment of the Court, Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 1-14.
236 Hôfner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 21.
237 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 17.
238 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 14,22.
239 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 17.
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scheme allegedly limited the scope o f its solidarity.240 The Court added that the pursuit of a 
social purpose, the existing requirements o f solidarity and the different legal rules governing 
the scheme did not prevent the fund’s activity from being regarded as an economic activity.241 
The non-profit making character did not deprive this activity o f its economic character either, 
because the activity might lead to behavior the competition rules try to prevent.242
Compared to Poucet et Pistre, it can be observed that neither the social purpose nor the non­
profit making character of the fund, nor its restricted elements o f solidarity and a certain 
influence o f the state were decisive in this case. It appears rather that the Court made a 
distinction between statutory first pillar pension schemes, based on the pay-as-you-go 
principle, and supplementary, optional second pillar schemes, based on capitalization.
In the Albany,243 Brentjens244 and Drijvende Bokken,245 triplet o f cases, the Court had to 
consider Dutch supplementary sectoral pension schemes established by collective agreements i 
and made compulsory for all enterprises in the sector by ministerial decree at the request of 
the social partners (again, second pillar schemes). As opposed to Fédération Française, the 
insurance schemes were compulsory. The funds operated, similar to those in Fédération 
Française, according to the principle o f capitalization, yet the level o f contributions and 
benefits was fixed by the fund and not optional. The benefits depended on the costs of 
management, reserves and results o f  the investments. There were certain elements o f 
solidarity involved: there was no selection of risks and the contributions were independent 
from the insured risk. Furthermore benefits, i.e. pension rights, were determined according to 
an average salary. An indexation mechanism and discharge o f  arrears o f contributions by the 
fund in case o f  an employer’s insolvency existed. An exemption from the duty to pay 
contributions was granted in the case o f  incapacity to work. Additionally, the funds were non­
profit making and pursued the coverage o f the Dutch working population with adequate 
insurance as a social objective.246
240 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 18 seq.
241 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 20.
242 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 21.
243 Albany, supra note 2.
244 Brentjens, supra note 2.
243 Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2.
246 See Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para.1-30 and his summary at para. 307 as well as 
Judgment in Albany, supra note 2, para. 3-24. In the following only the case Albany will be quoted, because the 
decisions in Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken hâve the same wording.
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The Court partly followed its line o f reasoning from Fédération Française and considered the 
funds to be undertakings.247 The Court again stressed that the pension funds were based on the 
principle of capitalization, i.e. the amount o f benefits depended on the result o f the 
investments; the funds also decided the level o f contributions and benefits themselves.248 With 
regard to the investments, the funds were, like private insurance companies, subject to the 
supervision o f the Insurance Board.249 250 Additionally, an exemption from compulsory 
affiliation had to be granted by the funds if  a  company had made available to its workers an 
equivalent pension scheme at least six months before the request to the competent minister to 
m ake affiliation compulsory was launched. An exemption could be granted where an 
employer provided his employees with insurance equivalent to the scheme and compensation 
was paid to the funds in case of withdrawal. This placed the funds in (at least possible) 
competition with private companies. Thus they pursued an economic activity. The Court 
again emphasized that the non-profit-making character o f the funds, their social objective, 
certain elements of solidarity and restrictions in the choice of investments imposed by law 
w ere not sufficient to regard the funds as not being undertakings.251 253This time the Court 
considered the fact that affiliation was compulsory in order to guarantee the financing and 
solidarity of the scheme as irrelevant, contrary to its former case-law in Poucet et Pistre and 
Fédération Française.
It follows that pension funds based on the principle of capitalization with benefits depending 
on the results o f  the investments and belonging to the so-called second pillar are, as opposed 
to  first pillar pension funds based on pay-as-you-go, considered undertakings by the Court.
The very similar case o f  Pavlov was decided only one year later. The Court had to again 
deal with a supplementary pension fund in the Netherlands. The main difference with the 
earlier cases was that this fund was not a  sectoral pension fund established by a collective 
agreement, but a pension fund set up by the representative body o f  a  free profession. The fund 
did not select risks and was non-profit-making, but the pensions were financed by a
247 Albany, supra note 2, para. 87.
248 Albany, supra note 2, para. 81.
249 Albany, supra note 2, para. 82.
250 Albany, supra note 2, para. 83 seq.
251 Albany, supra note 2, para. 85 seq.
252 See D. GADBIN, “Les fonds de pension obligatoire face au droit communautaire de la concurrence: des 
positions dominantes à préserver dans le futur marché intérieur des services financiers”, (2001 ) Droit Social 178, 
at 180 seq.; L. IDOT, “Droit social et droit de la concurrence: confrontation ou cohabitation? (À propos des 
quelques développements récents)”, (11/1999) 9 Europe 4, at 5.
253 Joined Cases C -180/98 to C-l 84/98, Pavlov, (2000) ECR1-6451.
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capitalization scheme, in which contributions and benefits were determined by the fund and 
the benefits depended on the results o f  the investments.254 256
Following its earlier line o f reasoning in the triplet o f Albany cases, the Court considered 
the fund m question to  be an undertaking, because the fund itself determined the rate of 
contributions and benefits and worked according to the principle o f capitalization. 
Additionally, the fund was with regard to its investments subject to the supervision of the 
Insurance Board, like a private insurer.257 258The possibility o f  insuring the basic reference 
penison either with the fund or with a private insurer as well as the fund’s power to grant 
exemptions from other components o f  the scheme in certain circumstances were also 
considered as indications that the fund was engaged in an economic activity in competition 
with private insurers. Again the Court considered the non-profit-making character of the 
fund, its aspects o f  solidarity such as lacking selection o f  risks and a disability scheme and the 
pursuit o f a social objective as insufficient to exclude it from the definition of an 
undertaking.259
The next case concerning the definition o f an undertaking in the field of social insurance was 
Cisal.260 This case can be considered as a turning point in the jurisprudence. Here the Court 
had to deal with an Italian scheme o f social insurance against accidents at work and 
occupational diseases. The fund in question pursued a social purpose (providing insurance 
against accidents at work and occupational diseases, even where the employer was not liable 
and in exchange for relieving the employer from his civil liability), it was non-profit-making 
and insurance was mandatory. On the other hand, the contributions depended on the insured 
risk and on one’s income. The benefits also depended partly on the income o f the insured: 
benefits for temporary incapacity were a certain percentage o f  the average earning 15 days 
prior to the cessation o f  work, while benefits for permanent incapacity were calculated 
according to the average earning one year prior to the termination of work, but for the latter 
only incomes within a range o f a maximum income o f  30% above average and a minimum of 
30% below average were taken into account. This meant that there was an indirect link
254 For the different features of the fund, see in detail Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 5- 
49 and para. 166-180; Judgment of the Court in Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 3-41 and para. 103-107.
255 Meaning Albany, Brentjens, Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2.
256 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 113, 119.
257 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 112-114.
258 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 112, 115 seq.
259 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 117 seq.
260 Cisal, supra note 106.
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between contributions and benefits via the wages, but this link was weakened by the fact that
long-term benefits, as opposed to contributions, were only calculated according to a certain
range o f  income. This feature, coupled with the fact that the payment of benefits occurred
automatically, even if  the employer had not paid the contributions, constituted elements of
solidarity in the scheme. The fund was financed by a mixture of the redistribution method and
o f capitalization. While in the agricultural sector the current benefits were directly paid by
current contributions, the scheme involved elements of capitalization in the industrial sector.
There the level o f the contributions was determined each year by a resolution of the fund,
anticipating the upcoming expenditures including the capital value o f the long-term pensions.
This resolution had to be approved by the competent minister. Higher benefits due to an
increase in average incomes were partly financed by an increase in contributions and partly
through investments, very similar to private insurance. The fund was obliged by law to
operate the insurance scheme according to sound economic and business practice and it was
* * £^1supervised by the competent ministry. It must be stressed that following the introduction of 
the mandatory insurance scheme in 1965, Italian legislation twice considered compulsory 
private insurance a valid alternative to public insurance by the fund.261 62
In assessing the nature o f the fund, the Court first made general statements on the role and 
importance of social law. It underlined that Community law did not affect the power of the 
Member States to organize their social security systems. It further stated that insurance 
against accidents at work and occupational diseases had been part of the social security 
schemes of the Member States for a long time.263 It then pointed out that the fund in question 
was authorized by Community law to coordinate the national social insurance schemes for 
accidents at work and occupational diseases for workers moving in the Community according 
to Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72.264 Here the Court obviously wanted to show that 
Community law accepted the scheme in question, even though the connection to competition 
law was not made clear. The Court continued by emphasizing the social purpose of the fund. 
In this context it mentioned the cover against risks of accidents at work and occupational 
diseases that did not depend on civil liability and the automatic payment of benefits.265 
Furthermore, the Court identified different elements of solidarity in the scheme: the rate of
261 For the different features o f the fund, see in detail Opinion of AG Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 3-26 
and para. 50-76; Judgment o f the Court in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 1-11.
262 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 14.
263 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 31 seq.
264 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 33.
265 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 34-36.
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contributions and the insured risk were not systematically proportionate, because there were 
certain maximum ceilings of the level o f  contributions and the earnings of the insured were 
taken into consideration as well in calculating the rate o f contributions; benefits were not 
necessarily proportionate to the earnings because of the calculation o f benefits according to a 
narrow range o f incomes (30% above and 30% below national average); there was thus no 
direct link between contributions and benefits and better paid workers financed lower paid 
workers.266 Finally, the Court stressed that the State not only supervised the fund, but 
ultimately fixed the amount o f benefits and contributions, the amount o f benefits being 
imposed by law independent from investment results, the amount o f contributions being 
approved by ministerial decree.267 The foregoing led the Court to conclude that the fund, 
“being engaged in one o f the traditional branches of social security”, fulfilled an exclusively 
social function and was hence not engaged in an economic activity.268
The latter point concerning the State’s influence might have been decisive; it constituted a 
kind of State action defence269 and made clear that the benefits were not directly related to the 
results o f  the investments. However, the former points are of higher doctrinal interest. In Cisal 
the Court was faced with a social insurance scheme against accidents at work, and not a 
pension scheme as in the previous cases (except for Poucet et Pistre, where there was also a 
sickness and maternity scheme at stake). Thus a distinction between the first and second pillar 
could not be applied. Furthermore the scheme in Cisai was a hybrid, based on both 
capitalization and the redistribution method.270 The Court could not simply follow the clear- 
cut reasoning established in Fédération Française, Albany, Brentjens, Drijvende Bokken and 
Pavlov, distinguishing between funds based on the redistribution method (pay-as-you-go) and 
those based on capitalization, where benefits depended on the results o f investments. The 
litmus test, whether competition between the fund and a private insurance company was (at 
least in principle) possible, was not mentioned by the Court either.271 Rather it stated in very 
general terms the importance o f  social security and the competence o f the Member States in 
organizing these schemes as well as the recognition o f these schemes in Community law. 
Referring back to Poucet et Pistre, the Court weighed the degree of social purpose and 
solidarity involved in the scheme, which were treated rather negligently in the other cases.
266 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 38-42.
267 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 43 seq.
268 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 45.
269 For the State action defence see below at pp. 64 seq.
270 See Opinion o f AG Jacobs, Cisal, (2002) ECR 1-691,707, para. 55-58.
271 As opposed to Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 17; Albany, supra note 2, para. 83 seq.; Pavlov, 
supra note 253, para. 112, 115 seq. and to the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 38.
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The first case in which the CFI was confronted with the problem o f  social insurance and 
competition law was FENIN  in 2003.272 Here the CFI had to deal with statutory health 
insurance in Spain. The main focus was on the relation between the fund and third parties (the 
suppliers of medical goods and services), which will be dealt with below.273 Nevertheless the 
judgment contained interesting statements concerning the definition o f an undertaking in the 
field of social insurance. The CFI claimed that the approach taken in Poucet et Pistre had 
never been abandoned, but was only clarified by the later case-law. The CFI thus listed certain 
features that prevented a fund from being regarded as an undertaking: an exclusively social 
function, an activity based on the principle o f national solidarity, the non-profit making 
character of the fund and the fact that benefits were not related to contributions. The CFI 
regarded the somewhat deviating decisions in Fédération Française and the triplet of Albany 
cases as a confirmation of the case-law, fine-tuning the feature o f solidarity that must be 
assessed according to its degree. Applying these features to the funds in question, the CFI 
came to the conclusion that they could not be considered undertakings.274 It is striking that, 
while the ECJ neglected the social purpose, the existing features o f solidarity and the non­
profit making character in Fédération Française and the Albany cases, the later jurisprudence 
o f  the CFI seemed to return to the original case-law of Poucet et Pistre.
The most recent case dealing with competition law’s treatment o f  social insurance was AOK- 
Bundesverband.275 Here the Court had to consider the statutory health insurance scheme in 
Germany. The main question concerned the relationship between the funds and the suppliers 
o f  medical goods and services.276 Yet the case also dealt with the question o f whether these 
funds could be regarded as undertakings in their relation to the insured. The features o f  the 
insurance scheme were the following: employees had to affiliate to the scheme, i f  their 
income did not exceed a certain threshold and if  they were not covered by any other statutory 
scheme (e.g. for civil servants). Contributions, paid by the insured and their employers, 
depended on the income of the insured. These contributions were not related to the basic 
benefits. The system was based on benefits in kind and not on reimbursement, meaning that 
the funds were in general required to purchase medical services and products directly and give 
them to the insured. A certain degree o f competition existed between the funds and between
272 Case T-319/99, FENIN, (2003) ECR11-357.
273 See below at p. 53.
274 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 38 seq.
275 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107.
276 See below at pp. 54 seq.
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the funds and private insurers, which made the activity o f  the funds similar to the economic 
activity o f private insurers. The funds themselves could determine the level o f  contributions 
and these levels varied between the different funds (by up to one third). Since employees were 
free to choose their fund, price competition existed between the funds. Yet despite this price 
competition, national solidarity was guaranteed by a system called Risikostrukturausgleich. 
This meant that profitable funds had to finance those funds that insured higher risks. 
Furthermore, there was competition with regard to services, since funds were allowed to offer 
special services in addition to the basic benefits. Funds and private insurers were in direct 
competition with regard to employees who exceeded the threshold of income and could 
choose between them.277
Advocate General Jacobs arrived at the conclusion that the funds in question constituted 
undertakings. They could determine for themselves the level o f  contributions, engaged in 
price and service competition with one another, and even competed with private insurers with 
regard to voluntary insurance. These elements of competition persuaded the Advocate 
General that the funds1 activities were o f  an economic nature and that hence the competition 
rules should apply.278 279
The Court, on the other hand, came to the conclusion that the funds in question could not be 
considered undertakings. Having quoted the general definition o f an undertaking in EC 
competition law from the Hofner v Riser case,280 the Court proceeded to define the term “in 
the field o f  social security”.281 28This might mean that there is a special definition o f the term 
“undertaking” with regard to social security. The Court held that social insurance funds were 
not engaged in an economic activity for the purposes o f  competition law, if  they pursued an 
exclusively social purpose. According to the ECJ, this occurs where funds managing 
compulsory insurance schemes are based on the principle o f national solidarity, are non- 
profit-making, merely apply the law, and cannot influence the amount of the contributions, 
the use o f assets and the fixing o f  the level o f benefits. These statutory benefits must not be
277 For the different features of the scheme, see in detail Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra 
note 107, para. 5-9, para. 36-42 and Judgment o f the Court in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 4-11, 
34-44.
278 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 37-42.
279 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 57.
280 Hofner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 21.
281 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 47.
282 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 47, 58 seq.
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directly linked to the amount the contributions.283 Thus the Court returned to its position in 
Poucet et Pistre, emphasizing long-neglected features like the social purpose and the non- 
profit-making character o f the fund. On the other hand, referring to Fédération Française and 
Albany, the Court stated that the funds in these cases engaged in an economic activity in 
competition with private insurance companies.284 285Regarding the German sickness funds, the 
Court emphasized the following features as relevant: they fulfil an exclusively social function, 
are entirely non-profit-making and are based on the principle o f national solidarity. The law 
obliges them to offer basic benefits that are independent from the amount of contributions. 
Thus they cannot influence the level o f these basic benefits. Additionally, the 
Risikostrukturausgleich facilitates a certain equalization o f  costs between the funds. The 
ECJ concluded that there was no competition among the funds or between the funds and 
private companies with regard to the grant o f  the obligatory benefits, which constituted their 
main function. Hence the funds were regarded as being similar to the bodies at issue in Poucet 
et Pistre and Cisal. Therefore the activity o f the funds was considered non-economic in 
nature.286 287
The ECJ simply ignored the competition between the funds and private insurers with regard to 
employees who were not obliged to insure with the funds. It also ignored the competition 
with regard to additional services, since these did not belong to the funds’ so-called main 
function of offering basic benefits 288 With regard to the competition in contribution rates, the 
Court plainly stated that this had been introduced by the German law to make the funds more 
effective and less costly, but that the pursuit o f this objective could not alter the character of 
the funds’ activity.289 This reasoning is idiosyncratic: social insurance can be made more 
efficient by the introduction of elements o f  competition, but competition law, whose very 
purpose is the protection of this competition, is not applicable.290 The simple negligence of 
these elements o f competition, which make the activities of the funds similar to those of 
private insurers, makes the case-law of the ECJ unreliable. One can literally sense how the
283 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 47.
284 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 50.
285 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 51-53.
286 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 54 seq. contra the order o f reference BGH, decision of 
03.07.2001 -K Z R  31/99, (2001) WRP 1331, 1335.
287 See U. M. GASSNER, “Arzneimittel-FestbetrSge: Luxemburg locuta-causa finita”, (2004) IVuW 1028, at 
1033.
288 See GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1032.
289 AOK-Bundesverbandt supra note 107, para. 56.
290 See S. BELHAJ, J. W. VAN DE GRONDEN, “Some Room For Competition Does Not Make a Sickness 
Fund An Undertaking. Is EC Competition Law Applicable to the Health Care Sector? (Joined Cases C-264/01, 
C-306/01, C-453/01 and C-355/01 AOK)n, (2004) ECLR 682, at 684 seq.; GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1037.
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ECJ tried to avoid the application o f competition law and thus political reason defeated legal 
doctrine.291
In summary, the development o f the case-law in this field is inconsistent.292 In the beginning 
{Poucet et Pistre) and the end {Cisal, AOK-Bundesverband), the Court stressed the following 
features to exclude a fund from the definition o f undertaking in EC competition law: 
exclusively social objective, compulsory schemes, based on the principle of national 
solidarity, i.e. involving elements o f redistribution and providing statutory benefits that are 
independent from the contributions, non-profit-making character, and finally the strength of a 
State’s influence via supervision or legally mandated requirements. The umbrella term for 
these features is the pursuit of an exclusively social objective that precludes an economic 
activity -  at least in the field o f social security.293 In the intervening cases {Fédération 
Française, Albany cases, Pavlov\ it seemed that the Court would only distinguish between 
funds based on the redistribution method (pay-as-you-go) on the one hand and funds based on 
the principle of capitalization on the other hand. Yet the Court obviously abandoned this line 
o f reasoning when faced with a hybrid scheme {Cisal) that involved both elements of the 
redistribution method and capitalization. Thus the Court takes into account the different 
features it first identified in Poucet et Pistre and tries to apply a Gesamtbetrachtung (overall 
view) weighing the different characteristics, especially with regard to the degree o f solidarity 
involved.294 This creates wide latitude for the Court and causes damage to legal certainty.295 
The impreciseness o f this case-law can be seen in AOK-Bundesverband, where AG Jacobs 
considered the funds to be undertakings and the ECJ did not, though both applied the same 
criteria.
291 GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1033 speaks o f ideological bias. O. HUMPE, “Arrêts « Albany International », 
« Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV » et « Brentjens’ Handelsondememing BV »”, (1999/4) Revue du Marché 
Unique Européen 200, at 205 and X. PRÉTOT, “La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes et les fonds 
de pension néerlandais - A d  augusta per angvsta...”, (2000) Droit Social 106, at 109 had already corne to the 
same conclusion regarding the Albany-cases.
292 W. BERG, “Neue Entscheidungen des EuGH zur Anwendung des EG-Kartellrechts im Bereiche der sozialen 
Sicherheit”, (2000) EuZWMQ, at 172 and C. KOENIG, C. SANDER, “Zur Vereinbarkeit des 
Festbetragssystems für Arzneimittel mit dem EG-Wettbewerbsrecht”, (2000) WuW975, at 980 describe the case- 
law as heterogeneous.
293 AOK-Bundesverbandt supra note 107, para. 47, 58 seq. See also M, HELIOS, “EuG: Nationale 
Gesundheitssystemeinrichtungen sind keine Unternehmen”, (2003) EuZW 2%3, at 288.
294 See BELHAJ, VAN DE GRÜNDEN, supra note 290, at 683 seq.; BERG, supra note 292, at 172; J. 
GUNDEL, “Europarechtliche Probleme der Bürgerversicherung”, (2004) EuR 575, at 580; L. GYSELEN, “Case 
Law”, (2000) 37 CML Rev. 425, at 439; J. W. VAN DE GRÜNDEN, “Purchasing Care: Economic Activity or 
Service o f General (Economic) Interest?”, (2004) ECLR 87, at 88.
293 For the same conclusion, see J. L. BUENDIA SIERRA, Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies under EC 
Law. Art. 86 (formerly Art. 90) ofthe EC Treaty, OUP, Oxford 1999, atpp. 54 seq.; ÏDOT, supra note 252, at 5; 
C. JENNERT, “Wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit als Voraussetzung für die Anwendbarkeit des europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrechts”, (2004) WuW 37, at 45. GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1028 speaks of notorious legal 
uncertainty.
52
b) T h e  relationship between the fund and th ird  parties
So far there have been only two cases concerning the relationship between the funds and third 
parties, i.e. suppliers o f medical goods and services. The first was the FENIN case in 2003.296 
Here the applicant, an association o f  the major suppliers of medical products in Spain, 
complained about the fund’s practice o f not paying their debts for an average period o f 300 
days, although they paid their debts to other creditors within a reasonable period. The 
applicant asked the Commission to intervene because o f  an abuse o f a dominant position 
(discriminatory practices) under Art. 82 EC, but the Commission refused, arguing that the 
funds did not act as undertakings. This refusal was challenged before the CFI.297 As 
mentioned above, the CFI considered the funds not to be undertakings in their relationship to 
the insured298 and came to the same conclusion regarding their relationship with the suppliers. 
The Court claimed that an economic activity was (only) the activity of offering goods and 
services on the market. A pure purchase activity could thus not be considered as an economic 
activity.299 According to the CFI, the activity of purchasing must always be regarded in 
connection with the subsequent use, i.e. the nature of the subsequent use is supposed to 
determine the nature o f  the purchasing activity,300 The CFI even admitted that the entity 
involved in a purchasing activity “may wield very considerable economic power, even giving 
rise to  a monopsony”, but was still not considered an undertaking because the subsequent 
activity was defined as non-economic.301 302Since the funds were allegedly engaged in a non­
economic activity when providing medical goods to the insured, the act of purchasing was 
also considered to be non-economic. Thus the funds were not regarded as undertakings in 
their relationship with the suppliers. The fact that the funds also used the purchased assets 
to provide services to private patients was not taken into account by the CFI due to procedural 
reasons.303 The impression again arises that the Court tried to use any means to preclude 
social insurance schemes from competition law.
296 FENIN, supra note 272.
297 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 1-8.
298 See above at p. 49.
299 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 36, quoting Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy, (1998) ECR1-3851, para. 36 and 
Case T-513/93, Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v Commission, (2000) ECR 11-1807, para. 36.
300 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 36
301 FENIN, supra note 272, para, 37.
302 SUpra note 272, para. 40.
303 The applicant challenged the Commission’s decision, yet it only introduced this argument in its reply before 
the Court and not when it launched its complaint to the Commission under Art. 3 Council Regulation No 17/62. 
Hence the Commission did not have to take this fact into account and in judging whether the Commission’s 
decision was erroneous, the CFI could not take it into account either.
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In the decision AOK-Bundesverband,304 the ECJ had to consider the fixing o f maximum 
amounts the German sickness funds would pay for a certain category of medicine in an 
insurance scheme based on benefits in kind. The different categories of medicine were 
determined by the Federal Committee o f Doctors and Sickness Funds. The maximum amount 
applicable to each category, on the other hand, was jointly determined by the associations of 
sickness funds. Every price exceeding this amount had to be borne by the insured themselves, 
thus leading to the result that 93% o f  the medicine sold on the German markets were within 
the price range set by the national associations o f sickness funds. This practice was challenged 
by medium-sized manufacturers o f medicinal products alleging that the associations were 
infringing Art. 81 EC by jointly determining the maximum amounts.305 3067
As mentioned above, the ECJ considered the funds not to be undertakings in their relation to 
the insured. Concerning the fixing o f maximum amounts, and thus the relation to the 
suppliers, the Court stated that the associations of the funds performed a task that was 
imposed on them by law (§ 35 V SGB V). The law specified the procedure and laid down 
certain requirements w ith regard to quality and profitability. Furthermore, if  the associations 
failed to determine the maximum amount, the competent minister would do so. Hence the 
discretion o f  the associations o f funds was restricted to setting the precise level o f  the 
maximum amounts. In this context, the Court somewhat opaquely stated that “the discretion 
relates to the maximum amount paid by the sickness funds in respect of medicinal products 
which is an area where the latter do not compete”.308 309A possible explanation o f this statement, 
which is supported by the order o f reference of the German BGH, is that the fixing of 
maximum amounts affects the relationship between the funds and the insured with regard to 
the statutory benefits, an area where the funds do not compete. This argument confuses the 
relationship between the fund and the suppliers on the one hand and between the fund and the 
insured on the other hand. Furthermore it is a circular argument, because the lack of 
competition with regard to the maximum amounts is the very problem in this case. The Court
304 Judgment o f the Court o f  16 March 2004 in joined cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/0I and C-355/0I, AOK- 
Bundesverband, not yet published.
305 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 5-15; Judgment of the Court in AOK- 
Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 12-30.
306 See above pp. 50-52.
307 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 61.
308 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 62.
309 See BGH, supra note 286, at 1336 and P. J. SLOT, “Applying the Competition Rules in the Healthcare 
Sector”, (2003) ECLR 580, at 586.
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eventually argues that competition law is not applicable, because there is a restriction o f 
competition.
The EC J then stated that, when determining the fixed maximum amounts, the associations o f 
funds did not pursue an interest separable from the funds’ social objective. The determination 
o f  fixed maximum amounts was rather deemed to be “integrally connected with the activity o f 
the sickness funds within the framework of the German statutory health insurance scheme”.310 31
According to the Court, the funds performed the task of managing the German statutory 
health insurance scheme imposed on them by law and were thus not engaged in an economic 
activity. The findings o f  the Court include both a State action defence argument (pure 
fulfillm ent of legal obligations) and also, similar to the CFI’s FENIN judgment, the 
application of another Gesamtbetrachtung (overall view), claiming that the determination o f  
m axim um  amounts could not be separated from the funds’ main activity o f providing social 
insurance.312 Thus one activity of an entity was declared the main activity that determined the 
nature o f  the entity, whereas the activity in question was considered a pure auxiliary activity.
c) D octrina l Critique
aa) Social insurance as an  economic activity
The foregoing analysis shows that the European Courts try to immunize social security from 
competition law by using the definition of the undertaking. It was also evident that this case- 
law  is inconsistent, governed by political considerations rather than by legal doctrine, and that 
it is unpredictable and unreliable. A critique o f this case-law thus has to focus on the concept 
o f  undertaking in Community competition law and has to ask, if the jurisprudence in the field 
o f  social insurance is in line with this definition.
Since the Treaty does not provide a definition of “undertaking”, this definition must be 
derived by interpretation. The interpretation should focus on a teleological and systematic 
approach, taking into account the objectives of competition law. The teleological 
interpretation of the term “undertaking” was confirmed by the Court on several occasion,
310 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 63.
311 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 64.
312 See C. KOENIG, C. ENGELMANN, “Das Festbetrags-Urteil des EuGH: Endlich Klarheit über den 
gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Untemehmensbegriff im Bereich der Sozialversicherung?”, (2004) EuZW 682, at 684.
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when it held that “Art. 85 (1) (now Art. 81 (1) EC -  added by the author) applies to 
associations as far as their own activities or those of the undertakings belonging to them are 
calculated to produce the results to which it refers. To place any other interpretation on Art. 
85 (1) would be to remove its substance”313 and stating that the decisive feature in defining 
the term undertaking is that an “activity may give rise to conduct which the competition rules 
are intended to penalize”.314 *The objectives o f  competition law are the protection of economic 
freedom, market integration, the promotion o f  allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency 
on the market and the protection o f competition as an economic learning process. Hence 
competition law deals with (potential) markets and economic activities. Undertakings, as the 
subjects o f  competition law, must thus be (potential) actors in these markets, i.e. they must, at 
least potentially, perform an economic activity.316 This is the initial point o f  the general 
definition o f undertaking given by the Court in its Hofner v Elser case: “the concept o f an 
undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless o f the legal 
status o f the entity and the way in which it is financed”.317 *This definition is also confirmed 
by a systematic interpretation o f the Treaty, because Art. 86 EC provides for “public 
undertakings and undertakings to which member states grant special or exclusive rights”, thus 
implying that neither the public law status nor the way o f financing prevents an entity from
* ' l l ! !
being an undertaking. This concept of an undertaking based on the activity rather than on 
the structure o f the entity, is called the functional concept.319
The decisive question now arises o f what an economic activity is. The Court makes a 
distinction between economic activity and the exercise o f public authority (imperium)320 by
3.3 Case 71/74 Frubo v Commission, (1975) ECR 563, para. 30 seq.; joined Cases 96/82-102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 
108/82 and 110/82, IAZ v Commission, (1983) ECR 3369, para 20; Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 
2, para. 313.
3.4 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 21; For the teleological interpretation, see also Case 170/83, 
Hydrotherm v Compact, (1984) ECR 1-2999, para. 11; KOENIG, SANDER, supra note 292, at 981; SLOT, 
supra note 309, at 584.
313 Compare above at pp. 5-14.
316 A. WINTERSTEIN, “Nailing the Jellyfish: Social Security and Competition Law”, (1999) ECLR 324, at 324.
317 Höfner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 21. The Court repeated this definition in the context o f social security in
Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 17; Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 14; Albany, supra note 2, 
para. 77; Brentjens, supra note 2, para. 77; Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2, para. 67; Pavlov, supra note 253,
para. 74, 108; Cisal, supra note 106, para. 22; FEN IN, supra note 272, para. 35; AOK-Bundesverband, supra 
note 107, para. 46.
3I# Particularly with regard to social insurance funds the argument is frequently brought forward that a consistent 
interpretation of Art. 86 EC must lead to the conclusion that they are engaged in an economic activity and thus 
undertakings, see GUNDEL, supra note 294, at 579.
319 See, for example, Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 214; JENNERT, supra note 295, at 
37.
320 See, for example, P. AXER, “Europäisches Kartellrecht und nationales Krankenversicherungsrecht”, (2002) 
NZS 57, at 62; SLOT, supra note 309, at 584 seq. The term imperium is used by WINTERSTEIN, supra note
316, at 326.
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stating with regard to employment procurement in Hofner v Elser: “The fact that employment 
procurement activities are normally entrusted to public agencies cannot affect the economic 
nature o f such activities. Employment procurement has not always been, and is not 
necessarily, carried out by public entities” (emphasis added by the author).321 The distinction 
between economic activity and public authority was further clarified by the Court in its 
Eurocontrol judgment, dealing with an international organisation in charge of, inter alia, 
collecting route charges for users of air space and controlling the air space on behalf of some 
o f its Member States in certain regions in Europe: “(t)aken as a whole, Eurocontrors 
activities, by their nature, their aim and the rules to which they are subject, are connected with 
the exercise o f  powers relating to the control and supervision of air space which are typically 
those o f public authority. They are not o f an economic nature justifying the application of the 
Treaty rules of competition” (emphasis added by the author).322 Hence the fulfillment o f  a 
classical State function that is based on the sovereignty of the state and its power o f  coercion 
over citizens (so-called imperium or official authority),323 cannot be considered an economic 
activity, because private companies could not possibly exercise this power by themselves.324 
Yet it has to be noted that the exercise o f imperium can be carried out by the State itself325 326or 
that the State can entrust private actors with it. As the Court stated: “In that connection, it is o f 
no importance that the State is acting directly through a body forming part o f the State 
administration or by way of a body on which it has conferred special or exclusive rights”. 
The nature of the activity, and not the legal status of the acting entity, is hence relevant in 
accordance with the functional concept of an undertaking: “In order to make the distinction 
between the two situations (...) (between exercise o f public authority and economic activity — 
added by the author), it is necessary to consider the nature o f the activities carried on by the
321 Hofner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 22.
322 Case C-364/92, SATFluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol, (1994) ECR1-43, para 30.
323 The basic definition of imperium or official authority was given by AG Mayras in case C-2/74, Reyners v 
Belgium, (1974) ECR 631,664 seq.: “Official authority is that which arises from the sovereignty and majesty o f 
the State; for him who exercises it, it implies the power o f enjoying the prerogatives outside the general law, 
privileges of official power and power of coercion over citizens. Connection with the exercise of this authority 
can therefore arise only from the State itself, either directly or by delegation to certain persons who may even be 
unconnected with the public administration.”
324 According to GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 440 and JENNERT, supra note 295, at 43-46 this negative 
definition of economic activity is the only valid definition, i.e. every activity is either the exercise o f public 
authority or an economic activity. See also GLTNDEL, supra note 294, at 577; WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, 
at 326.
325 For example with regard to the grant of a funeral concession by a municipality, the ECJ held in case C-30/87, 
Bodson v Pompes Funèbres des Régions libérées, (1988) ECR 2479, para. 18 that Art. 85 did not apply to 
“communes acting in their capacity as public authorities.”
326 Case C-343/95, Cali & Figli v SEPG, (1997) ECR 1-1547, para. 17. See also Case 118/85, Commission v 
Italy, (1987) ECR 1-2599, para. 8; Case C-387/93, Banchero, (1995) ECR M663, para. 49.
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public undertaking or body to which the State has conferred special or exclusive rights.”327 328
AG Jacobs deduced from this distinction between economic activity and imperium that an 
economic activity could be determined by the test o f whether a  private company could 
possibly be engaged in the activity itself: “The basic test is therefore whether the entity in 
question is engaged in an activity which could, at least in principle, be carried on by a private 
undertaking in order to make profit.” This test makes sense, because if private companies 
were not able to carry out the activity in question, there would be no need to protect 
(potential) competition between them. As AG Jacobs pointed out: “If there were no 
possibility for a private undertaking carrying on a given activity, there would be no purpose in 
applying the competition rules to it.”329 30
When applying this test to different social insurance schemes, Jacobs claimed that a pension 
scheme based on the redistribution method (meaning pay-as-you-go) is necessarily operated 
by the State and that it could not possibly be carried on by private companies, because nobody 
would affiliate without the guarantee that the upcoming generation would finance his 
pension. Similarly, he argued that the Italian insurance fund against accidents at work and 
occupational diseases in the agricultural sector, based on the redistribution method, was not an 
entity engaged in an economic activity, since the current pensions for workers incapable of 
working were financed by active workers.331 Regarding the Italian social insurance scheme 
against accidents at work and occupational diseases in the industrial sector, which was partly 
financed by current contributions and partly by capitalization, the Advocate General argued 
that this activity could not be considered economic, because contributions and benefits were 
only linked on an aggregate level and not on an individual level: “An insured (or a third party 
paying contributions in  respect of the insured) will be disposed to pay contributions only if he 
can expect in exchange the benefits which are related to the amount o f contributions paid. In a
327 Cali & Figli v SEPG, supra note 326, para. 18. See also Commission v Italy, supra note 326, para. 7 and 
WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 327.
328 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 311 ; similarly id. in his Opinion in Pavlov, supra note 
253, para. 173 and AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 27. In his Opinion in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 
38 he added that the activity “consists in offering goods and services on a given market”. See also opinion o f AG 
Cosmas in Commission v Italy, supra note 299, para. 51 and the statement o f AG Tesauro in Fédération 
Française, supra note 105, para. 13: “...the non-profit making status o f the CNAVMAandthe other agricultural 
social insurance funds is irrelevant, since the activity to which they are entrusted is undeniably capable of being 
carried on by a private undertaking with a view to gain within the meaning o f the Höfner and Elser 
judgment...” . In the same vein GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1030; GUNDEL, supra note 294, at 577; 
JENNERT, supra note 295, at 45 seq.; H.-P. SCH WINTOWSK.I, “Der Begriff des Unternehmens im 
europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”, (1994) ZEuP 294, at 299; WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 325.
329 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 27.
330 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 338. See WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 330, 
agreeing with AG Jacobs on this point.
331 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 57.
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free market no private undertaking could for example operate a health insurance scheme in 
which contributions were related to earnings, whilst benefits were identical for all insured.”332 
However it must be recalled that in this case {Cisal) there was at least an indirect and limited 
link between contributions and benefits, because both benefits and contributions were 
calculated according to earnings, even though only a limited range o f  earnings (below and 
above 30% of average) was taken into account for the calculation o f  benefits. Hence AG 
Jacobs had to balance the degree of solidarity, i.e. the strength of the link between benefits 
and contributions, involved.333 AG Jacobs himself uttered doubts as to the practicability of his 
test o f  an economic activity: “However, the application of that test in relation to certain fields 
of activity is by no means straightforward.”334 This led him to the conclusion that, especially 
in the field of social insurance and in determining the necessary degree of solidarity that 
renders the activity non-economic “(i)t is o f course difficult to arrive at any precise statement 
of the point at which the redistributive component o f  a pension or insurance scheme will be so 
pronounced as to eclipse the economic activities which private pension and insurance 
providers compete to supply.”335
Apart from the problem of applying the test in the single case and weighing the elements o f 
solidarity, Jacob's reasoning has a major general flaw. When considering whether the 
activities of social insurance funds are o f an economic nature, Jacobs does not restrict his 
analysis to the services offered, but also takes into consideration the way in which they are 
financed and organized and treats them as one single activity that is to be assessed.336 37It is not 
disputable that private companies can and do engage in health insurance, pension 
insurance338 and insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases339.340 The only
332 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 62.
333 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 66 seq. and para. 80. See also his opinion in AOK- 
Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 35: “Classification is thus necessarily a question of degree.”
334 Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 28.
335 Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 35. See also GUNDEL, supra note 294, 
580.
336 So AG Jacobs stated in his Opinion in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 33 with regard to 
redistributive pension funds: “In such a scheme, redistribution is not ancillary to some other activity that could 
exist independently o f it. Rather, the scheme consists entirely of the State-compelled redistribution of resources 
from those cuiTently employed to those who have retired.” Contra this reasoning GASSNER, supra note 287, at 
1031.
337 For example in Germany for self-employed workers and for workers whose incomes exceed a certain level, 
compare Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband’ supra note 107, para. 5 and judgment of the court in 
AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 6.
338 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 338: “ ...it is clear that the market has generated pension 
schemes operating on the basis of the capitalisation principle.”
339 For example in Belgium see Case C-206/98, Commission v Belgium, (2000) ECR 1-3509 and opinion of AG 
Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 54.
social insurance that definitely does not constitute an economic activity is unemployment 
insurance, because the risk of unemployment is not calculable on an actuarial basis and hence 
not insurable. It depends on too many contingent factors like economic development and the 
behavior o f  the employee and the employer. With regard to the different forms of 
solidarity and redistribution, a distinction between the four groups o f  solidarity as identified 
above and the financing method o f  either pay-as-you-go or capitalization must be made.340 142 
The different elements o f solidarity constitute an organizational choice343 which facilitates 
insuring large parts o f  the population with insurance against social risks under socially 
acceptable conditions. These elements of solidarity essentially constitute the way in which the 
social insurance is financed,344 i.e. the mechanisms o f redistribution explained above,345 
which facilitate the cross-subsidizing o f bad risks and the less w ell-off They are necessary so 
that the funds can fulfill their social objective. But the pursuit o f a social objective itself, as 
settled by the case-law, cannot deprive the activity in question from being economic.346 The 
activity on the market, i.e. offering insurance services against the payment o f contributions, 
has to be clearly distinguished from the additional social objective o f  providing large parts of 
the population with insurance under socially acceptable conditions. This social objective 
requires solidarity in the financing o f  the scheme. And this solidarity can only be maintained 
by certain anti-competitive measures like compulsory affiliation.347 But it is the very purpose 
o f Art. 86(2) EC, and not of the definition o f  “undertaking” in Art. 81 EC, to justify anti­
competitive behavior or state measures because o f a general interest like the social objective 
in question here.348 In Poucet et Pistre the Court in fact applied a  proportionality test to the 
anti-competitive measures when defining the term undertaking,349 while this test should be 
conducted in the framework of Art. 86(2) EC, which is intended for this very situation.350 
Thus a systematic and teleological interpretation of the Treaty leads to the result that a
340 See WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 327; G1ESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at p.
125.
341 GI ES EN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at p. 125.
342 See above pp. 18-20.
343 BERG, supra note 292, at 172.
344 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 50, 58. AG Tesauro actually admits in his opinion in Poucet et 
Pistre, supra note 1, para. 9 with regard to the State fixing benefits and contributions of the insurance scheme in 
question: “In doing so, the State makes an economic policy choice which, white intended to ensure that the 
schemes in question are financed , also has consequences for the distribution of wealth in so far as, where 
necessary, it redistributes funds among the members o f  society.” (emphasis added by the author).
345 See above at pp. 18-21.
346 See, for example, Case 155/73, Sacchi, (1974) ECR 409, para. 13 seq.; Fédération Française, supra note 105, 
para. 20 and also Case C -41 /90, Hôfner v Elser, supra note 231.
347 See above at p. 21.
348 Compare below at pp. 85-93, pp. 97-100 and BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 51,58.
349 Poucet et Pistre, supra note I, para. 8-13, 18 seq.
350 BERG, supra note 292, at 172; GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at pp. 123-127; 
GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 439 seq.
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distinction must be made between the economic activity of offering insurance services on the 
market and the underlying social objective, which is attained by a certain solidaric financing 
mechanism. This argument is supported by the Court’s decision in Hofner v Elser. Here the 
Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit (German unemployment procurement agency) pursued a clear social 
objective in providing unemployment procurement, which was financed by contributions o f 
employers and employees in the framework of the unemployment insurance.351 This financing 
method exhibits a high degree of solidarity, because the working population and the 
employers finance procurement for the unemployed.352 Nevertheless the Court considered the 
activity in question, i.e. employment procurement, to be o f an economic nature.353 The 
decision o f Member States to include certain elements of solidarity in their schemes cannot 
prevent the social insurance funds from being engaged in an economic activity and being 
considered undertakings.354 35Rather solidarity has to be taken into account in the framework o f 
Art. 86(2) EC, but not when defining the economic nature of an activity.
With regard to the different financing methods in pension schemes, the conclusion of AG 
Jacobs is even more dismissible. The decision between the principle o f pay-as-you-go and 
capitalization (or, in some cases, a mixed scheme) is a financing decision and Member States 
are currently moving away from the pay-as-you-go system, because the demographic 
development no longer allows for this method o f financing.356 In this context it must be 
emphasized that schemes based on capitalization also can, and do, include strong elements o f 
solidarity and redistribution like the lack of risk selection,357 independence o f benefits from 
contributions and/or risks358 and hence compulsory affiliation359.360 Making the definition o f
351 Hofner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 19.
352 See GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at p. 117.
353 Hofner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 21-23.
354 See HELIOS, supra note 293, at 288, who holds that the regulatory interventions o f the State cannot prevent 
the activities o f a social insurance fund from being economic. See also BERG, supra note 292, at 172; 
GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1031.
355 See BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 58; GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at 
pp. 123-127; id., Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 131 ; GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 439 
seq.
356 For example the introduction o f the Riester-Rente in Germany. This concept means a shift of the German 
pension insurance scheme towards a three pillar system consisting of mandatory insurance, company pensions 
and private pensions. The German state subsidizes private insurance and grants certain tax advantages. To 
explain this shift in paradigm, the German Ministry o f Health and Social Security argues that the redistributive 
mandatory scheme can no longer finance all pensions due to the demographic development, hence the promotion 
of schemes based on capitalization is necessary. See http://www.bmgs.bund.de/deu/gra/themen/rente/4738.cfm.
357 As in Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 9 and para. 19; Albany, supra note 2, para. 75; Pavlov, 
supra note 253, para. 39 and para. 106.
354 Independence of benefits from risks was a factor in Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 9 and para. 
19; in Albany the benefits depended on the reserves and financial results o f investments, but they were not linked 
to risks and contributions on an individual basis, i.e. the payment of average contributions led to benefits that 
were a certain percentage o f the insured’s former salary -  Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para.
6 1
“economic activity” dependent on the question of capitalization or pay-as-you-go in pension 
schemes actually means that the Member States are able to determine the nature of an activity 
by a simple organizational decision. This clearly contradicts the general concept o f an 
undertaking that involves every entity engaged in an economic activity, “regardless o f the 
way in which it is financed .”359 6061 362
The negative definition o f economic activity outlined above (economic activity is not exercise 
o f  public authority) has been supplemented with a positive definition by the CFI in FENIN  
According to this definition, an economic activity consists o f “offering goods and services on 
a  given market”. This supplementary definition was also used by AG Jacobs in his test of 
economic activity in Cisal.363 The positive definition o f an economic activity is a 
generalization of a  statement of the ECJ in Commission v Italy, where the Court had to make a 
distinction between economic activity and public authority. Regarding the body managing the 
tobacco monopoly in Italy, the AAMS, the Court stated that it “exercises an economic activity 
inasmuch as it offers goods and services on the market”364 and that “the State may act either 
by exercising public powers or by carrying on economic activities of an industrial or 
commercial nature by offering good and services on the market”.365 It becomes obvious from 
the context that the Court defined the activity o f offering goods and services as an economic 
activity, but did not want to imply the flipside o f this definition, namely that an economic 
activity could only consist in the act of offering goods and services.366 In the former sense 
‘tha t any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic 
activity” the definition has been constantly used in the case-law.367 The generalization and 
turn-around o f this definition in FENIN  is hence undue and very disputable,368 but it includes
306 and para. 343, where he incomprehensibly denies this feature, and the judgment of the Court in Albany, 
supra note 2, para. 74 seq.
359 Because o f the missing link between contributions and benefits, compulsory affiliation was essential in 
Albany, supra note 2, para. 75. The same argument with regard to the missing link between insured risk (age, 
health) and the granted pensions was brought forward by the defendants in Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 106.
360 For a summary of elements of solidarity in activities that are considered economic, see W1NTERSTE1N, 
supra note 316, at 330.
361 Hofner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 21, emphasis added by the author.
362 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 36.
363 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Cisal, supra note 106, para. 38.
364 Commission v Italy, (1987) supra note 326, para. 3.
365 Commission v Italy, (1987) supra note 326, para. 7.
366 Contra the interpretation of JENNERT, supra note 295, at 38 seq.
367 Commission v Italy, (1998) supra note 299, para. 36; Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 75; Cisal, supra note 106, 
para. 23; Consiglio Nazionale degliSpedizioneri Doganali v Commission, supra note 299, para. 36.
368 It is restricted to markets for goods and services, even though there are also technology markets (intellectual 
property and know-how) as well as innovation markets that are subject to the competition rules. Furthermore this 
definition is restricted to offering goods and service and excludes purchasing. This problem will be discussed in
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at least the true thought that offering goods and services constitutes an economic activity. 
Since services also include insurance services,369 the application o f this additional definition 
does not alter but confirms the conclusion that social insurance funds must be regarded as 
undertakings.
Another issue that is relevant in this context is the question o f whether an entity which merely 
applies national law is engaged in an economic activity. The relevant case-law goes back to 
the Ladbroke decision o f the ECJ, hence it is justified to speak o f the Ladbroke doctrine.370 
Here the Court set aside a judgment o f the CFI371 372and argued against the opinion o f AG 
Cosmos that Articles 81 and 82 EC only apply to the behavior an undertaking is engaged in 
on its own initiative and that, if  this conduct is imposed on the undertaking by national law or 
if  national law itself eliminates the possibility to compete, the anti-competitive effects are not 
attributable to the autonomous conduct o f the undertaking and hence these articles are not 
applicable. The Court could actually rely on a more than 20 year old tradition o f case-law 
that (at least implicitly) always followed this doctrine.374 The underlying idea of the Ladbroke 
doctrine has also had a prominent impact on case-law concerning social security. Thus the 
ECJ decided in Poucet et Pistre that the insurance funds did not act as undertakings, because, 
among many other reasons, they were subject to control by the State and they merely applied 
the law  in fixing benefits and contributions as well as in deciding upon the use o f  their 
assets.375 Similarly, the Court argued in the triplet Albany cases and in Pavlov that the funds 
in question were undertakings. It gave as one argument that the funds themselves (and not the 
State via the law) determined the amount o f contributions and benefits.376 In Cisal the Court 
deemed the insurance fund not to be an undertaking, because the amount of benefits and 
contributions was ultimately fixed by the State.377 Finally, the Court decided in AOK-
detail below at pp. 67-70. JENNERT, supra note 295, at 42 criticizes that this definition is restricted to a given 
market, thus not being able to protect potential competition in monopolized sectors.
369 Compare above at pp. 59-62.
370 SLOT, supra note 309, at 588 introduces this term.
371 Case T-32/93, Ladbroke Racing v Commission, (1994) EC R 11-1015.
372 AG Cosmos argued in his opinion in joined cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, Commission and France v 
Ladbroke Racing, (1997) ECR 1-6265, para. 49-76 that the ECJ should confirm the judgment of the CFI and 
overturn its former case-law, because Articles 8 land 82 EC take precedence over national rules and have a direct 
vertical and horizontal effect, so undertakings must obey Community law and breach contradictory national law.
373 Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing, supra note 372, para. 33.
374 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission, supra note 43, para. 36-72, especially 65,66, 71,72; Case 41/83, Italy 
v Commission, (1985) ECR 873, para. 16-20; Case C-202/88, France v Commission, (1991) ECR 1-1223, para. 
55; Case C-18/88, GB-Inno-BM, (1991) ECR 1-5941, para. 20.
375 Poucet et Pistre, supra note I, para. 13 seq.
376 Albany, supra note 2, para. 81 ; Brentjensi supra note 2, para. 81 ; Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2, para. 71 ; 
Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 112-114.
377 Cisal, supra note 106, para. 43.
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Bundesverband that the statutory German sickness funds did not constitute undertakings for 
the purposes o f competition law, because, among other reasons, they were compelled by law 
to offer obligatory benefits independent o f  contributions.
There are eventually two possibilities to deal with the Ladbroke-doctrine: either the conduct 
of merely applying national law can be deemed not to constitute an economic activity or the 
defendant can be granted a so-called State action defence, i.e. only accountability is 
interrupted. The difference is that, in the latter case, at least Art. 86(1) EC is applicable to the 
relevant state measures, which would otherwise be excluded, since the entities acting 
according to the national law would not constitute undertakings. Since an economic activity is 
considered to include at least the offering o f  goods and services and to exclude the exercise of 
imperium, it is more stringent to apply a  State action defence, because the mere application of 
law does not automatically constitute the exercise of imperium  and can well consist o f the 
distribution o f goods and services. The mere application o f  the law does not change the nature 
o f the activity, but is only decisive in establishing accountability and responsibility for the 
activity.* 379 This solution is clearly in line with the wording o f the Ladbroke judgment, where 
the Court stated that “the restriction o f  competition is not attributable, as those provisions 
(art. 81 seq.) implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct o f  the undertakings” (emphasis 
added by the author).380 381In its C.I.F. judgment the Court confirmed this approach and 
restricted the effect o f the Ladbroke doctrine to prevent an undertaking from penalization for 
past anti-competitive behavior, before the national legislation in question had been declared 
incompatible with Articles 81,10, 3 EC by a national competition authority. The existence of 
the national legal obligations was deemed “a justification which shields the undertakings
ifii
concerned from all the consequences o f  an infringement of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC.* 
Even though the national law would remain in force, undertakings could no longer rely on the 
State action defence for preventing penalization for their future conduct after the decision of 
the competition authority had become definitive.382 This clearly shows that the Ladbroke 
doctrine only interrupts accountability and does not prevent an activity from being economic
311A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 52.
379 WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 327 also arrives at this conclusion with the argument that it has been held 
irrelevant by the Court if  the State is directly involved in an economic activity or via a private entity endowed 
with special rights and enforcing the law.
380 Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing, supra note 372, para. 34.
381 Case C-198/01, C./.F.,(2003) ECR1-8055, para. 54.
382 Judgment o f the Court in C.I.F., supra note 381, para. 55 against the Opinion o f AG Jacobs, para. 55-60.
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in nature. In the field o f  social security, on the other hand, the Court has obviously included 
the test of the State’s influence in its definition o f an undertaking, thus deviating from its 
other case-law.38 84
Another strand o f  case-law which became relevant in defining an undertaking/association o f 
undertakings in the field o f social insurance is the distinction between an association o f 
undertakings and a public expert body.385 In AOK-Bundesverband, the fixed maximum 
amounts were set by the associations o f sickness funds. The Court has constantly held that 
bodies consisting o f independent experts who are not bound by orders or instructions of the 
undertakings and are obliged by law to take into account not only the interests of the 
undertakings concerned, but also general public interests, cannot be considered associations o f 
undertakings, even if the. concerned undertakings participate in appointing the experts (the 
term R eijf doctrine will subsequently be used).386 In AOK-Bundesverband the Court did not 
explicitly distinguish between independent expert bodies and associations of undertakings. 
Rather it considered if  the setting o f fixed maximum amounts constitutes an economic 
activity. In doing so, it seemed to employ elements of the Ladbroke doctrine when stating that 
the associations merely perform an obligation imposed on them by law and only have a very 
limited discretion that is restricted to an area in which the funds do not compete.387 38The Court 
also seemed to apply elements of the R eijf doctrine when stating that in determining fixed 
maximum amounts the associations do not pursue a specific interest separable from the 
exclusively social objective of the funds, thus acting in the public interest like independent
expert bodies. This wild mixture of different doctrines seems rather ludicrous. On the other 
hand, AG Jacobs (who thoroughly distinguished between the different questions) arrived, 
when applying the R eijf doctrine, at the clear result that the associations of sickness funds 
must be considered associations o f undertakings. He regarded the German sickness funds as
383 See also BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 50; GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 
94, at p. 123; contra C. ENGELMANN, Kostendämpfung im Gesundheitswesen undEG-Wettbewerbsrecht. Am 
Beispiel der Versorgung mit Arzneimitteln und ärztlichen Leistungen in der deutschen undfranzösischen 
gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft,, Baden-Baden 2002, at p. 68 seq.
384 C. KOENIG, C. ENGELMANN, supra note 312, at 685. In AOK-Bundesverband AG Jacobs applied a State 
action defence to the activity o f setting fixed maximum amounts, Opinion o f AG Jacobs, A OK-Bundesverband, 
supra note 107, para. 73-85. The Court did not apply this defence.
383 See GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1034 seq.
386 Case C-l 85/91, Reiff, (1993) ECR1-5801, para. 15-19; Case C-153/93, Delta Schiffahrts- und 
Speditionsgesellschaft, (1994) ECR 1-2517, para. 16-19; joined Cases C-l 40-142/94, DIP and Others v 
Commune di Bassano del Grappa and Commune di Chioggia, (1995) ECR 1-3257, para. 16-19; Commission v 
Italy, (1998) supra note 299, para. 39-44.
387 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 61 seq.
388 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 63.
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undertakings and their leading associations as associations o f  undertakings. He gave the 
following reasons for considering them associations of undertakings: they only consisted of 
representatives o f the sickness funds, their decisions became directly effective without prior 
approval o f the minister o f health and the criteria of the procedure laid down by law only 
corresponded to the (economic) interest o f the sickness funds to set maximum amounts at the 
lowest possible level.389 90 One must agree with the Advocate General that a body which only 
consists o f representatives of the sickness funds who are bound to act on their behalf and have 
to fix purchase prices for these funds at as low a level as possible cannot be considered an 
independent expert body, but constitutes an association o f  undertakings.391
In summary it can be said that, instead o f  observing the general principles described above, 
i.e. the general definition of an undertaking from the Hofner v Elser case, the State action 
defence (Ladbroke doctrine) and the R eiff doctrine, the Court introduced in its case-law a 
Gesamtbetrachtung (overall view) o f a certain number o f  features that have to be taken into 
account when determining the nature of the activity of a  social insurance fund. These features 
are: the exclusively social objective, a compulsory insurance, based on the principle of 
national solidarity, i.e. involving elements o f  redistribution and providing statutory benefits 
that are independent from the contributions, the non-profit-making character and finally the 
State’s strong influence via supervision or requirements o f the law, all o f  which can be 
summarized under the term “pursuit of an exclusively social function”.392 The Court weighs 
those features, paying special attention to the degree of solidarity involved,393 and then comes 
to a conclusion as regards the nature o f the activity. It must also be borne in mind that the 
features just mentioned do not describe the activity of offering insurance services by the funds 
as such (as it should be according to Hofner v Elser and the functional concept of an 
undertaking), but rather characterize the organization of the scheme (institutional concept of 
an undertaking).394 This concept o f undertaking is clearly not in line with the general concepts 
o f competition law as outlined above. This is further illustrated by the fact that the non-profit- 
making character o f  an entity395 or its pursuance o f a social, non-economic purpose396 are not
389 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 37-42.
390 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 52-61.
391 See also SLOT, supra note 309, at 585 seq.
392 See HELIOS, supra note 293, at 288.
393 See above at p. 52.
394 BERG, supra note 292, at 172. GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1030 seq. describes it as a paradigm shift from 
the functional to an institutional concept.
395 See, for example, Case 209/78 Van Landewyck v Commission, (1980) ECR 3125, para. 88; Fédération 
Française, supra note 105, para. 21; BUEND1A SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 32, 50; SCHWINTOWSKI, 
supra note 328, at 300.
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usually relevant. It must be concluded that the Court has introduced a special definition o f 
undertaking in the field o f social security, which leads, because o f  the wide discretion o f 
the Commission and the Court, to a high degree of legal uncertainty and eventually to 
arbitrary decisions.396 798
bb) Purchase as an economic activity
When considering if  entities can be deemed undertakings because o f  purchase activities, it 
must be borne in mind that the concept o f undertaking in EC competition law is a functional 
concept. This means that it is not the legal status o f an entity which is decisive in determining 
whether it is an undertaking, but the activity it is involved in.399 The concept of an 
undertaking is thus a relative one, since an entity can be considered to constitute an 
undertaking being engaged in one activity and not to constitute an undertaking being engaged 
in another activity.400 The classical example is the role of the State as in the case o f Italy v 
Commission: “ ...the State may act either by exercising public powers or by carrying on 
economic activities o f an industrial or commercial nature by offering goods and services on 
the market.”401
In F E N  IN, the CFI held that isolated purchase could not itself constitute an economic activity, 
because it only considered the offering o f goods and services to be an economic activity.402 As 
illustrated above,403 the Court’s assumption was based on a misinterpretation of the case-law 
that always described offering of goods and services as an economic activity, but did not, as a  
consequence, exclude other activities from being economic in nature. The CFI went on to 
conclude that the nature o f the subsequent use o f the purchased items was decisive for the
396 See, for example, Sacchi, supra note 346, para. 13 seq.; Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 20 ; 
GADBIN, supra note 252, at 180.
397 The ECJ itself seems to admit that there is a special definition in the field of social security, when it states in 
A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 47: “In the fie ld  ofsocial security, the Court has held that certain 
bodies ( ...)  pursue an exclusively social objective and do not engage in economic activity.” (emphasis added by 
the author). For the same conclusion see BELHAJ, VAN DE GRONDEN, supra note 290, at 683; GUNDEL, 
supra note 294, at 577; HELIOS, supra note 293, at 288; VAN DE GRONDEN, supra note 294, at 88 seq.; 
WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 327.
398 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 54 seq.
399 See above at pp. 55 seq.
400 See, for example, AOK~Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 58; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra 
note 2, para. 207 and his Opinion in Case C-475/99, Ambulam Glôckner, (2001) EC R 1-8089, para. 72, in Cisal, 
supra note 106, para. 48; id. in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 45; AXER, supra note 320, at 61 ; 
BELHAJ, VAN DE GRONDEN, supra note 290, at 686; GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1033; KOENIG, 
ENGELMANN, supra note 312, at 683.
401 Commission v Italy, (1987) supra note 326, para. 7.
402 FEN IN, supra note 272, para. 36.
403 See above at pp. 62 seq.
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nature o f  the purchase activity.404 Firstly, this reasoning clearly deviates from the functional 
and relative concept o f an undertaking, because every activity ought to be regarded 
separately.405 It is not possible to declare one activity as the main activity which determines 
the nature o f  subordinate activities.406 For example it is clear that the main activity o f the State 
is the exercise o f  public authority, which does not prevent it from also being involved in 
economic activities, even though this economic behavior might only serve the exercise of 
public authority.407 Furthermore the CFI’s interpretation is clearly contrary to teleological and 
economic considerations.408 The Court itself admits that the entities in question “ ...m ay wield 
considerable economic power, even giving rise to a monopsony...”.409 Concentrated buying 
power can have very negative impacts on competition in a  market. Prices and buying 
conditions can be dictated by the monopsony, restricting or even erasing the economic 
freedom o f  the suppliers. Important parameters of competition such as prices and quality as 
well as quantity o f goods can be predetermined by the monopsony, thus eliminating all room 
for competition on the supply side.410 The monopsony can abuse its dominant position by, for 
example, discrimination, thus causing a distortion o f competition, because the economic 
performance o f the suppliers is made subject to the disposal of the monopsony.411 *The Court’s 
argumentation is also contrary to the wording o f Articles 81 and 82 EC. In Art. 81(l)(a) EC, 
the direct or indirect fixing of purchase prices is given as an example o f a restriction or 
distortion o f  competition and in Art. 82(a) EC the direct or indirect imposing o f unfair 
purchasing prices is given as an example o f an abuse o f a dominant position. Hence the 
Treaty clearly considers purchasing to be an economic activity and does not make a 
distinction on the basis o f the subsequent use o f the purchased items.413
404 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 356.
405 See AXER, supra note 320, at 62; BERG, supra note 292, at 172; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at pp. 70 
seq.; GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1030 seq.; KOENIG, SANDER, supra note 292, at 981 seq.
406 GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 439.
407 AXER, supra note 320, at 62.
408 See GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1034.
409 FEN IN^ supra note 272, para. 37.
4,0 For fixed maximum amounts see AXER, supra note 320, at 61; KOENIG, SANDER, supra note 292, at 980.
411 HELIOS, supra note 293, at 288 argues with regard to the negative repercussions for suppliers that at least the 
relationship between funds and suppliers should not be immunized from EC competition law, since it does not 
belong to the core objectives of social security. Similarly KOENIG, SANDER, supra note 292, at 981. Contra 
VAN DE GRONDEN, supra note 294, at 92 who claims that it is not the possible influence on the supply side, 
but the interest that an entity derives in its downstream selling market by its purchase on the upstream market 
which is decisive.
4.2 See GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1029; KOENIG, SANDER, supra note 292, at 980.
4.3 ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 66 seq. emphasizes that the purchase o f medical supply is an economic 
activity, because it cannot be compared to private consumption, since the funds distribute the purchased supplies 
to their affiliated. See also G1ESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG- Vert rages, supra note 138, at p. 114.
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The ECJ partly followed the CFI414 and decided in AOK-Bundesverband, regarding the setting 
o f fixed maximum amounts for medical supply by the associations o f German statutory 
sickness funds, that the interest the associations of funds pursue in this activity cannot be 
separated from the funds’ exclusively social objective o f  insuring large parts o f the 
population 415 This appears to abolish the functional concept o f an undertaking, because the 
exclusively social objective seems to be regarded as a characteristic o f  the entity, regardless o f  
the particular action it is engaged in.416 Furthermore, the Court ruled that the determination o f  
fixed maximum amounts is “integrally connected” with the funds’ main activity o f providing 
statutory benefits 417 418This wording is a clear reference to the Court’s case-law in Eurocontrol 
and Cali. In Eurocontrol, the Court held that the collection o f route charges for airplanes 
carried out by Eurocontrol (an international organisation for the supervision of air traffic) on
J l A
behalf o f  its Member States “cannot be separated from its other activities”. It must be noted 
that the route charges were applied for the use of air navigation control facilities and 
“services” which were deemed not to constitute an economic activity, but the exercise o f  
public authority.419 4201In Cali the Court ruled that the levying of charges for anti-pollution 
surveillance in the port o f  Genova “is an integral part o f  its (the entity’s) surveillance 
activity”, which was deemed exercise o f public authority and not an economic activity.
There is one major difference between these cases and AOK-Bundesverband, which forbids a  
sim ple transfer o f the arguments. A market is governed by the quantity and quality of the 
products and services offered and the prices demanded. Demand o f  price and offering o f  
services are two sides o f the same coin. This, o f course, does not imply that the nature o f a 
service can be determined by its remuneration or the way the entity is financed. Otherwise 
the Member States could determine what an economic actitivity is by deciding if services are 
financed according to private or public law (in the form of fees and taxes). On the other hand, 
i f  a  “service” is in a certain case not a real service, but rather the exercise of public authority, 
the remuneration for this “service” and the respective collection o f charges must also 
constitute the exercise o f public authority, since it forms part o f the coercion of citizens. This
414 See GUNDEL, supra note 294,at 581; KOENIG, ENGELMANN, supra note 312, at 685. Contra GASSNER, 
supra  note 287, at 1034 who claims that the ECJ returns to a relative concept of undertaking and thus contradicts 
the CFI in FENIN.
415 Judgment m AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 63 and also Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK- 
Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 43-46.
416 BERG, supra note 292, at 172. GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1030 seq.
417 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 63.
418 SA T Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol, supra note 322, para. 28.
4,9 S A T Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol, supra note 322, para. 24-31.
420 Cali & Figli v SEPG, supra note 326, para. 23 seq.
421 See above at pp. 55 seq. and at pp. 59-62.
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situation is comparable to the collection o f taxes which is undoubtedly the exercise of public 
authority.422 The situation in AOK-Bundesverband is fundamentally different. The fixed 
amounts in question here are not remuneration for providing social insurance, which was 
considered a non-economic activity by the Court. Remuneration for insurance is rather the 
contributions o f  the insured. The fixed amounts determine the prices on the upstream market 
of medical goods and services as opposed to the downstream market of providing insurance. 
Hence it cannot be said that the determination o f fixed amounts is “integrally connected” with 
the funds’ main activity o f providing statutory benefits as charges and corresponding public 
“services” are connected. They are two different activities, in two different markets, with 
different economic outcomes.423
Even though the ECJ did not explicitly follow the CFI, which generally considered 
purchasing itself not to be an economic activity, the result is nevertheless very similar. The 
Court ruled in this particular case that the activity o f fixing maximum purchase prices could 
not be separated from the subsequent use o f  providing statutory benefits.424 Hence the same 
arguments can be brought forward against this decision as against FENIN. The leading 
associations o f the German sickness funds must be considered associations o f  undertakings 
when determining the fixed maximum amounts, because the funds constitute undertakings in 
their activity o f demanding medical supply on the market.425
The decisions in FENIN  and AOK-Bundesverband involve abandoning the functional concept 
o f an undertaking without providing a new solution to define this term in competition law. It 
is a clear contradiction o f the wording o f the Treaty in Articles 81 and 82 EC and it is highly 
detrimental to the functioning o f  the market and to competition. The new concept of 
“undertaking” in the field o f social security, especially in the relationship between funds and 
third parties, might also have negative repercussions for other areas o f  competition law, which 
are subject to strong political pressures, making the application of competition law 
unpredictable.
422 See Opinion of AG Tesauro in SAT Fluggesellschaft v Eurocontrol, supra note 322, para. 14: “...those 
charges undoubtedly constitute a tax burden, since they are a sort of financial contribution to the costs incurred 
by the States, payable by the individual for the benefit he has received, as a result o f  a specific administrative 
activity carried on chiefly in the interest o f  the community.”
423 See also WIMTERSTEIM, supra note 316, at 332 seq.
424 AOK-Bundesverband supra note 107, para. 54,63. Against a restriction to considering a so-called main 
activity in this case when determining the nature o f the other activities, see GASSNER, supra note 287, at 1032.
425 ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at pp. 79-82.
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2. The case-law in the field of collective bargaining and competition law
it
¡>i
a) The non-statutory labo r exemption
While the Court approached the problem o f the collision o f  competition law and social 
insurance by creating a new category o f  the concept o f undertaking, thus giving rise to a de 
facto  exemption for certain types o f social insurance schemes, the approach in dealing with 
the collision o f competition law and collective bargaining is different
The Court was confronted with this problem for the first time in the triplet o f Albany cases, 
which concerned sectoral pension funds set up by collective agreement. Regarding the 
collective agreements establishing the funds and requesting the public authorities to make 
affiliation to the same compulsory, the Court ruled “that agreements concluded in the context 
of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit o f  such objectives (i.e. 
social policy objectives -  added by the author) must, by virtue o f their nature and purpose, be 
regarded as falling outside the scope o f Art. 85(1) (now Art. 81(1) -  added by the author)”. 
The Court thus established a non-statutory exemption for certain collective agreements. It 
arrived at this new dogmatic figure by “an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole which is both effective and consistent”.426 728 On the one hand, the Court considered the 
importance the Treaty attaches to competition law. Conduct prohibited by Art. 81(1) EC is 
considered so detrimental to the economy that the authors of the Treaty expressly declared the 
respective agreements and decisions to be void in Art. 81(2) EC. Furthermore Art. 3(l)(g) EC 
provides that the Community is to establish a “system ensuring that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted.”429 On the other hand, the Court pointed out the value the 
Treaty ascribes to a  social policy in general and to collective bargaining in particular. It 
mentioned that Art. 3(l)(j) EC provides that the activities o f the Community shall include “a 
policy in the social sphere”. Art. 2 EC describes the promotion o f “a high level o f 
employment and social protection” and “a harmonious and balanced development o f 
economic activities” to be one o f the tasks o f the Community. The Court further mentioned 
Art 118 EC Treaty (now Art. 140 EC) which imposes a duty on the Commission to encourage
426 Meaning Albany, supra note 2; Brentjens, supra note 2, and Drijvende Bokkeny supra note 2. In the following 
the Albany case will be quoted, whose judgment has the same wording as the other two cases.
427 Albany, supra note 2, para. 60.
428 Albany, supra note 2, para. 60.
429 Albany, supra note 2, para. 53 seq.
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cooperation between Member States in all social policy fields, especially with regard to the 
right o f  association and collective bargaining between workers and employers. The Court also 
drew attention to Art. 118 b EC Treaty (now Articles 138 and 139 EC) which provides that 
the Commission is to promote the dialogue between management and labour at European 
level which can eventually lead to contractual relations. Finally, the ECJ referred to the 
Agreement on Social Policy430 whose Art. 1 named as objectives to be pursued by the 
Community and the Member States, among others: improved living and working conditions, 
proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of 
human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating o f exclusion -  
this provision has now become part of the Treaty in Art. 136 EC. The Court also referred to 
Art. 4(1) and (2) o f  the Agreement which made it possible that the dialogue between 
management and labor led to agreements, which could be implemented either in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labor and the Member States, 
or, at the joint request o f  the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the 
Commission - this provision has by now become part o f the Treaty in Art. 139 EC.431 The 
Court admitted that certain restrictions of competition are inherent to collective agreements, 
but that the social objectives of these agreements would be undermined if  they were made 
subject to competition rules.432 43
The formulation used by the Court, however, makes it clear that not all collective agreements 
are to be exempted from the scope o f competition law. Collective agreements are exempted 
“by virtue o f their nature and purpose” 434 This imprecise condition can be interpreted taking 
into consideration the other statements o f the Court. With regard to the nature o f the 
agreements, the Court restricts the exemption to “agreements concluded in the context of 
collective negotiations between management and labour” .435 As can be seen from the later 
case-law, the Court also requires the agreement to have the form o f  a collective agreement.436 
With regard to the purpose  o f the agreement, the Court demands that it has to be “in pursuit of 
such objectives”.437 The scope o f this condition is very unclear.438 The Court speaks in the
430 OJ 1992 09 1 /9 1 .
431 Albany, supra note 2, para. 54-58.
432 Albany, supra note 2, para. 59.
433 GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 441 writes: “The only safe (and interesting) conclusion that can be drawn from 
the judgment is that the Court does not rule out that Art. 81(1) might apply to certain types of collective 
agreements.”
434 Albany, supra note 2, para. 60.
435 Albany, supra note 2, para. 60.
436 Case 222/98, Van der Woude, (2000) E C R 1-7111, para. 24.
437 Albany, supra note 2, para. 60.
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preceding paragraph of “the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements”.438 39 It 
further speaks of a situation in which management and labor seek “jointly to adopt measures 
to im prove conditions o f work and employment”.440 It was not made clear whether social 
policy objectives are restricted to the improvement of conditions o f work and employment. 
The later case-law and van der Woude44] and Pavlov clarified that the agreements must be 
“aim ed at improving employment conditions”.442 43Taking into consideration the decision in the 
triplet o f  Albany cases, there is some evidence that the Court prefers a  broad interpretation of 
the requirement “to improve conditions of work and employment” and thus gives a wide 
discretion to the social partners in determining the content of collective agreements. Thus the 
establishm ent of a supplementary pension scheme was deemed to contribute “directly to 
im proving one of their (the workers’ -  added by the author) working conditions, namely their
. „441remuneration.
The C ourt was given a chance to clarify its reasoning in the two later decisions in Pavlov and 
van der Woude. In Pavlov the Court held that a decision o f a liberal profession’s 
representative body to set up a pension scheme very similar to the one at issue in Albany and 
to request the public authorities to make affiliation compulsory was subject to the competition 
rules, because it was “not concluded in the context of collective bargaining between 
em ployers and employees.”444 This clarifies that an agreement must both by its purpose (the 
C ourt did not doubt the social objective of the agreement at issue in Pavlov)445 and by its 
nature , which is strictly limited to classical collective agreements between management and 
labor, fall outside the scope of the competition rules. The Court stressed in that context that 
there w ere no provisions in the Treaty encouraging the members o f liberal professions to 
conclude collective agreements.446 47
In van der Woude441 the Court was faced with a  collective agreement which established a 
sectoral health insurance scheme. Here it was not the nature of the agreement that was
438 Compare BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, at pp. 45 seq., recital 89.
439 A lbany, supra note 2, para. 59.
440 Albany, supra note 2, para. 59.
441 Van der Woude, supra note 438, para. 22.
442 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 67; BRUUN, HELLSTEN (ed.), supra note 162, at pp. 55 seq., recital 113-117 
interpret the case-law as referring to all social objectives named in Art 136 EC, thus giving the exemption a 
much broader scope. The clear wording o f Pavlov and van der Woude strongly contradicts this interpretation.
443 Albany, supra note 2, para. 63.
444 Pavlov , supra note 253, para. 68.
445 Pavlov , supra note 253, para. 68.
446 Pavlov , supra note 253, para. 69.
447 Van der Woude, supra note 436.
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problematic - it was concluded in the context o f  collective bargaining between trade unions 
and employers - but the purpose. The Court confirmed its broad interpretation o f the term 
“improving the working conditions” by subsuming the establishment of the health insurance 
scheme under this condition, since this ensured that workers had the necessary means to meet 
medical expenses and reduced the costs borne by the employees.448 It further clarified that the 
fact that the insurance business was outsourced to a private insurance company, i.e. not 
carried out by the administrative body o f  the social partners itself, did not exclude the 
application o f the non-statutory exemption, because the social partners must be allowed to 
create a body to implement the agreement and this body itself must be allowed to entrust third 
parties with the specific tasks.449
b) Doctrinal C ritique
The first point o f criticism against the creation o f a non-statutory exemption is that it does not 
fit into the competition law system o f the Treaty and constitutes an inconsistency in the 
traditional case-law.450 The Court has constantly held that “where the Treaty intended to 
remove certain activities from the ambit o f the competition rules, it made an express 
derogation to that effect”.451 Examples include Art. 36 EC concerning agriculture, Art. 296 
EC concerning military equipment, and the limited exemption o f  Art. 86(2) EC concerning 
certain undertakings engaged in a  service o f  general economic interest. The Court applied 
competition law to  sectors that receive special treatment in some Member States like 
transport,452 energy,453 banking,454 insurance,455 *458and technology transfer456 457 It even applied
if a
competition law to the labor market with regard to public employment procurement. The
448 Van der Woude, supra note 436, para. 25.
449 Van der Woude, supra note 436, para. 26.
430 BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, at p. 41, récital 81 describe the Court’s interprétation as 
“certainly rare”.
451 Joined Cases 209/84 to 213/84, Ministère Public v Asjes, (1986) ECR 1425, para. 40; Case 45/85, Verband 
der Sachversicherer v Commission, (1987) ECR 405, para. 12. See also Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra 
note 2, para. 123.
452 Ministère Public v Asjes, supra note 451, para. 40-42; Case 66/86, AhmedSaaed Flugreisen and others v 
Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, (1989) ECR 803.
453 Almelo, supra note 44.
454 Züchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank, supra note 44, para. 6-9.
453 Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission, supra note 451, para. 7-16.
436 See, for example, Case C 258/78, Nungesser v Commission, (1982) ECR 2015, para. 23-43.
437 See also Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 122 seq.
458 Höfner v Elser, supra note 231; Case 55/96, Job Center, (1997) ECR 1-7119. See also Opinion o f AG Jacobs 
in Albany, supra note 2, para. 127. AG Lenz in his Opinion in Case C-415/93, Bosman, (1995) ECR 1-4921, para. 
273 seq. and H. FLEISCHER, “Tarifverträge und Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht - Besprechung der Albany- 
Intemational-Entscheidung des EuGH”, (2000) DB 821, at 822 hold that there is no general non-statutory labor 
exemption in EC compétition law.
74
1Court never took the view that the existence o f special Community objectives mentioned in ||
s
the Treaty, for example a common policy in the sphere of transport in Art. 3(1 )(f) EC, the kI
promotion of coordination between employment policies of the Member States with a view to i
I enhancing their effectiveness in Art. 3(l)(i) EC, the promotion of research and technological \
¡1'
I development in Art. 3(1 )(n) EC and measures in the sphere o f  energy in Art. 3(l)(t) EC could j
j prevent the application o f  the competition rules.459 Rather, the ECJ held that the competition
| rules provided other tools like Art. 81(3) EC “to take account o f the particular nature o f
1 different branches of the economy and the problems peculiar to them”460.461 The contradiction
I o f  the case-law in other fields becomes especially obvious in the field o f social security. In ;
| spite o f  the provisions in Articles 2, 3(j), 136 ,137(l)(c) and (k), Articled 137(4), 140 and 144
I EC, which clearly show that the Treaty respects and promotes the social security schemes o f
j the Member States, the Court refused to establish a non-statutory social exemption. The
| perverse results o f this inconsistency become apparent when comparing Albany and Pavlov. j
I The agreements in both cases had as their objective the creation o f a supplementary pension j' j
I \
I scheme. In Albany a non-statutory exemption was applied, whereas the agreement in Pavlov
i
I was fully subject to Art. 81 EC.462
i :
I :
Secondly, the limits o f the exemption are not clearly drawn. The formal requirements, i.e. the
“nature” o f the agreement is well defined, whereas the substantive requirements, i.e. “the
pursuit o f social objectives” consisting in the “improvement of working and employment j
conditions” is not that clear.463 Is it an improvement o f  working conditions to forbid
subcontracting tasks which are usually carried out by employees? Can collective agreements j
which forbid the introduction of new technologies in order to secure jobs be regarded as an ■!
improvement o f  working conditions or do they rather concern entrepreneurial decisions that
m ust be scrutinized under Art. 81 EC? The same question arises with regard to opening hours,
especially taking into consideration the Commission's decision in Irish Banks * Standing i
Committee, in which the Commission held that Art. 81(1) EC applied to an agreement
between Irish banks and trade unions concerning opening hours.464
459 See Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 126.
460 Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission, supra note 451, para. 15.
461 PRETOT, supra note 291, at 109 seq. argues that the Court could not preclude the application o f the 
competition rules by referring to merely programmatic norms. An application and proper interpretation of the 
competition rules would have been more consistent
462 GADBrN, supra note 252, at 182.
443 See BERG, supra note 292, at 171.
464 Commission Decision o f 30.09.1986, Irish Banks’ Standing Committee, OJ 1986 L295/28.
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A final criticism relates to the protection o f  competition. The non-statutory labor exemption 
creates a very broad exemption for collective agreements without taking into account the 
objectives o f competition law. It is biased in favor o f collective agreements and does not try to 
balance the different interests involved by, for example, a comprehensive test of 
proportionality. This is particularly true for the effects on third parties and third markets. 
Undoubtedly, collective agreements can have negative effects on third parties. Examples 
include the exclusion of third providers by the establishment o f sectoral insurance funds,465 
the effects on suppliers o f agreements banning rationalization, the effects on subcontractors of 
agreements forcing a manufacturer to subcontract only to companies that are bound by 
collective agreement466 or by agreements prohibiting the subcontracting of tasks that are 
usually carried out by employees.467 There have even been collective agreements in Denmark 
excluding certain types of consumers from the supply o f cheaper clothes.468 In Germany 
consumers were affected by shop opening hours fixed by collective agreements.469 
Furthermore, certain collective agreements can have negative effects on markets other than 
product markets. Agreements banning rationalization can have impacts upon innovation 
markets, technology markets and markets for research and development. Additionally, 
collective agreements which allegedly serve to improve working conditions can be a sham to 
enable employers to conclude restrictive agreements that would otherwise infringe Art. 81 
EC, thus perverting the sense o f  collective agreements.470
Considering these problems, AG Jacobs in his opinion in Albany came up with the solution of 
distinguishing between the application o f  competition law ratione materiae (a non-statutory
465 According to AG Jacobs, this was not the case in Albany, because affiliation to the fund was allegedly not 
made compulsory by the collective agreement, but by the minister’s decision on general applicability and 
compulsory affiliation. See Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 276-286.
466 For this example see the case of Connell Construction Co. v Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,2 
June 1975,421 U.S.616.
467 For this example, see Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 84, who refers to the Finish case 
KHOtaltio 1586, 11 April 1995.
464 For this example, see Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 84 referring to the Denish case 
Ufr. 1965.634H cf. Ufr. 1965B.260.
469 While the highest German labor court (BAG) in its judgment o f27.06.1989 BAGE 62,171, at 183-190 
deemed competition law not applicable to these agreements, the Bundeskartellamt was in favor o f applying 
competition law -  Bundes kartellamt WúW 1989, 563. For the discussion in Germany, see U. IMMENGA, 
Grenzen des kartellrechtlichen Ausnahmebereichs Arbeitsmarkt -  Zur Zulässigkeit tarifvertraglicher Regelung 
von Ladenschlußzeiten, C.H. Beck, München 1989; M. KULKA, “Die kartellrechtliche Zulässigkeit von 
Tarifverträgen überdas Ende der täglichen Arbeitszeit im Einzelhandel”, (1988) RdA 336.
470 See GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 443; BRUUN, HELLSTEN (eds.), supra note 162, at p. 42 seq., recital 84 
claim that the non-statutory exemption is not applicable to collective agreements which only cover an intentional 
distortion o f competition. Hence the benefit o f the exemption can be, comparable to block exemptions, 
withdrawn.
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exemption) and ratione personae. For the exemption of collective agreements ratione 
materiae he formulated three conditions:
- the agreement must be made within the formal framework of collective bargaining between 
both sides of the industry.
- the agreement should be concluded in good faith, so that the employers cannot abuse it.
- the agreement must concern core subjects o f collective bargaining like wages and working 
conditions and must not directly affect third parties or markets.471 472
For agreements that directly affect third parties and markets, AG Jacobs proposed to balance 
the different interests involved in the framework of Art. 81(3) EC and to grant an exemption 
where appropriate, applying a broad interpretation of Art. 81(3) EC which takes social policy 
objectives into consideration. Regarding the application o f  Art. 81 EC to collective 
agreements ratione personae, AG Jacobs distinguished between employees, trade unions and 
employers, while he only considered the latter undertakings in the sense of competition 
law.473
The exemption ratione materiae proposed by AG Jacobs is to be criticized as well. Apart 
from the general critique against the creation of a non-statutoiy exemption, there are also 
specific points o f critique against the exemption AG Jacobs suggested. The second condition, 
the requirement o f good faith, is obviously derived from the American case-law.474 AG 
Jacobs did not take into consideration that, as opposed to section 1 Sherman Act in its 
alternative o f a “conspiracy in restraint o f trade or commerce”, Art. 81 EC lacks any 
subjective criterion and does not require intention in any of its alternatives. The object (or 
effect) of preventing, restricting or distorting competition is a purely objective criterion.475 
Thus the requirement o f good faith is foreign to Community competition law. The condition 
that the collective agreement must not directly affect third parties and markets is flawed as 
well. It seems difficult, if  not impossible, to draw a clear divide between direct and indirect 
effect476 and one could well argue that an agreement on wages has a direct effect on the 
markets for goods and services by raising costs of production. Hence an exemption ratione 
materiae as created by Jacobs cannot constitute a solution either.
471 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 191-194.
472 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 193.
473 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 209-236.
474 See United Mine Workers o f  America v James M. Pennington, 7 June 1965,381 U.S. 657, at 665 seq.; Meat 
Cutters Union v Jewel Tea C o 7 June 1965,381 U.S. 676, at 690.
475 See, for example, V. EMMERICH in U. IMMENGA, E.-J. MESTMÄCKER (eds.), EG-Wettbewerbsrecht: 
Kommentar, Band 1, C.H. Beck, München 1997, Art. 85 Abs. 1, recital 240 seq.
476 See FLEISCHER, “Tarifverträge und Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht”, supra note 458, at 824 seq.
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3. Summary
The above analysis and criticism show that the ECJ has developed two different methods to 
deal with the collision of competition law with the fields o f social insurance and collective 
bargaining. On the one hand, it has introduced a new definition of undertaking which only 
awkwardly fits into the general principles and doctrine o f competition law and thus causes 
legal uncertainty and might have negative repercussions in other fields of competition law. On 
the other hand, it has established a non-statutory exemption for collective agreements without 
properly defining the limits o f  this exemption. This fuzzy concept also causes legal 
uncertainty and leads to inconsistent results, especially compared with other social objectives 
which are not covered by the exemption. Furthermore, the non-statutory exemption is not able 
to take into consideration the objectives o f  competition law, particularly with regard to the 
effects o f collective agreements on third parties and markets. Hence a new solution must be 
found which can take into consideration the objectives of all three areas - competition law, 
social security and collective bargaining -  and which is consistent with the general concepts 
o f law.
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IV. The Trade-off: Applying competition law, respecting
fundamental rights and general principles of law
Having described the case-law and having identified its major flaws, this author’s solution o f 
how to deal with the relation o f  competition law with social insurance and collective 
bargaining will be presented. The underlying idea is that it should first be considered whether 
competition law can simply be applied to social insurance schemes and collective agreements 
without causing a conflict between these fields of law. Only where the application o f 
competition law would eventually lead to an impediment o f social insurance and/or collective 
bargaining, a balanced trade-off must be found between the colliding fields, whereby special 
attention will be paid to both the fundamental role competition law plays in the EC Treaty and 
to the importance o f social protection and collective bargaining in the Community legal order.
1. The Art. 86(2) EC solution in the field of social insurance -  avoiding 
confrontation, safeguarding proportionality
Regarding the relation between social insurance and competition law, the ECJ and the CFI 
seek to find a balance by weighing the diverse features o f solidarity when defining the term 
“undertaking”. The discussion above showed that this approach is flawed.477 478In this section, 
w e shall examine whether the application of competition law to social insurance schemes 
really leads to a clash. Only where this is the case must a method be found to resolve the 
conflict. Due consideration will be given to the competence o f the Member States in the field 
o f  social security, the insufficient integration of the Community in this field, and the 
fundamental right o f  access to social security. For the purpose o f the analysis, a distinction 
shall be drawn between the relationship o f the insurance funds to their affiliated and the 
relationship o f the insurances funds to third parties, e.g. suppliers of medical goods and 
services.
477 See above at pp. 55-70.
478 Compare above pp. 22-28.
79
a) The relationship between the funds an d  the affiliated
aa) Possible infringements o f com petition law: A rt. 82 E C  and A rt. 86(1) EC in 
conjunction w ith A rt. 82 EC
Firstly we shall question to what extent infringements of competition law can occur in the 
relation between the social insurance funds and their affiliated.
An infringement o f  Art. 82 EC is possible where the funds themselves abuse a dominant 
position. Social insurance funds, be it at national or sectoral level, usually hold a dominant 
position in the relevant market o f insurance against the specific risk. This dominant position 
can result from compulsory affiliation479 or from special rights granted to the funds, which 
make an affiliation with such funds more attractive or even the only possible choice for the 
insured.480 The Court ruled in Albany and Pavlov that the funds held a (collective) dominant 
position, because they had the exclusive right to manage supplementary pension schemes in a 
certain sector in a Member State and hence in a substantial part o f  the common market.481 482
Abuses o f that dominant position which might occur include: imposing unfair contributions or 
insurance conditions on the affiliated according to Art. 82(a) EC; limiting the provision o f 
insurance services contrary to Art. 82(b) EC; or discriminating between the affiliated when 
granting individual exemptions to compulsory affiliation in the sense of Art. 82(c) EC. The 
issue o f unfair contribution rates or insurance conditions within the meaning o f Art. 82(a) EC 
can occur in any context, in which the fund is a monopolist and itself determines the rate o f 
contributions and benefits. In Poucet e t Pistre, for example, the plaintiffs contended that 
private insurers offered wider insurance cover for lower premium rates. An example of 
limiting insurance services according to Art. 82(b) EC is given in Albany, where the funds 
only provided an average pension o f 70% o f  the former income and did not provide for 
additional pensions. Because o f  compulsory affiliation, there was no opportunity to entrust a 
single insurer with the complete provision o f  pensions at a higher level.483 Discriminatory
479 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 381-383 and his Opinion in Pavlov, supra note 253, 
para. 34.
480 See Opinion o f AG Tesauro in Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 4.
481 Albany, supra note 2, para. 92; Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 125 seq. See the criticisms of GYSELEN, supra 
note 294, at 444 seq.
482 The plaintiffs argued that the dominant position occupied by the funds enabled them to fix prices and trading 
conditions unilaterally and that they therefore operated under conditions that they would not have been able to 
obtain in a competitive market. See Report of the Hearing in joined Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, at 641.
483 Albany, supra note 2, para. 96 seq. It must be noted that in this context Art. 86(1) in conjunction with Art 82, 
and not Art. 82(b), was analyzed.
80
practice according to Art. 82(c) EC can also be seen in the Albany cases, where the plaintiffs 
complained that the funds should have granted them an individual exemption from 
compulsory affiliation.4®4 Even though this was not explicitly done so in the respective cases, 
this practice can be interpreted as discrimination, if others were granted exemptions under 
similar conditions. Another abuse that might occur in the exercise of the right to grant 
exemptions is that the funds themselves can determine the degree of competition they arc 
exposed to.48 85 Discrimination might also occur where the funds can suspend payment of 
contributions or exempt the affiliated from payment of contributions for specific reasons, c.g. 
economic difficulties o f the affiliated or its undertaking, and use their discretion in a 
discriminatory way.
Furthermore, Art. 82 EC requires that the abusive behavior has a (potential) effect on trade 
between Member States. Since national and sectoral insurance schemes arc nationally 
bounded, their behavior can have an effect on trade between Member States with regard to the 
provision of cross-boundary insurance or of cross-boundary supplies purchased by insurance 
funds.
In the given context, the Ladbroke doctrine, which was discussed intensively above,4*7 plays a 
crucial role. If the funds are given a certain discretion in determining the contributions, 
benefits or services vis-à-vis the affiliated,488 or in granting exemptions from compulsory 
affiliation,489 they themselves can be held liable for abuse of their dominant position. If, on 
the other hand, the funds merely apply the law without discretion, they cannot be made 
responsible for the anti-competitive behavior.490 For example, in Poucet et Pistre, the rate of 
the contributions and the amount o f benefits was proscribed by law or by decree, leaving no 
discretion to the funds in question.491 Art. 82 EC can only apply to social insurance funds in 
their relationship with their affiliated: if  they themselves impose unfair contributions or 
insurance conditions on the affiliated; if  they are responsible for limiting the supply of 
insurance services on the market by refusing to offer additional services and/or benefits; or if
484 See, for example, Albany, supra note 2, para. 25-37, especially para. 33.
485 See Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 442.
486 This right existed for example Fédération Française, supra note 105, see Opinion of AG Tesauro at para. 7. 
A similar provision existed in Pavlov, see Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Pavlov, supra noie 253, para. 34.
487 See above at pp. 63-65.
488 As, for example, in the German statutory health insurance scheme, sec Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK- 
Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 38,40.
489 As, for example, in the Albany cases, see Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 354.
490 See Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing, supra note 372, para. 33 seq.; C.I.F., supra note 381, para. 
54 seq.; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG- Vertrages, supra note 138, at pp. 114 seq.
491 Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 15.
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they engage in discriminatory behavior on their own, exercising discretion, by refusing to 
grant individual exemptions or suspension of/exemption from payment to their affiliated.
Even if the Ladbroke doctrine is applicable, an infringement o f  competition law may still 
exist, not by the undertaking concerned, but rather by the Member State. According to Art. 
86(1) EC, a  M ember State shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to 
the rules contained in the EC Treaty, especially Articles 81-89, with regard to public 
undertakings or undertakings to which the Member State grants special or exclusive rights. In 
this context, an infringement o f Art. 86(1) EC in conjunction with Art. 82 EC might be of 
relevance. The application of Art. 82 EC does not preclude the application of Art. 86(1) in 
conjunction with Art. 82 EC, both provisions can be applied at the same time.492 On the other 
hand, the provision o f Art. 3(g), 10, 82 EC, which obliges Member States not to adopt or 
maintain in force any measures which could deprive the competition rules o f their 
effectiveness,493 is not applicable in cases where Art. 86(1) EC is applicable, the latter being a 
lex specialis provision.494
The first objection against the applicability o f Art. 86(1) EC, brought forward by the 
Netherlands Government in the Albany cases, is that social insurance funds are not granted 
special rights, but that only a certain group (in this case undertakings in a given industrial 
sector) is obliged to affiliate with the fund in question.495 Yet this argument is to be rejected, 
because compulsory affiliation also means that only the respective funds are able to raise 
contributions and provide social insurance services in a given sector, thus conferring an 
effective monopoly on the funds, which constitutes an exclusive right.496 In the Albany cases 
the funds also enjoyed the exclusive right o f granting exemptions to compulsory affiliation497 
Therefore social insurance hinds to which affiliation is somehow made compulsory by state 
measures enjoy exclusive rights.498
492 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 150 seq. and p. 290.
493 Case 13/77, Inno vA TA B , (  1977) ECR 2115, para. 30 seq.; AhmedSaaed Flugreisen, supra note 452, para. 
48; Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 371.
494 Case C-323/93, Centre d'insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Mayenne, (1994) ECR 1-5077, 
para. 15; Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 371 ; BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 
266.
495 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 374.
496 The mere fact of compulsory affiliation takes away any incentive to conclude an additional insurance contract 
with private companies, thus conferring an effective monopoly on the insurance funds. Albany, supra note 2, 
para. 90 and Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra  note 2, para. 375.
497 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 376.
498 See also Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 122.
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The addressees o f Art. 86(1) EC are the Member States. Where only the undertakings 
themselves are responsible for a breach o f  competition law, Art. 86(1) EC is not applicable.499 
Therefore there must be a causal link between the state measure and the anti-competitive 
behavior the undertakings are engaged in; the abusive behavior must be a direct consequence 
of the Member State’s legal framework.500 This is, as AG Jacobs recognized, **... one o f the 
reasons for the fundamental dilemma in the application of Art. 90(1) (now Art. 86(1) EC -  
added by the author)”.501 502Art. 86(1) EC implies that Member States are allowed to grant the 
special or exclusive rights in question to certain undertakings, thus creating statutory 
monopolies. Therefore the creation o f a dominant position by granting these rights as such 
does not constitute an infringement of the competition rules.503 There must be additional 
circumstances leading to the conclusion that there is an infringement of the Treaty’s 
provisions on competition (in this case Art. 82 EC), which is directly caused by the exclusive 
right.504 According to the Courts, this occurs under certain conditions where the mere exercise 
o f this right necessarily and unavoidably involves the abuse of a dominant position;505 or if 
the exclusive right is liable to create a situation in which the respective undertaking is induced 
to commit such abuses;506 or if state measures enable the undertaking which is granted an 
exclusive right to abuse its dominant position.507 The case-law in this field can be roughly 
divided into three strands.508
First there are what AG Jacobs calls the ERT-type cases.509 Here the exclusive right is 
connected to additional (structural) features and this leads to abusive behavior or makes it
499 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 388
500 Centre d ’insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Moyenne, supra note 494, para. 20; Opinion o f AG 
Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 388.
501 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 389.
502 See, for example, Case C-320/9I,Corbeau, (1993) ECR1-2533, para. 12-14,
503 See, for example, Case 311/84, CBEM v CLTand IPB, (1985) ECR 3261, para. 17; Höfncr v Elsner, supra 
note 231, para. 29; Case C-179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Ge nova, (1991) ECR 1-5889, para. 16; Centre 
d'insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Moyenne, supra note 494, para. 18; Albany, supra note 2, 
para. 93; Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 127; Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 389-391.
Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 392.
505 Höfner v Elsner, supra note 231, para. 29; Centre d'insémination de ia Crespelle v Coopérative de la 
Moyenne, supra note 494, para. 18; Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 127.
506 ERT, supra note 202, para. 37; Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova, supra notc 503, para. 17; Pa\’lov, 
supra note 253, para. 127.
502 GB-lnno-BM, supra note 374, para. 20; Case C-203/96, Dusseldorp and others v Minister van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, (1998) ECR 1-4075, para. 61.
508 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 395. For a division into at least four strands, including 
the additional category “extension of the dominant position doctrine": BUEND1A SIËRRA, supra note 295, at 
pp. 163-176.
509 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albarty, supra note 2, para. 395-405. BUENDIA SIËRRA, supra note 295, al pp. 
165 seq* speaks o f the “conflict of interests doctrine”.
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very likely.510 This usually involves an inherent conflict of interests. For example in the ERT  
case, a broadcasting company was assigned the exclusive right to broadcast its own 
programmes and to retransmit foreign broadcasts, which led to discrimination in favor o f  its 
own programmes.511 In Raso, certain dock-work companies were granted the exclusive right 
to supply temporary labor to other companies, while they were also allowed to compete with 
the latter companies.512 513In GB-Inno-BM , an undertaking which marketed telephone equipment 
was granted the exclusive right o f drawing up the specifications for such equipment, 
monitoring their application and granting type-approval, thus determining which products 
were allowed to  compete with its own products. According to the opinion o f AG Jacobs, 
one example from the field o f social insurance is the exclusive right of the funds to grant an 
exemption to compulsory affiliation in the Albany cases. The funds had discretion to grant 
exemptions, were only subject to marginal judicial review and could thus themselves 
determine the degree o f competition to which they were exposed. The exclusive right of 
granting individual exemptions thus caused an inherent conflict of interests.514
The second strand o f  case-law is the Hofner-type cases, as AG Jacobs calls them.515 In these 
cases, Member States create a situation by granting exclusive rights that inevitably leads to 
the abuse o f  a  dominant position under Art. 82(b) EC when the right is exercised by the 
monopoly undertaking, because the monopoly undertaking is manifestly not in a position to 
satisfy demand on the respective market.516 In the field of social insurance, the Court found 
this to be the case in the three Albany cases, where every worker affiliated to the scheme 
received an aggregate pension o f  70% o f  his final salary. Since some undertakings intended to 
provide their employees with higher pensions, but could not entrust it to a single insurer 
(which would have been more efficient and would have caused less administrative costs), the 
Court regarded the situation as a  Hofner-type case, in which the undertaking was not able to 
satisfy the existing demand.517
5,0 Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 400.
511 ERT, supra note 202, para. 37 seq.
5,2 Case C-l 63/96, Raso and others, (1998) ECR 1-533, para. 28-32.
513 GB-Inno-BM', supra note 374, para. 24-28.
5,4 Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 441 -465.
315 Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 406-416. BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 
163-165 speaks of the “demand limitation doctrine” .
5,6 Hofner v Eisner, supra note 231, para. 29-31; Job Centre, supra note 458, para. 31-35.
™ Albany, supra note 2, para. 94-97.
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A third type o f case is the Corbeau cases as identified by AG Jacobs.518 Here the Court did 
not analyze an infringement o f Art. 86(1) EC, but stated that this provison had to be read in 
conjunction with Art. 86(2) EC. It moved directly to assessing the justification o f  Art. 86(2) 
EC.519 520One example o f an infringement o f Articles 86(1) and 82 EC, which cannot be clearly 
attributed to the former two strands o f case-law, is the exclusive right of tax deductibility o f 
contributions granted to the funds in the case Fédération Française. This right, combined 
with the possibility that the supplementary scheme could use the assets o f the statutory 
scheme, constituted an abusive impediment o f  the competitors and could also be regarded as a 
form o f predatory pricing.
In summary, there are cases where either Art. 82 EC or Art. 86(1) in conjunction with Art. 82 
EC  can be infringed in the relation between the funds and the affiliated. The question then 
arises i f  Art. 86(2) EC as a justification or exemption is fulfilled, which is applicable both to 
Art. 82 EC and Art. 86(1) EC infringements.521
b b ) T he justifìcation/exemption according to Art. 86(2) EC
The essential question is whether the anticompetitive behavior o f the funds and the Member 
States can be exempted from the competition rules under Art. 86(2) EC. This article is 
designed to find a compromise between the grant of special rights to undertakings by the 
M em ber States in order to fulfill tasks o f service public (service o f general interest) and the 
Community’s interest in undistorted competition in the common market.522 According to Art. 
86(2) EC, the competition rules are only applicable to these undertakings as long as their 
application does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks
518 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 417-440. See also BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, 
a tp p . 173-176.
519 Corbeau, supra note 502, para. 12-14; Case C-266/96, Corsica Ferries France, (1998) ECR 1-3949, para. 40- 
47. AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Albany, supra note 2, para. 419 claimed that even the case of Sacchi may fall in 
this group -  see the assessment of the Court in Sacchi, supra note 346, para. 12-18 in connection with the 
Opinion o f AG Reischl, at p. 443 seq.
520 Fédération Française, supra note 105.
521 This is consistent in the case-law, see for example Corbeau, supra note 502, para. 12-14 and the summary by 
BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 288-299, particularly pp. 292-298; critical GIESEN, 
Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at pp. 88-91 and p. 95, who wants to apply Art. 86(2) EC, because 
o f  its wording that is addressed to undertakings, only indirectly to the Member States in the context of Art. 86(1) 
EC by justifying the required anti-competitive conduct o f the undertakings and thus also justifying the measure 
o f  the Member States. A direct application should only be possible where the legislation itself restricts 
competition and substitutes the economic behavior o f an undertaking. This eventually leads to the same results as 
a direct application.
522 See, for example, France v Commission, supra note 374, para. 12; Case C-157/94, Commission v 
Netherlands, (1997) ECR 1-5699, para. 39; Albany, supra note 2, para. 103; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, 
supra  note 2, para. 436.
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assigned to them. This implies a trade-off subject to the principle o f  proportionality:523 
restrictions o f competition as well as abuses o f a dominant position are allowed, in so far as 
they are necessary for the provision o f a service public and trade is not affected to an extent 
that would be contrary to the interest o f the Community.
aaa) Entrusted with the operation o f  services o f  general economic interest 
Art. 86(2) EC firstly requires that the funds are undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services o f  general economic interest. As discussed in detail above, the funds constitute 
undertakings and offer a service -  social insurance.524 52 The question is whether social 
insurance is a service o f general economic interest. It might be argued that the provision of 
social insurance is of general social interest and not o f general economic interest. Yet there 
are good reasons to reject such an argument. The requirement o f  a general economic interest 
is usually interpreted broadly by the Court, which only demands a general interest and omits 
the term economic. Furthermore it is argued that “services o f  general economic interest” is 
an incorrect formulation which is not to be interpreted literally, but rather teleologically.526 
The interest envisioned by Art. 86(2) EC is supposed to be o f  a social, cultural or similar 
nature, because the mere aim o f attaining economic benefits for the public undertaking or the 
state cannot of itself constitute a  general interest in the sense o f  Art. 86(2) EC (the economic 
interest o f  the undertaking and the Member States is rather protected by the second alternative 
of Art. 86(2) EC: revenue-producing monopoly).527 Art. 86(2) first alternative EC was created 
for the maintenance o f service public in the Member States528 and not to protect the Member
523 Art. 86(2) involves a classical test o f proportionality: competition can be restricted (or even erased) if there is:
I. a legitimate purpose: the task assigned to the undertaking (in our case the provision of services of general 
economic interest).
II. necessity: the anticompetitive measure must be necessary to perform the particular task under economically 
acceptable conditions.
III. proportionality in a narrower sense: the effect on trade must not be so strong as to be contrary to the interests 
of the Community.
AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Albany, supra note 2, para. 417 describes the test under Art. 86(2) as a balancing 
process on the justification of the scope o f the monopoly. In A OK-Bundesverband he even speaks o f a test of 
proportionality with regard to Art. 86(2), see Opinion of AG Jacobs in A OK-Bundesverbandy supra note 107, 
para. 90. See also BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 300-341; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p.
72; GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at p. 93 (Art. 86(2) as an expression of the 
Community principle o f proportionality).
524 See above at pp. 55-67.
525 In Albany, supra note 2, para. 98, the Court speaks o f “a particular social task of general interest’*. In Corsica 
Ferries France, supra note 519, para. 45 the Court identified public security as a general economic interest. See 
also BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 277 seq..
526 See BERG, supra note 292, at 173.
527 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 278, similarly GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 
94, at p. 92.
528 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 279.
86
States from economic difficulties experienced because of the removal of trade-barriers.529 
Therefore it is argued that the term “economic” refers to the activity in question and not to the 
interest pursued and that the correct wording should be: “economic services of general 
interest”.530
The funds pursue a social objective, because they cover large parts of the population with 
insurance against social risks under socially acceptable conditions for the individual.531 This 
objective is also in the general interest, since large parts of the population are covered with 
social insurance and this contributes to social peace and justice in the entire society. With 
regard to supplementary occupational pension funds (second pillar), AG Jacobs argued in the 
Albany cases that the funds clearly have a social objective, because they provide additional 
pensions beyond the minimum pensions of the statutory scheme for large parts of the 
population. Thus they do not primarily act in their own or the affiliated members' interest, but 
in the general interest.532 53The ECJ followed the opinion of its Advocate General.333 However 
even a literal interpretation of the term “general economic interest” would come to the same 
result. Social insurance provides for the material background which enables each individual to 
exercise his economic freedom without the constant constraint and threat of incalculable 
social risks.534 Social insurance contributes to national economies as a whole, since it prevents 
the impoverishment o f  those whose ability to work is impeded or erased by the occurrence of 
social risks (including the inevitable occurrence of age) and who would otherwise have to live 
on social assistance. Hence the provision of social insurance is in the general economic 
interest. The funds are furthermore entrusted with this interest by the Member States, because 
either national legislation or the state-approved statutes governing them determine the 
provision of social insurance as their task.535
bbb) No obstruction o f  the particular task assigned to the funds
Art. 86(2) EC also requires that the application of the competition rules must not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to the undertakings in question. 
The term obstruct is interpreted broadly by the Courts. Taking into consideration the wording 
{obstruct) and the telos (reconciling the Member States’ interest in service public with the
529 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 303.
530 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 278.
531 See above at pp. 18-22. See also GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 134.
532 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 423 seq.
533 Albany, supra note 2, para. 105.
534 See above at pp. 39 seq.
535 Critical with regard to the Dutch legislation in the Albany casts GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 445 seq.
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Community’s interest in undistorted competition) o f the rule, the ECJ ruled that it is not 
necessary that the survival o f  the undertaking is threatened. Rather it suffices that the 
maintenance o f  exclusive rights is necessary to enable the undertaking to perform the tasks of 
general economic interest assigned to it under economically acceptable conditions.536 37 538When 
describing the objectives of social insurance above, it was explained that in order to provide 
large parts o f  the population with insurance under socially acceptable conditions, the 
respective schemes must involve certain degrees o f solidarity to cross-subsidize bad risks, the 
worse-off and the individual. Otherwise underprivileged groups in society - the poor, the old 
and the sick -  could not afford insurance or would not even be accepted in the insurance 
scheme. The maintenance o f the financial equilibrium o f  the schemes based on solidarity 
requires compulsory affiliation or other restrictive measures.539 Without compulsory 
affiliation, the good risks would leave the scheme, looking for more advantageous insurance 
conditions in the private market (where they do not have to finance the bad risks), and only 
bad risks would remain in the scheme. This would inevitably lead to increased costs for the 
funds and thus to an increase in contributions. In the end it would become more difficult or 
even impossible to insure the bad risks at acceptable prices.540 With regard to solidarity 
between the different income groups, the same effect would occur without compulsory 
affiliation. The better-off would leave the scheme seeking more advantageous insurance with 
private suppliers, so that their contributions could not be used to subsidize the worse-off.541 
The same argument can also be applied to the third group of solidarity between the 
community and the individual and to the fourth group o f intergenerational solidarity (be it in a 
scheme based on pay-as-you-go or capitalization), which also involve a redistribution of 
wealth. The concept that the good risks subsidize the bad risks, the better-off the worse-off,
536 Commission v Netherlands, supra note 522, para. 38-43. See also Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra 
note 2, para. 438. A literal interpretation of the English version (obstruct) and the French version (faire échec) 
clearly supports the broad interpretation chosen by the Court. Yet the German version “verhindem” (prevent) is 
more restrictive and a literal interpretation of the term would not allow for the broad interpretation. Therefore the 
Court formulated its decision in a way that gives at the same time semantic and teleological reasons for the broad 
interpretation of Art. 86 (2) EC.
337 Corbeau, supra note 502, para. 14-16; Commission v Netherlands, supra note 522, para. 53; Albany, supra 
note 2, para. 107.
538 See above at pp. 18-21.
539 See above at p. 21 and Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 13: “a system o f compulsory contribution (...) is 
indispensable for application of the principle o f solidarity and the financial equilibrium of those schemes.”
540 See the opinion o f the Commission in Report of the Hearing in Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, at pp. 656 seq. 
This was also the argument of the funds and the Netherlands government in the Albany cases, which the ECJ 
followed. Albany, supra note 2, para. 108; Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 427. See also 
BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 305 seq., who uses the French term écremage to describe this 
phenomenon; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG- Vert rages, supra note 138, at p. 134 seq.; WINTERSTEIN, supra 
note 316, at 330.
541 See the opinion o f  the Commission in Report o f the Hearing in Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, at pp. 656 seq. 
In the same vein the argument o f the funds and the Netherlands government in Albany, Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
Albany, supra note 2, para. 428.
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the community the individual and the generations each other would be rendered unworkable. 
In the Albany cases, the Court explicitly referred to the elements of solidarity in the respective 
schemes to justify the anticompetitive measures under Art. 86(2) EC.542 Thus compulsory 
affiliation to the funds is necessary to maintain the financial equilibrium of social insurance 
and to prevent a “downward spiral”.
The plaintiffs in the Albany cases contended that compulsory affiliation to the scheme was not 
necessary to maintain its financial equilibrium. They argued that collective agreements 
containing minimum requirements for pensions would suffice, that the law could impose 
minimum requirements, i.e. by forbidding risk selections, and that many sectoral pension 
funds in the Netherlands functioned without compulsory affiliation.543 This actually led AG 
Jacobs to conclude that the question of whether compulsory affiliation was necessary had to 
be left to the national courts.544 The ECJ, on the other hand, employed the argument of the 
“downward spiral”, as described above, and found that the requirements of Art. 86(2) EC 
were fulfilled.545 The judgment of the ECJ deserves approval.546 Firstly, it is doubtful that the 
alternative suggestions o f  the plaintiffs, i.e. only requiring minimum standards, would suffice 
to maintain a social insurance scheme, because solidarity and redistribution, essential for the 
functioning o f  such schemes, can best be guaranteed by compulsory affiliation. Another factor 
must also be taken into account. As discussed previously, Community competence in the field 
o f  social protection is limited to coordination and a minimum degree of harmonization. The 
organization o f  social insurance schemes clearly lies within the competence of the Member 
States.547 This does not mean that Community law cannot address social insurance issues at 
all.548 But when applying Community law to social insurance schemes, the competence of the 
Member States in this field is to be given due regard.549 This means that the Member States 
must be given a relatively wide margin of appreciation in the organisation of their social 
insurance schemes and that any interference by the European Courts must be restricted to
542 Albany, supra note 2, para. 109 seq.
543 Albany, supra note 2, para. 99 seq.; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 430-432.
544 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 433-435.
545 Albany, supra note 2, para. 108-111.
546 Contra GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 447 seq.
547 See above at pp. 22 seq.
548 AXER, supra note 320, at 60; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 77.
549 For the application of Art. 28, see, for example, Duphar v Netherland, supra note 137, para. 16; for the 
application of competition law see Poucet et Pistre, supra note 1, para. 6; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, 
supra note 2, para. 437; U. BÜDENBENDER, “Anmerkung zu EuGH Urt. v. 21.9.1999 -  Rs. C-67/96", (*2000) 
ZIP 44, at 47; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 122; GIESEN, 
Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at pp. 159 seq.
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clear infringements o f Community law.550 Such an infringement cannot be seen in compulsory 
affiliation, which is the most effective way to ensure solidarity and thus the financial 
equilibrium o f social insurance schemes.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Albany, supported by AG Jacobs, contended that the exclusive 
right o f  the funds to grant individual exemptions to compulsory affiliation (in which they 
enjoyed discretion and judicial review was only marginal) constituted an infringement o f Art. 
86 (1) in conjunction with Art. 82 EC. The possibility to grant exemptions as such, which is 
necessary for fairness in the single case, was not at issue but the fact that this right was 
granted to the funds and not to an independent entity.551 The ECJ, on the other hand, ruled 
that there was no infringement. The Court analyzed the right to grant exemptions in 
conjunction with compulsory affiliation. It read Articles 86(1), 82 EC in connection with Art. 
86(2) EC, as is its constant practice in the Corbeau-type cases.552 Since the exemption from 
compulsory affiliation must not threaten the financial equilibrium of the scheme, the ECJ 
recognized that such a decision involves a complex analysis of actuarial data, which 
necessarily involves a wide margin of appreciation. Because o f  this complex analysis, the ECJ 
accepted the Member State’s decision to entrust this task to the funds themselves, which have 
the best expertise, and not to a separate entity. The only condition was that those decisions 
were subject to judicial review in order to prevent arbitrary decisions and to safeguard the 
principle o f  non-discrimination.553 This judgment is to be welcomed. The Court respected the 
competence o f the Member States in the field of social security and their respective margin of 
appreciation, while at the same time demanding judicial measures in order to prevent arbitrary 
decisions by the funds.554 The same solution should be applied to other exemptions that can 
be granted by the funds for reasons o f social justice in the single case, like the exemption 
from, or suspension of, payment o f  contributions in cases of financial difficulties.
The next question to be addressed is whether compulsory affiliation can also be justified with 
regard to the financing system of pay-as-you-go in pension schemes, which does not 
necessarily involve greater or lesser solidarity than the schemes based on capitalization. 
Firstly, it must be observed that social insurance is within the competence o f the Member
550 Albany, supra note 2, para. 122.
551 Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 441-465.
552 See above at p. 85.
553 Albany, supra note 2, para. 119-121.
554 See the critique o f GADB1N, supra note 252, at 184, who doubts that the national courts can guarantee that 
the funds’ decisions are non-discriminatory.
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States and that they therefore enjoy a margin of discretion in the organization of their 
schemes. Even though there might be good arguments against pay-as-you-go, e.g. Europe’s 
demographic development, there are also some arguments in favor o f this system. It does not 
expose pensions to the volatility o f the capital markets and does not make pensions dependent 
on macroeconomic development. Furthermore, a change from a system of pay-as-you-go to 
capitalization involves major difficulties. It is very expensive to simultaneously pay, during 
an initial phase, both redistributive pensions and to create a capital stock. Additionally, the 
high accumulation o f  capital in pension funds might cause macroeconomic distortions.555 
Thus there are legitimate reasons for a state to maintain its pension scheme based on the 
redistribution method. It is obvious that the functioning o f  such a scheme necessarily depends 
on compulsory affiliation, which guarantees that the working generation finances the retired 
and that future generations will finance the present working generation.556 Without 
compulsory affiliation, the funds based on pay-as-you-go would not be able to provide 
pension insurance. Therefore the feature o f  financing by pay-as-you-go can also serve as a 
justification under Art. 86(2) EC.
A n example o f an exclusive right granted to a social insurance fund, which is different from 
compulsory affiliation, is the possibility for the insured to deduce their contributions from 
taxable earned income, as was the case in Fédération Française,557 *Even though this right 
w as granted to the insured rather than to the fund, the fund directly and exclusively profited 
from  it because only the contributions to this fund were deductible from taxes. Thus it can be 
interpreted as the exclusive right o f the fund to offer tax deductibility. The strong incentive 
thus provided to affiliate with the fund conferred an effective monopoly on it. Since the 
fund in question also exhibited certain features o f solidarity: for example the possibility o f 
exemption from contributions in the event o f  illness; the suspension o f payment in case o f 
econom ic hardship;559 no selection o f  risks;560 the independence o f contributions from risks561 
and was clearly intended to cover a large, underprivileged part o f the population with 
insurance against social risks,562 it might well be argued that the exclusive right conferred on
355 GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 135.
356 See Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 338; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertragest 
supra  note 138, at p. 135.
537 Fédération Française, supra note 105.
338 Opinion of AG Tesauro in Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 4.
359 Opinion of AG Tesauro in Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 7.
360 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 9.
361 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 19.
362 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 8.
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it was necessary in the sense o f Art. 86(2) EC to maintain its financial equilibrium.563 The 
ECJ indicated some support for this position.564 Since the facts provided in the judgment are 
relatively rare, a definite answer as to the necessity o f the exclusive right o f tax deductibility 
for the financial equilibrium o f  the fund and the accomplishment o f its social objective cannot 
be given here.
ccc) The development o f  trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to 
the interest o f  the Community
The final requirement o f Art. 86(2) EC is that the development o f  trade must not be affected 
to such an extent as would be contrary to the interest o f  the Community. The interpretation o f 
this term is highly controversial. The exact content o f this provision is disputed, especially the 
meaning o f  the term “interests o f the Community”. One opinion argues in favor o f an 
objective interpretation which relies on the objectives in Art. 2 EC in order to identify the 
Community interests. Some went even further and restricted the interests o f the Community to 
the maintenance o f  a common market in which competition freely operates.565 Yet this narrow 
interpretation cannot be upheld today with regard to the development of the Community after 
Maastricht and Amsterdam. A more flexible approach advocates a subjective interpretation, 
considering Art. 86(2) EC a mainly political norm.566 *Furthermore the question was discussed 
of whether the second sentence o f Art. 86(2) EC was directly applicable or if  it was a sub- 
exception to the first sentence, only applicable by the Commission. The ECJ directly 
applies Art. 86(2) EC, but simply ignores the second sentence o f  this provision. This can be 
interpreted as suggesting that the second sentence is only a clarification o f the first sentence 
and lacks any independent meaning.568
The interpretation favored here is that the provision o f  Art. 86(2) -  second clause - EC is part 
of a comprehensive test o f proportionality in the framework o f  Art. 86(2) EC, which is 
directly applicable. While the first sentence assures that the restrictions o f competition serve a 
legitimate aim * the fulfillment o f a  general interest - and that they are necessary to attain this 
purpose, the second sentence introduces a test o f proportionality in the narrow sense. It is
563 G1ESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 138 seq.
564 Fédération Française, supra note 105, para. 20.
565 See BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 342 seq.
566 BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 343 seq.
367 Compare BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 25, at pp. 344 seq. See also the doubts AG Jacobs had with regard 
to direct applicability in his Opinion in Albany, supra note 2, para. 433-435.
568 See, for example, the overview by BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at pp. 348-352. A dear example 
from the case-law is Albany, supra note 2, para. 103-123.
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undisputable that the Member States have at least a broad margin o f  discretion in defining the 
general interest and that the very purpose o f Art. 86(2) EC is to take into account the Member 
States’ service public.569 The second clause o f Art. 86(2) EC guarantees that the interests and 
objectives of the Community are not completely undermined by consideration o f the service 
public . In the case o f social insurance, it must be borne in mind that social security and social 
protection are considered objectives o f the Community (see Articles 2, 3(j), 136 seq. EC) and 
that it can even be assumed that there is a fundamental right of access to social insurance on 
the Community level.570 Thus social protection and security themselves constitute major 
Community interests and their consideration cannot possibly be contrary to the interests o f  the 
Community.
cc) Sum m ary
The above analysis shows that, in the relation between social insurance funds and their 
affiliated, the respective anti-competitive measures are generally justified under Art. 86(2) 
EC. Compulsory affiliation and the creation o f monopolies in the field o f  social insurance are 
necessary to maintain the financial equilibrium of the schemes and the features o f solidarity 
involved in them. Certain additional rights granted to the funds which are necessary for social 
justice  in the single case, like the right to grant exemptions from compulsory affiliation or the 
right to grant suspension of payment under certain conditions, are justified as well. These 
exemptions directly affect the financial equilibrium of the funds and thus require a complex 
actuarial analysis. A Member State must be allowed to entrust the funds with these decisions, 
because they have the highest expertise in deciding if an exemption is justified and financially 
feasible. Here the competence of the Member States in the field o f  social security must be 
respected by granting them a wide margin o f  appreciation. Only arbitrary decisions should be 
avoided by guaranteeing judicial review.
569 Albany, supra note 2, para. 103 seq.; BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 281 and p. 331.
570 See above at pp. 23-28.
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b) The relationship  between the funds and third parties
The next section deals with the application o f competition law  in the relation between the 
funds and third parties (e.g. suppliers o f  medical goods and services). The examples used will 
be confined to those stemming from the case-law.
aa) Possible infringements of competition law: Art. 81 EC, Art. 82 EC, Art. 86(1) EC in 
conjunction with Art. 81 EC and Articles 3(g), 10 and 81 EC
The first example from the case FENIN  concerns the abuse o f a dominant position by 
statutory health insurance funds.571 In Spain, 26 organizations were entrusted with the 
management o f the national health insurance scheme. Since those organisations had the 
exclusive right to manage the scheme and they behaved as a  collective entity on the market, 
they had a  collective dominant position in a substantial part o f the market.572 573They were 
accused o f  discrimination in the sense o f  Art. 82(c) EC, because they systematically took an 
average o f 300 days to pay their debts to the plaintiffs, providers of medical goods and 
equipment used in Spanish hospitals, while they settled their debts with other creditors in a far 
more reasonable period of time. This discrimination was attributed to their dominant position, 
which enabled the funds to delay payment without the threat o f  commercial pressure by the 
suppliers.
Another case concerning the relation between social insurance funds and the suppliers of 
medical goods and services was A OK Bundesverband,574 Here the leading associations of 
statutory sickness funds in Germany jointly  determined the so-called “fixed amounts”, fixed 
maximum amounts that would be paid for the purchase o f a certain category of medicine.575 
The German statutory health insurance system is based on benefits in kind and the insured 
were only reimbursed for the purchase o f  the respective medicine up to the level o f  the fixed 
maximum amount. The excess costs had to be borne by the insured themselves.576 This joint 
determination of the fixed maximum amounts by the leading associations o f funds constituted 
a purchase price fixing decision in the sense o f Art. 81(l)(a) EC. Usually price fixing 
decisions are regarded as having the restriction of competition as their objective, without a
571 FENIN, supra note 272.
572 For the concept o f  collective dominance in Art. 82, see joined Cases C -395,396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime 
Beige Transports and other v Commission, (2000) ECR 1-1365, para. 36.
373 FENIN, supra note 272, para. 1. 
m AOKBundesverband, supra note 107.
573 Opinion of AG Jacobs in A OK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 1.
576 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in A OK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 9.
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further consideration o f  the actual effects on competition being necessary.577 Although in 
theory the suppliers o f  medical products remained free to set prices above the level o f the 
fixed amounts, only 7%  o f  medical products to which the price fixing applied were sold at a 
higher price.578 579This additionally showed a  restrictive effect o f the decision. Therefore the 
decisions of the leading associations had both the objective and the effect of restricting 
competition. Since the entire German market of medical supply was affected, competition 
in a  substantial part o f  the common market was restricted and trade between Member States 
was affected.580
It w as very controversial in this case whether the associations o f funds themselves could be 
held responsible for this conduct or if  they only applied national law (§35  (3) SGB V), 
whereby accountability would be interrupted according to the Ladbroke doctrine.581 The 
restriction of competition would be attributable to the leading associations of the funds, i f  it 
was either wholly attributable to the manner in which they had exercised a given discretion or 
i f  their choices had exacerbated the restrictive effects.582 *The first possibility could be 
excluded, since the German law required the leading associations to set the fixed amounts on 
the basis o f the lowest sale prices. Therefore they could not have avoided any restriction o f 
competition. The question of whether the second alternative was fulfilled was answered in 
different ways by the national courts. The German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) was in favor o f  
applying the Ladbroke doctrine, because § 35 (3) SGB V imposed an obligation on the 
associations of funds to set the maximum amounts; it obliged them to review their decisions at 
least once a year; the funds were compelled to set the fixed amounts on the basis o f the lowest 
pharmacy sales price; the law laid down certain requirements for the decisions as to quality 
and profitability; the decisions were subject to judicial review and, finally, if  the associations 
o f funds failed to make a decision, the competent minister would do so. Hence the 
Bundesgerichtshof concluded that the funds had no discretion o f their own allowing them to 
exacerbate the restrictive effects of the determination o f fixed amounts.584 The 
Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Düsseldorf, on the other hand, came to the conclusion that the
377 Case 123/83, BNIC/Clair, (1985) ECR 391, para. 22; Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra 
note 107, para. 69.
578 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 10.
579 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 63-70.
580 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 71.
581 For the Ladbroke doctrine see above at pp. 63-65.
382 Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 82 and judgment in C.I.F., supra note 
381, para. 66.
313 Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 83.
™  BGH, supra note 286, (2001) WRP 1331, at 1337 seq.
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funds were engaged in autonomous conduct restricting competition, because they possessed 
discretion with regard to the exact level o f the maximum amounts and with regard to the time 
when to determine such amounts, thus having enough power to adversely affect competition 
on the relevant market,585 586One example of the discretion o f the funds was that they could 
appreciably lower the maximum amounts by changing the method of calculation. With 
regard to the restrictive application o f  the State action defense in the case-law and the need to 
protect the remaining competition,587 the view of the OLG Düsseldorf is preferable. The 
leading associations o f  the funds had enough discretion to themselves exacerbate the negative 
effects on competition. This is even truer with regard to the case-law in Consiglio Nazionale 
degli Spedizioneri Doganali v Commission, where the Court decided that the legal obligation 
to fix prices is irrelevant as long as the undertakings have an, albeit limited, discretion left.588
Furthermore, Art. 86(1) EC in conjunction with Art. 81 EC might be applicable in this case. 
The question is whether the leading associations o f the funds enjoy an exclusive right with 
regard to the determination o f fixed amounts. § 35 (3) SGB V imposes on the leading 
associations o f  sickness funds the obligation to jointly determine the fixed amounts. This 
obligation can also be interpreted as a  right to form a purchase cartel. An obligatory cartel, as 
exists in the case o f the determination o f fixed amounts, is a  classical example for the 
application o f Art. 86(1) in conjunction with Art. 81 EC.589 Yet even if  § 35 (3) SGB V 
cannot be regarded as an exclusive right granted to the funds, Articles 3(g), 10 and 81 EC as 
the lex generalis can still be applicable. These provisions were mentioned by AG Jacobs with 
regard to the determination of fixed amounts.590 The provisions o f  Articles 3(g), 10 and 81 EC 
require Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of legislative or 
regulatory nature, which may render the competition rules ineffective. This is particularly the 
case where a Member State requires or favors the adoption o f agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices contrary to Art. 81 EC, reinforces their effects, or where it deprives its 
own rules o f the character o f  legislation by delegating to private economic operators
585 OLG Düsseldorf, decision o f27.07.1999, U (Kart) 36/98. In the same vein AXER, supra note 320, at 62; 
ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at pp. 81 seq.; KOENIG/SANDER, supra no te , at 980; SLOT, supra note 309, 
at 588 seq.
586 OLG Düsseldorf, judgment o f 18.05.2001, U (Kart) 28/00, at p. 9; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 81.
587 See Van Landewyck v Commission, supra note 395, para. 106-134; joined Cases 240 to 242,261,262,268 
and 269/82, Stichting Sigarettenindustrie v Commission, (1985) ECR 3831, para. 13-45; Case C-219/95 P, 
Ferriere Nord  v Commission, (1997) ECR 1-4411, para. 22-25; Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizioneri Doganali 
v Commission, supra note 299, para. 41-75.
388 Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizioneri Doganali v Commission, supra note 299, para. 41-75. See also 
Opinion o f AG Jacobs in C.I.F., supra note 381, para. 61-74.
58i BUENDIA SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 190.
390 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AO K Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 85.
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responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.591 *It must be pointed out in 
this context that Articles 3(g), 10 and 81 EC are also applicable where the ami-compctitivc 
behavior is imposed on the undertakings by national legislation and the infringements of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC are not attributable to the undertakings because of the ladbroke
CM
doctrine. In the given case the German legislation clearly required the leading associations 
o f  sickness funds to set fixed amounts on the basis of the lowest pharmacy sale price, thus 
requiring decisions contrary to Art. 81 EC.593
bb) The justification/exemption according to Art. 86(2) EC
The next question is whether the infringements of competition law can be justified under Art. 
86(2) EC. As described above,594 the funds provide services of general economic interest -  
social insurance. The particular task assigned to them is the coverage of large parts of the 
population with insurance against social risks under socially acceptable conditions for the 
individual. The main question in the given context is whether the application of the 
competition rules obstructs, in law or in fact, the performance of this task.
In the FENIN case, it is difficult to see why delaying payment towards certain undertakings 
should be necessary to enable the social insurance scheme to perform its social task under 
economically acceptable conditions. Unfortunately the case does not provide further details, 
but a first assessment leads to the conclusion that the funds’ behavior is not justified under 
A rt. 86(2) EC and thus constitutes an infringement of Art. 82(c) EC.595
T he situation is different in AOK Bundesverband. The bearing of costs by the insurance 
causes the problem that neither doctors nor patients, i.e. the insured, care about the prices of 
medical supply. The affiliated or the prescribing physicians can choose the medicine freely 
and they do not have to pay for it. Since the insured do not bear the costs themselves, they do 
no t develop an awareness of prices.596 This can also lead to a moral hazard, i.e. the temptation
591 Case 267/86, Van EyckevASPA, (1988) ECR4769,para. 16; Reiff,supranote 386,para. 14; Delta 
Schijfahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft, supra note 386, para. 14; Case C-96 '94, Centro Servizi SpeJjporto v 
Spedizioni Marittima del Golfo, (1995) ECR 1-2883, para. 20 seq.; C.I.F., supra note 381, para. 45 seq; Opinion 
o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 85.
392 C.I.F., supra note 381, para. 50 seq.; Opinion of AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 
85. Contra ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 68.
593 See also AXER, supra note 320, at 62 seq.; SLOT, supra note 309, at 590-592.
394 See above at pp. 86 seq.
395 See also thè opinion of thè plaintiffs in FENIN, supra note 272, para. 24.
596 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 3.
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of the insured to make excessive use o f the insurance services.597 Consequently the suppliers 
of medical goods were never exposed to any pressure from the demand side to lower their 
prices.598 The opposite was often the case, because many patients consider the more expensive 
medicine the better medicine and have no incentive to save money on it.599 Another special 
feature o f the market for medical supply is its intransparency. Patients are seldom aware of 
what alternatives exist to a certain medicine, because o f the high degree o f differentiation in 
this market and it is difficult for them to compare the different qualities.600 This led to a lack 
of price competition in the German market for medical supplies which almost caused the 
financial collapse o f the German statutory health insurance scheme.601
The fixed amounts, being based on the lowest prices in the respective category o f  medicine, 
enable the funds to save money with regard to the purchase o f medicine.602 They furthermore 
cause the insured to develop an awareness o f  prices, because they have to bear the excessive 
costs for medicine themselves. The introduction o f the system of fixed amounts was a 
necessary reply to the inherent structural failures in the market for medical supplies. It is an 
indispensable measure to maintain the financial equilibrium o f  the funds and so enable them 
to perform the task entrusted to them: the coverage o f large parts of the population with 
insurance against sickness under socially acceptable conditions. The counterargument that 
there might be other means to maintain financial equilibrium or that the determination of 
fixed amounts should be entrusted to an independent authority like the German Minister of 
Health603 can be answered with the consideration from the Albany cases:604 the Member States 
enjoy a margin o f discretion in organizing their social insurance system.605 There is no 
evidence that other means would be as efficient as, but less restrictive of competition than, the 
fixed amounts. It is not obviously disproportionate to entrust the funds themselves with 
determining the fixed amounts, because they have the highest expertise in maintaining their 
financial equilibrium.606 As long as sufficient judicial review is guaranteed in order to avoid
597 ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 21 seq.; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG- Vertrages, supra note 138, at
p. 126.
598 AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 3; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 22.
s"  GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 126.
600 ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 21; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG-Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 
125 seq.
601AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 3.
602 A OK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 3.
603 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK-Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 86.
604 AXER, supra note 320, at 64; KOENIG, SANDER, supra note 292, at 984.
605 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 95.
606 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband, supra note 107, para. 96-100.
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arbitrary decisions, 7 the procedure o f determining fixed amounts can be justified under A r t 
86(2) EC.* 608 *
/ A A
A s outlined above, the maintenance o f social insurance also constitutes a Community 
interest, so that the requirement o f the second sentence of Art. 86(2) EC is fulfilled as well.
cc) Summ ary
The above analysis shows that anti-competitive behavior on third markets, in this case the 
upstream markets for medical supplies and services, can be justified under Art. 86(2) EC. As 
long as breaches of competition law are necessary to facilitate the social task o f  social 
insurance funds, they are accepted by EC law. Only where the infringements o f competition 
law  do not pass the test of proportionality under Art. 86(2) EC, as may be the case with 
arbitrary discrimination against certain suppliers, will they be forbidden under EC 
competition law. ,>
c) T h e  results found in light of the fundam ental right of access to social security and the  
C onstitutional Treaty
A s illustrated above,610 there is a negative fundamental right/principle of access to social 
security on the Community level. Since the Art. 86(2) EC test ensures that competition law is 
only applicable to social insurance schemes, if  it does not impede the provision o f social 
insurance under economically acceptable conditions, the application o f competition law can 
never lead to a limitation o f this fundamental right. The only case found where the behavior o f  
the funds is not justifiable under Art. 86(2) EC is arbitrary discrimination which is 
unnecessary for the functioning of the scheme under economically acceptable conditions.
Furthermore the results found will also satisfy the requirement of the cross-sectional clause in 
A rt. III-l 17 o f the future Constitution, which obliges the institutions o f  the Union to take into 
account the guarantee o f  social protection in defining and implementing the policies o f  Part 
III o f  the Constitution, including competition law. Art. 86(2) EC (the future Art. 111-166(2)) 
provides the tool for taking account o f  the guarantee of adequate social protection by ensuring
407 See Opinion o f AG Jacobs in AOK Bundesverband’ supra note 107, para. 101.
408 See also AXER, supra note 320, at 63 seq.; contra SLOT, supra note 309,592 seq.
409 See above at pp. 92 seq.
4,0 See above at pp. 23-28.
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that schemes o f social protection are not subject to competition law where it would be 
economically detrimental to them. Furthermore the solution put forward takes into account the 
principle o f  subsidiarity by granting M ember states a margin o f  appreciation in organizing 
their social insurance schemes and by respecting their competence in this field.
d) Summary
While the ECJ and the CFI try to find a balance between competition law and social insurance 
by weighing the diverse features o f the funds, in particular the degree o f solidarity, when 
defining the term undertaking,611 *it is submitted that the more appropriate tool to find the right 
balance is Art. 86(2) EC. The application o f Art. 86(2) EC to social insurance schemes has 
three major advantages. The first one is that the application o f  the principle o f  proportionality 
leads to results that meet the objectives o f  both competition law and social insurance: anti­
competitive behavior is generally forbidden, but exceptionally allowed, where the purpose of 
social insurance requires it.613 The second advantage is that the application o f  Art. 86(2) EC is 
more appropriate in light of the modernization o f the welfare state. The existing case-law has 
generally excluded pension schemes that belong to the first pillar and are financed by the 
redistribution method from the ambit o f competition law, whereas occupational schemes, 
based on capitalization, were made subject to the justification o f Art. 86(2) EC.614 Since the 
second and third pillar will gain more importance because o f Europe’s demographic 
development,615 equal treatment o f the different pillars with regard to the purpose o f  covering 
large parts o f the population with insurance against social risks is justified. Third, it was 
evident that the general exemption o f certain social insurance schemes from competition law 
can lead to detrimental effects on third (upstream) markets.616 *Here an application of Art. 
86(2) EC guarantees that these anti-competitive effects are only allowed where they are 
indispensable to the functioning o f the insurance schemes. Thus Art. 86(2) EC, as an 
expression o f the general legal principle o f  proportionality, provides the appropriate tool for 
striking the right balance between competition law and social insurance.
6.1 See above at p. 52.
6.2 See BELHAJ, VAN DE GRONDEN, supra note 290, at 687; BERG, supra note 292, at 172; BUENDIA 
SIERRA, supra note 295, at p. 58; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 72; GIESEN, Die Vorgaben des EG- 
Vertrages, supra note 138, at p. 131; GIESEN, Sozialversicherungsmonopol, supra note 94, at pp. 123-127; 
GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 439 seq.; WINTERSTEIN, supra note 316, at 329 seq.
6.3 See BERG, supra note 292, at 173; ENGELMANN, supra note 383, at p. 72.
614 See the analysis o f the case-law above at pp. 41-52.
615 See above at pp. 21 seq. and Commission o f the European Communities, Adequate and sustainable pensions,
supra note 120, at p. 70-79.
See above at p. 68.
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2. The solution in the field of collective bargaining -  actors, justifications and 
fundamental rights
As outlined above, the solution to a possible collision o f competition law and collective 
bargaining was solved by the ECJ with the creation o f a non-statutoiy exemption for 
collective agreements. Since this solution is doubtful from a doctrinal point of view, causes 
legal uncertainty and is prejudiced in favor o f  collective bargaining and against the objectives 
o f  competition law,618 a  different solution will be proposed in the following section, which 
seeks to reconcile the objectives o f competition law and collective bargaining. Firstly we shall 
examine to what extent collective agreements can actually infringe Community competition 
law. If  such infringements occur, a method to strike the right balance between competition 
law and collective bargaining will be proposed.
a) Employees and employers, trade  unions and employers’ associations -  are they 
undertakings?
The first requirement o f  competition law is that the parties to an agreement, in our case trade 
unions, employers’ associations and single employers, constitute undertakings or associations 
o f  undertakings.
In order to answer the question if trade unions are associations o f undertakings, it is necessary 
to ask if  employees can be considered undertakings.
The definition o f the term undertaking must focus on a teleological interpretation in order to 
provide for the effet utile o f the competition rules.619 620For this interpretation the formula from
£*yf\
Hòfner v Elser can be employed, as discussed above : “the concept of an undertaking 
encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless o f the legal status o f the 
entity and the way in which it is financed”.621 The main feature o f  the functional, relative 
concept o f undertaking in EC competition law is engagement in an economic activity.
6.7 See above at pp. 71*74.
6.8 See above at pp. 74-77.
619 KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 25 seq.
620 See above at pp. 55 seq.
621 Hòfner v Elser, supra note 231, para. 21.
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Employees might be engaged in an economic activity, because they offer their work in the 
labor market in exchange for remuneration.622 Yet the “services” they offer are those of 
dependent work and hence fundamentally differ from other services. AG Jacobs identified 
certain features which distinguish dependent work from regular service: employees usually do 
not bear the financial risks o f transactions, they only work for a single employer, do not offer 
services to a variety o f clients and they are subject to the orders o f their employer.623 624Guido 
Kordel criticizes this assessment, claiming that employees bear the financial risk of their 
transactions in the labor market. This is not exactly true. Certainly, employees bear the 
consequences o f  infringements o f  their labor contract because o f bad performance.625 Yet they 
receive their salary or wages independent o f the fact that the goods they produce are sold or 
the services they provide are used by customers in the single case. It is the employer, and not 
the employee, who bears the risk o f the economic performance o f the undertaking. O f course, 
the employee also bears the risk that the undertaking he works for is efficient, otherwise he 
will be made redundant in order to lower production costs. Yet this is not a direct risk o f his 
transaction to offer labor, but rather a  risk o f the employer who has to perform efficiently in 
the market. Hence it cannot be said that the employee bears the financial risk o f  his own 
transactions, but rather the employer’s risk o f good performance in the market.
Regarding the dependence o f the employee on the employer, Kordel argues that the employee 
can terminate the labor contract and offer his labor to other employers.626 With regard to this 
argument it must be remarked that usually the employee can only offer his labor to one 
employer at a  time, thus constituting a fundamental difference with the provision of 
independent services. In addition, the termination of a labor contract involves legal difficulties 
and economic risks that do not exist in a  market for normal services.627
Yet the main difference with an economic activity in the usual sense o f competition law is the 
special features o f  the labor market which fundamentally distinguish it from other markets. 
These special features include the limited exit option o f the employees due to the dependence 
o f the individual on his job, high entry costs due to the immobility of human capital and to
622 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 211 seq. See also KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 32
seq.
623 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 214 seq.
624 KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 33.
625 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 33, Fn. 152.
626 KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 33 seq.
627 For example the termination period, duties o f loyalty towards the former employer, the difficulty o f finding 
an appropriate new job in times of high unemployment and the immobility o f human capital.
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education and vocational training, and consequently an anomalous supply function which can 
— at least in cases o f high demand elasticity -  eventually lead to a race to the bottom with 
wages not covering the marginal costs of living. This is especially true for under-qualified 
workers in times o f  high unemployment. Thus dependent work cannot be considered a 
normal service or economic activity.628 29 As Art. 1(a) o f the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia 
and § 6 o f the U.S. Clayton Act state: “Labor is not a commodity.”
In the same vein, the ECJ ruled in Becu and Others that Belgian dock workers did not 
constitute “undertakings” for the purposes o f EC competition law, because they worked for 
certain undertakings under employment contracts and under the direction o f  these 
undertakings and they were incorporated in these undertakings so to form an economic unit 
with them. Since they fell under the definition of workers in Art. 39 EC, they could not be 
considered undertakings in the sense o f EC competition law.630 In Pavlov, on the other hand, 
the Court ruled that self-employed, independent medical specialists constitute undertakings, 
because they are economic actors, provide services on the market, are paid by their customers 
(i.e. by different cu) and assume the financial risk attached to their activity.631
A  systematic interpretation o f the Treaty leads to the same result. The Treaty distinguishes 
between freedom o f services in Articles 49 and 50 EC and freedom of establishment of 
enterprises and companies in Articles 43 and 48 EC on the one hand, and free movement of 
workers in Art. 39 on the other hand, thus recognizing the fundamental difference between 
dependent work and independent activities on regular markets. Furthermore, Art. 81 EC lists 
as typical restrictions o f competition the fixing of “purchase and selling prices or any other 
trading condition” and not of wages and working conditions. Art. 81 EC also provides the 
example of the limiting or controlling o f “production, markets, technical development and 
investment” and not the limiting o f labor or working time. As AG Jacobs pointed out, the 
formulations o f Art. 81 EC clearly show that it is not designed for dependent work.632
A final argument can be drawn from a semantic interpretation o f the term “undertaking”. A 
semantic interpretation finds that employees work for undertakings, but are not undertakings 
themselves, because they do not offer goods and independent services on a market. In English
628 See above at p. 32.
629 Contra KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 33 who considers dependent work as a normal service.
630 Case C-22/98, Becu and Others, (1999) ECR1-5665, para. 24-30.
631 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 76 seq.
632 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 216.
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(undertaking/worker or employee), French (entreprise/employé or salarié) and German 
(Unternehmen/Arbeitnehmer) there is a clear difference between these terms and they exclude 
each other.
For these reasons employees cannot be considered undertakings under the Treaty’s 
competition rules, and trade unions cannot be considered associations of undertakings.633 The 
next question is whether trade unions, i f  they are engaged in collective bargaining, constitute 
undertakings themselves. Certainly trade unions can act as undertakings, i f  they are engaged 
in economic activities like trade union banks, supermarkets or as investors in the capital 
market and as shareholders of third companies. However in their function as representatives 
o f the employees in collective agreements, they cannot be considered undertakings. They do 
not act in their own right, but only execute the collective will o f  their members. Hence they 
merely act as agents in the interest of the employees on the labor market. Thus trade unions 
are not undertakings in their function as negotiators of collective agreements.634
The different employers, on the other hand, negotiate with the trade unions concerning wages, 
working conditions and other issues. These are essential cost factors for their production and 
offering o f  goods and services; human work is one o f the most important input factors. 
Therefore they negotiate about issues that are part of their economic activity o f  producing and 
offering goods and services. Thus they act as undertakings in collective bargaining about cost 
factors. The same is true for their organizations, which constitute associations of 
undertakings.635
For the application o f Art. 81 EC, the results found have the following implications: collective 
agreements themselves are not agreements in the sense o f Art. 81 EC, because they are not 
agreements between undertakings (the trade unions lack this characteristic). For multi­
employer collective agreements, this means that only the underlying agreements between the 
different employers or the decision of the employers’ association to conclude a collective 
agreement can fall within the scope of Art. 81 EC.636 This also means that single-employer
633 See for the same result Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 217 seq.; H. FLEISCHER, 
“Absprachen im Profisport und Art. 85 EGV”, (1996) Wu W 473, at 485; contra KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 
37 seq.
634 See the argumentation of AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Albany, supra note 2, para. 220-227. See also 
KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 38 seq.
635 See the argumentation o f AG Jacobs in his Opinion in Albany, supra note 2, para. 228-236 and KORDEL, 
supra note 182, at p. 41.
636 See also Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 237-244.
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collective agreements can never come under the ambit o f Art. 81 EC, because there is only 
one undertaking involved. This solution has the advantage that trade unions and employees 
will never be made subject to competition law, but only the employers. Furthermore it creates 
a method to tackle anti-competitive agreements between the employers that are not related to 
the labor market and are hidden under the disguise o f a collective agreement without 
punishing the trade unions.
This result, which was also proposed by AG Jacobs in the Albany cases,637 638was criticized by 
Gyselen. Admitting that the difference might be o f a purely semantic nature, he argued that 
the restrictions of competition (for example the coordination o f  costs of production between 
employers) were not the direct result o f the underlying agreement between the employers, but 
o f  the collective agreement. The additional “screen” o f  the consent o f the trade unions 
allegedly interrupts causality. He compared the situation to the minister’s decree in Albany, 
which made affiliation to the pension funds compulsory. Gyselen referred to AG Jacobs 
opinion that the collective agreement to apply to the minister for compulsory affiliation did 
not cause a restriction o f competition, rather the minister’s decree did, which was not 
attributable to the undertakings. Hence he concluded that both the minister’s decree and the 
consent of the trade unions to a collective agreement constitute “screens” which interrupt 
accountability.639
There are different arguments against this point o f view. First, the decision of the employers’ 
association to sign the collective agreement is a condition sine qua non for its validity, hence 
being directly causal for its effects.
Second, the decree o f the minister constitutes an exercise o f public authority (imperium), 
whereas the consent o f the trade unions is part of a bargaining procedure between private 
actors. The democratic right to apply jointly to State authorities for certain political and legal 
actions, referred to by AG Jacobs to justify the interruption o f accountability,640 cannot be 
compared to an alliance between private actors with a view to restricting competition. This 
argument is supported by the judgment o f the Court in Pavlov. There the Court held that a 
request of a professional association to make affiliation to a pension fund compulsory did not
637 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 205-244.
638 Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 287-294.
639 GYSELEN, supra note 294,441-443.
640 See the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 293.
105
iiitiij
constitute an infringement of Art. 81 EC, because it was made under a scheme of national law 
concerning the regulatory authority in the social sphere. The Court argued that those schemes 
were designed to promote second pillar pension insurance and included procedural 
safeguards. For these reasons the request o f  the professional association could not infringe 
Art. 81 EC.641 Instead o f relying on the fuzzy idea of direct and indirect causality as 
advocated by Gyselen, the Court created another non-statutory exemption in the social field.
Third, the ECJ ruled in BNIC/Clair that a  price-fixing agreement by a board of wine-growers 
and dealers, which was made generally binding upon request o f the association by ministerial 
order, infringed Art. 81 EC. The counterargument that the anti-competitive effects were not 
caused by the agreement in question, but by the ministerial order, was rejected by the Court. 
The Court ruled that the actual effects o f the agreement did not have to be taken into account, 
as long as its object was the restriction o f competition: “By its very nature, an agreement 
fixing a minimum price for a product which is submitted to the public authorities for the 
purpose o f obtaining approval for that minimum price, so that it becomes binding on all 
traders on the market in question, is intended to distort competition on the market.”642 The 
very purpose o f a collective agreement and the underlying decision o f the employers1 
organization is to erase competition between employers with regard to wages and 
employment conditions as input costs.643 It clearly has as its object a restriction of 
competition, so that the actual effects do not have to be taken into account.
Fourth, there is a contradiction in G yselen’s reasoning itself. Even though he claims that the 
implied agreement o f  the employers (or the decision o f  the employers1 association) cannot 
have a restrictive effect on the market, he nevertheless wants to apply Art. 81 EC to collective 
agreements which are a “sham”, i.e. only serve as a cover-up for restrictive agreements of 
employers. He argues that, in this case, the underlying agreements are explicit as opposed to 
implicit and can hence be caught by Art. 81 EC.644 Apart from the fact that a decision of an 
employers1 association to conclude a collective agreement is also explicit, Art. 81 EC does not 
distinguish between explicit and implicit agreements. It covers both agreements and concerted 
practices (which are always implicit) and treats them equally. For these reasons the critique of 
Gyselen is to be rejected.
641 Pavlov, supra note 253, para. 98.
642 BNIC/Clair, supra note 577, para. 22.
643 See above at pp. 32 seq.
644 GYSELEN, supra note 294, at 443.
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The decision of the employers’ association or the concerted practice/agreement o f  the 
employers about certain conditions o f employment necessarily has as its object the restriction 
o f  competition, because competition on certain cost factors is to be erased in the relevant 
market. In case of sectoral or national agreements it is beyond doubt that those agreements 
significantly impede competition and affect trade between Member States.
b) The decision o f the employers’ association — an ancillary restraint u n d er a 
“ Community style rule of reason” ?
The next question is whether the agreement/concerted practice o f the employers or the 
decision of the employers’ association which are necessary for the conclusion o f a collective 
agreement can be regarded as an ancillary restraint under the so-called “Community style rule 
o f  reason”.645
The idea of ancillary restraints can be employed both in the field o f  mergers646 647and under Art. 
81 EC. Only the latter is of interest here. The Commission explained in its Guidelines on the 
application o f  Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty that: “If an agreement in its main parts, for instance a 
distribution agreement or a joint venture, does not have as its object or effect the restriction o f 
competition, then restrictions, which are directly related to and necessary for the 
implementation of this transaction, also fall outside Article 8 l( l) .w647
This concept o f ancillary restraints has been employed by the CFI and the ECJ on several 
occasions.648 In all o f  these cases, the main part of the agreement involved an economic 
transaction or decision which had neither as its object nor effect the restriction o f competition. 
The case with collective agreements is different. First o f all, collective bargaining cannot be 
regarded as a normal economic transaction from the perspective o f  the trade unions. They are 
only representatives o f  the employees and negotiate wages, working conditions and other
645 This solution is proposed by BERG, supra note 292, at 171.
646 See Art. 6(1) (b), 8(1) and 8 (2) Regulation No 139/2004 and Commission Notice on restrictions directly 
related and necessary to concentrations, (2005) OJ C56/24.
647 Guidelines on the application o f Art. 81 (3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ CI01/97, para. 29.
648 See especially the CFI’s interpretation o f ancillary restraints in Case T-l 12/99, M6 and Others v Commission, 
(2001) ECR 11-2459, para. 104-117 and also Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm, supra 
note 49, at 250 ; Case 42/84, Remia v Commission, supra note 67, para. 17-20; Case 161/84, Pronuptia, (1986) 
ECR 353, para. 9-27; Case C-250/92, Gottrup~Klim v Dansk Landbrugs Growareselskab AmbAf (1994) ECR I- 
5641, para. 28-45; Case C-399/93, Oude Luttikhuis and Others v Coberco, ( 1995) ECR 1-4515, para. 9-20.
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issues related to their jobs. As explained above,649 these transactions in the labor market 
cannot be regarded as typical economic activities. Thus the collective agreement is not an 
agreement in the sense of Art. 81(1) EC, but only the underlying agreement between the 
employers650 constitutes such an agreement.651 * This means that the agreement between the 
employers cannot be considered a m ere ancillary restraint in one main agreement. 
Furthermore, it is the very purpose o f  both collective agreements and the underlying 
agreements o f the employers to erase competition on wages and working conditions. 
Therefore a collective agreement does not constitute an agreement which has in its main parts 
neither the object nor the effect to restrict competition and hence the agreement between the 
employers is not an ancillary restraint.653
Yet the agreement between the employers may be regarded as an ancillary restraint under the 
so-called “Community style rule o f reason”.654 This expression is a misleading term. While 
the rule o f  reason in US antitrust law means a trade-off between efficiency gains and losses in 
assessing the effects o f  a restrictive agreement on the market,655 efficiency considerations can 
only play a role under Art. 81(3) EC in EC competition law.656 The so-called “Community 
style rule o f reason” has a completely different function. It was applied for the first time in the 
case Wouters and others 657 658
In Wouters, the Court ruled that a regulation o f the Netherlands Bar (a decision o f an 
association o f  undertakings) forbidding lawyers to enter into partnerships with accountants
¿« a
had an adverse effect on competition and affected trade between Member States. Yet it then 
pointed out an objective o f the regulation in question which was outside the field of 
competition law: “The aim o f the (...) regulation is therefore to ensure that, in the Member 
State concerned, the rules o f professional conduct for members o f the Bar are complied with,
649 See above at pp. 102-104.
650 In the following, the term “agreement” between employers will be used to refer to the underlying decisions of 
employers* organizations, agreements and concerted practices between employers.
651 See above at pp. 104-107.
632 See VON WALLWIT2, supra note 51, at p. 125.
653 See for the same result KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 99 seq.
654 This term is used by KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 100 seq. MONTI, supra note 42, at 1088 calls it a 
“European style rule o f  reason”.
655 See VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 123 seq.; WESSELING, supra note 46, at pp. 102-105.
656 For this controversial opinion, compare above at pp. 11 seq. and see Case T-l 12/99, M6 and Others v 
Commission, supra note 648, para. 107; contra W.-H. ROTH, T. ACKERMANN, Art. 81 EG-Vertrag 
Grundfragen, in: H. GLASSEN and others (eds.), Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht - Mit 
Kommentierung des GWB, des EG Kartellrechts und einer Darstellung ausländischer Kartellrechtsordnungen, 
Band VI, O. Schmidt, 57. EL, Köln Juni 2005, recital 254-264.
657 Wouters and Others, supra note 44.
658 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 86-94.
having regard to the prevailing perceptions o f the profession in that State.”659 The Court then 
examined whether the regulation in question was “necessary in order to ensure the proper 
practice of the legal profession, as it is organized in the Member State concerned.”660 Since it 
could be considered necessary, the Court concluded that the regulation did not infringe Art. 
81(1) EC.661 Thus the “Community style rule of reason” is rather a trade-off between the 
Community’s interest in undistorted competition and the legitimate public interests o f 
Member States, similar to the test o f Cassis de Dijon662 63which the Court applied in the field of 
the free movement o f goods. Restrictions of competition are considered “ancillary 
restraints” to objectives outside the economic sphere. It must also be noted that the Member 
States were granted a broad margin o f discretion with regard to the organization o f their legal 
professions and the measures they consider necessary to guarantee their functioning,664 In the 
following discussion, the term Wouters doctrine will be used to avoid the misleading term 
“rule of reason”.
There are general points of critique against the Wouters doctrine.665 It does not specify which 
interests of the Member States can be taken into account and whether there is a hierarchy 
between the different possible national interests and the Community’s interest in undistorted 
competition. The test lacks legal certainty. Since national authorities and courts will play a 
crucial role in the enforcement o f  competition law under Regulation 1/2003, the lack o f 
guidance and precision can undermine the effet utile o f  the competition rales i f  the national 
institutions apply a broad interpretation o f  the Wouters doctrine. The Wouters doctrine opens 
economic competition law to political considerations o f  national interest, thus undermining 
the  Community’s principle o f an open market economy with free competition (Art. 4(1) EC). 
Competition law, which serves to protect the economic constitution,666 would be downgraded 
to  a  political tool o f intervention in the market.
A part from this general criticism against the Wouters doctrine, there is an additional argument 
w ith  regard to its application in the field o f  collective bargaining. This argument is essentially 
th e  same as that put forward above against the non-statutory labor exemption: the Wouters
659 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 105.
660 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 107.
661 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 110.
662 Case 120/78, Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltungfur Branntwein, (1979) ECR 649, para. 14.
663 MONTI, supra note 42, at 1087 seq.
664 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 108.
665 In favor of the doctrine, see MONTI, supra note 42, at 1088-1090, who considers it a logical convergence o f  
the case-law in the field o f competition law and free movement.
666 This is the ordoliberal point of view, compare above at pp. 5-8.
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doctrine is biased in favor of collective agreements and does not provide the appropriate tool 
to strike the right balance between collective bargaining and competition law. The Wouters 
doctrine would create an exemption for collective agreements, without providing for a test of 
proportionality in the narrow sense between the objectives o f collective bargaining and 
competition law (the Court was satisfied in Wouters to verify that the restrictions of 
competition were “necessary” to attain the legitimate national interest and did not engage in a 
balancing procedure).667 68
For these reasons neither the concept o f  ancillary restraints nor the Wouters doctrine are the 
appropriate means to deal with collective agreements under EC competition law.
c) The applicability of Art. 81(3) EC
As discussed above, the Commission and the Courts have frequently taken into account 
public policy considerations when applying the Art. 81(3) EC exemption. For this reason, the 
question arises whether the agreements o f  the employers might be exempted under Art. 81(3) 
EC in conjunction with the cross-sectional clause o f Art. 127(2) EC, which obliges the 
institutions o f the Community to promote a high level o f employment. It must be emphasized 
that public policies might constitute additional considerations in the assessment o f Art. 81(3) 
EC, but this does not discharge them from being subsumed under the four requirements of 
Art. 81(3) EC.669 This is especially true under the ambit o f Regulation 1/2003, where it is 
crucial that national courts and authorities have clear legal standards in order to apply Art. 
81(3) EC.670 The Commission emphasizes in its Guidelines on the application o f  Art. 81 (3) o f  
the Treaty: “Goals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent 
that they can be subsumed under the four conditions o f Art. 81 (3).”671 Thus the cross- 
sectional clause o f Art. 127(2) EC should be taken into account when subsuming 
considerations under Art. 81(3) EC, because it clearly obliges the institutions o f the
667 Wouters and Others, supra note 44, para. 105-110.
668 See above at pp. 12-14.
669 KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 105; similarly MONTI, supra note 42, at 1077 seq.; contra WESSEL1NO, 
supra note 46, at pp. 104-112, who wants to use Art. 81 (3) as a tool to take into consideration public policy 
considerations other than competition (so-called political rule of reason) and who wants to assess efficiency 
gains and losses in the framework of Art. 81(1), applying an economic rule o f reason. This is clearly against the 
wording o f Art. 81 and its ordoliberal roots and exegesis.
670 For this effect see MONTI, supra note 42, at 1092 seq., 1095 seq.; WESSELING, supra note 46, at p. 112.
671 Guidelines on the application o f Art. 81 (3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 42.
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Community to take into consideration the objective of a high level of employment when 
implementing the Community’s policies and activities.672
Art. 81(3) EC must be applied to each relevant market to which the agreement in question 
relates.673 It was shown above674 675that the labor market cannot be regarded as a regular 
economic market for the employees who offer their work. Yet it is an economic market for 
employers, who purchase input for production and services. Since this input also directly 
influences the downstream market for goods and services, the agreements between the 
employers affect these markets as well. The same is true for third upstream markets for 
input like technology markets or markets for production machinery. These are the relevant 
markets that will be taken into account in the following section.
aa) The first requirem ent: contribution to the im provem ent of the production o r 
distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical o r economic progress
Art. 81(3) EC requires that the practice in question contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. This requirement 
essentially demands efficiency gains, whereby all objective economic efficiencies can be 
taken into account.676 The efficiencies in question are generally productive or dynamic 
efficiencies, which lead to allocative efficiencies.677 The Commission makes a broad 
distinction between cost efficiencies, i.e. reducing costs o f  production and distribution of 
goods and services,678 679and qualitative efficiencies, i.e. the generation o f improved or new 
products or services by technological and economic progress.
It is very controversial whether collective agreements, and thus the underlying agreements 
between employers, can give rise to such efficiency gains. Some economists {neo-classical 
approach) argue that the monopolization of supply and demand on the labor market leads to 
wages over the competitive level -  the so-called union wage premium . The result is a decrease 
in productive efficiency in the markets for goods and services. Marginal costs of production
672 To this effect see also MONTI, supra note 42, at 1093. For the situation before the introduction o f Art. 127(2) 
see VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 184 seq.
673 Guidelines on the application ofArt. 81 (3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ CIO 1/97, para. 43.
674 See above at pp. 102 seq.
675 For the consideration o f downstream markets in the case of purchasing agreements, see Guidelines on the 
application o f  Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ CIO 1/97, para. 43.
676 Guidelines on the application ofArt. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 50,59, 105. See also 
MONTI, supra note 42, at 1063 seq.
677 For the different sorts o f efficiencies see above at pp. 10 seq.
678 For examples see Guidelines on the application o f Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 64-68.
679 For examples see Guidelines on the application o f Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 69-72.
are too high because o f  anti-competitive wages and the employer has to reduce the number o f 
employees or cannot hire new employees, thus reducing economies o f scale. Additional costs 
o f production are passed on to the consumers o f  goods and services. This leads to a decrease 
in demand on those markets, which lowers the employers’ incentive to invest in additional 
labor or which forces him to dismiss workers. Clauses that forbid outsourcing or the 
introduction o f new, cost-saving technologies (anti-rationalization clauses) further enhance 
the detrimental effect on both productive and dynamic efficiency. Furthermore, it is claimed 
that collective bargaining wages as uniform wages prevent the employees from seeking jobs 
that represent their productive level, thus leading to a misallocation of the workforce as an 
input, causing productive inefficiency.680 6812
Other economists, who can be grouped under the term bargaining model, emphasize the
/o i
positive effects o f collective bargaining, claiming that these outweigh the negative effects. 
These models take as their starting point the imperfection o f  the labor market due to the 
immobility o f human capital, which is caused by high transaction costs (financial and also 
emotional costs o f  moving for example), the resulting lack o f  transparency on the labor 
market and its high barriers to entry (education, vocational training). It is claimed that the 
collective action o f trade unions can mitigate the imperfections o f the labor market. The 
intransparency o f the market can be overcome by trade unions which articulate the 
preferences o f  the employees and also provide the employees with information about job 
opportunities and vocational training (theory o f  collective voice). This leads to a better 
allocation o f labor, thus enhancing productive efficiency.683 Collective agreements also lower 
the transaction costs related to the conclusion and readjustment o f employment contracts, 
because otherwise the employer would have to negotiate with every single employee.684 685
Additionally, collective bargaining is a device to articulate the need of employees for public 
goodsm  (facilities for the workers in the undertaking) and to create them, thus reducing the
680 For a summary o f these economic models, which are mainly based on neo-classical ideas, see KORDEL, 
supra note 182, atpp. 73-78 and also VAN DEN BERGH, CAMESASCA, supra note 189, at 503-505.
681 For a summary of these economic models, which are grouped under the term bargaining model, see 
KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 78-84 and also VAN DEN BERGH, CAM ES ASCA, supra note 189, at 502 
seq.
682 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 78 seq.
683 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 79 seq. Contra MÔSCHEL, supra note 183, at 709 seq., who claims 
that competition would be the best tool to provide information. Môscheï does not take into consideration the high 
transaction costs o f workers and the lack o f mobility o f human capital.
684 Contra MÔSCHEL, supra note 183, at 710, who rejects this argument, claiming that the monopolization of 
the labor market is a disproportionate response.
685 Public goods are common goods that are non-competitive in consumption, i.e. several people can use them 
without decreasing the utility of the individual, and they are non-exclusive, i.e. everybody has access to them. 
See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 80, Fn 414.
1 1 2
number o f employees who quit at inconvenient times because of unsatisfactory working 
conditions.686 687
Furthermore, employees gain plant-specific know-how and skills during their working life, 
which is a valuable resource and contributes to productive efficiency. Since this plant-specific 
know-how makes it more difficult to change the employer, employees might be reluctant to 
train young employees properly in order not to endanger their own job. The solution of this 
problem is a long-term contract which rewards the employee for the attainment o f  plant- 
specific know-how and thus makes him recoup his sunk costs (invested time and training). 
This contract, which guarantees the employee both his job and his wages, including increases 
of wage with age, gives him an incentive to train new employees and thus prevents 
opportunistic behavior on the part o f  the employee. It also prevents opportunistic behavior by 
the employer, who might be prone to dismiss the employee before he reaches the highest level 
of wages and is not profitable for the employer any more because of his age. The trade unions 
are entrusted with creating and safeguarding such a contract, because only they have the 
power to protect the employee from opportunistic behavior by the employer and to guarantee 
the prevention o f opportunistic behavior by the employee. Therefore they promote investment 
in plant-specific know-how and skills, prevent shirking o f the employee and enhance 
employee morale. On the other hand, it must be noted that long-term contracts that are not 
limited might have very negative economic effects with regard to the flexibility o f the 
employer to react to external shocks and with regard to the introduction o f new 
technologies.688
The model of union shock effect claims that collective agreements contribute to productive 
and dynamic efficiency, because the employer, faced with higher labor costs, has to introduce 
more efficient methods o f organization and production to lower his production costs.689
It is also claimed that the union wage premium is not necessarily financed by an increase of 
prices on the product market, but by the revenues o f the undertaking, thus simply leading to a 
redistribution o f profit between employer and employees and not causing higher costs for the
686 VAN DEN BERGH, CAMESASCA, supra note 189, at 503.
687 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 80-82; VAN DEN BERGH, CAMESASCA, supra note 189, at 502 seq. 
Contra MOSCHEL, supra note 183, at 710, who thinks that opportunistic behavior should rather be avoided by 
legal protection.
688 See in detail below at p. 123.
689 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 82.
consumers of goods and services.690 Yet it must be noticed that this explanation assumes a 
market for goods and services that is not very competitive and leaves enough room for high
profits for the undertakings.
Recent research from the field of behavioral economics emphasizes mutual trust as an 
important factor in labor relations. Advantages granted to the employees, because o f trade 
union intervention and collective agreements, enhance mutual trust and cooperation and thus
In summary, it can be said that the effects o f collective bargaining on economic efficiency are 
ambiguous. Even though the choice o f the bargaining model might be justified as an 
assumption with a view to the importance of collective bargaining in the EC Treaty
case whether collective agreements and thus the underlying agreements between the
Within the assessment o f the first requirement of Art. 81(3) EC, the cross-sectional clause of 
Art. 127(2) EC can be taken into account. Thus it can be argued that a high level of
the level o f  employment is also highly controversial. Neo-classical economists argue that 
collective agreements are detrimental to the rate of employment, because the uncompetitive 
level of wages forces employers to either switch to cheaper substitutes for production or to
690 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 82 seq.
691 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 83 seq.
692 KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 84-86.
693 See also KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 106 seq.
694 Metro v Commission, supra note 67, para. 43; Remia v Commission, supra note 67, para. 42; VON 
WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at p. 184.
695 KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 111.
have a positive impact on productive efficiency, because employees better identify with their 
undertaking,691 Lastly, it must be emphasized that the neo-classical model and the bargaining 
model do not exclude each other, but that the different results depend on an economic analysis 
in the single case. Both approaches can be regarded as the extreme poles in a sliding scale 
model.692
(especially with regard to the provisions on social dialogue), it is clear that the predictions o f 
this model are only applicable to certain constellations. It is a question for each individual
employers have positive or negative effects on efficiency.693
employment contributes to the general improvement o f production694 or generally to 
economic progress.695 The question of whether collective agreements have positive effects on
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curb their production. This leads to a  decrease in the demand for labor and to dismissals.696 697*In 
the case o f Germany, sector-wide collective agreements led to a situation in which increases 
in real wages (labor costs) rose faster than productivity growth per hour. This situation is 
called “wage overshooting”. Since the trade unions did not follow the advice of the German 
Council o f Economic Advisers to align real wages with productivity growth (taking into 
consideration the high unemployment rate and the high costs of labor in Germany), demand 
for labor decreased and unemployment was even enhanced by the trade unions’ behavior. 
This development affected in particular less qualified workers, whose wages remained stable 
in spite o f the dramatic rise in unemployment.
The bargaining model, on the other hand, assumes that collective agreements can contribute 
to a high level o f  employment by a better allocation o f labor through the articulation o f 
collective voice and that union wage premia do not necessarily lead to dismissals, because 
they are financed by revenues and the respective undertaking is not interested in lowering its 
productivity by dismissing employees, since it can still make profits. The latter assumption is 
based on a highly uncompetitive market o f goods and services, because revenues need to be 
high enough to finance higher wages (monopoly revenues). Certain anti-rationalization 
clauses may also contribute to a higher level o f employment, even though here a trade-off 
must be made between the effects on the market o f production o f goods and services and the 
effects on the upstream market o f production o f technologies (or input in general), where jobs 
might be destroyed. Again, assessing whether the agreement contributes to a higher level of 
employment is a question for the single case.700 At least with regard to the German labor 
market, it must be concluded that in most cases it does not.
bb) The second requirem ent: indispensability
The next (logical) requirement o f Art. 81(3) EC is that the restrictive agreements in question 
are indispensable for acquiring efficiency gains. This means, according to the Guidelines on 
the application o f  Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, that the restrictive agreement must be reasonably 
necessary to achieve the efficiencies and that the individual restriction of competition is also 
reasonably necessary for the attainment o f the efficiencies. Thus the agreement and the
696 KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 73-75; MÖSCHEL, supra note 183, at 705; VAN DEN BERGH, 
CAMESASCA, supra note 189, at 503 seq.
697 H. SIEBERT, “Why the German Labor Market is Failing”, (2004) IJCLLIR 489, at 499-507; see also 
MÖSCHEL, supra note 183, at 705 seq.
694 KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 78-83.
699 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 111 ; VON WALLWIT2, supra note 51, at pp. 186 seq.
700 See also VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 186 seq.
restriction must cause more efficiencies than would have existed in their absence.701 7023This is a 
question for determination in the single case.
cc) The th ird  requirem ent: fa ir share fo r the consumers
Furthermore Art. 81(3) EC demands that consumers must be allowed a fair share of the 
resulting benefit. The Guidelines on the application o f Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty define 
consumers as all direct or indirect users o f the products covered by the agreement, including 
producers that use the product as an input. The agreements of the employers, underlying 
the collective agreements, deal primarily with work as an input for production. The employers 
are themselves the consumers o f labor and can hence not be included in the context of Art. 
81(3) EC. Yet by determining the cost factors of production, the agreements of the employers 
also have an effect on the downstream markets for goods and services. Therefore consumers 
within the meaning o f Art. 81(3) EC, are the consumers on the downstream markets in this 
case.
The concept o f a “fair share” means, according to the Guidelines, that consumers must be at 
least compensated for any negative impact the restriction of competition may have on them.704 
Partly, even net gains for the consumers are demanded.705 706According to the neo-classical 
model, consumers have to bear the costs o f  the collective agreements that are passed on to 
them by increased prices. The bargaining model, on the other hand, assumes the union wage 
premia are financed by revenues, so that the situation for consumers remains at least 
neutral. Only in exceptional circumstances there might be net gains for the consumers, as 
for example higher product quality or better supply (social peace function o f  collective 
agreements), caused by collective agreements according to the bargaining model.707 Hence 
the question o f  the fair share for consumers depends, according to the idea of a sliding scale 
between the neoclassical and the bargaining model, on the specificities o f the single case and 
the structure o f downstream markets.
701 Guidelines on the application ofArt. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 73 seq.
702 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 115 and VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 188 seq., who assume 
that the fulfillment o f this requirement is highly unlikely, except for the attainment of a high level o f 
employment.
703 Guidelines on the application o f A rt 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 84.
704 Guidelines on the application o f Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ Cl 01/97, para. 85.
705 H. SAUTER in 1MMENGA, MESTMÄCKER, EG- Wetibewerbsrecht Kommentar, supra note 475, Art. 85 
Abs. 3 C., para.20.
706 KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 111.
707 KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 112 seq. See also VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 187 seq.
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dd) The fourth requirem ent: no possibility to eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial p a rt o f the products in question
Lastly Art. 81(3) EC requires that there must be no possibility for the undertakings concerned 
to eliminate competition in respect o f a  substantial part of the products in question. According 
to the Guidelines, all agreements are caught by this requirement that would constitute an
4 A Q
abuse of a dominant position in the sense o f Art. 82 EC. Furthermore, it is explained that 
the question o f whether competition can be eliminated is a matter of degree taking into 
consideration the characteristics o f the different markets in question. This means for the 
agreement between the employers that competition with regard to demand for labor is 
restricted because o f the fixing o f minimum wages or minimum standards o f work. Yet there 
is still competition left with regard to higher wages or better working conditions.708 910 Taking 
into consideration the downstream markets for goods and services, competition is only 
restricted with regard to certain input factors, which may not even constitute the main part of 
costs of production. With regard to upstream markets o f technology or other inputs, anti­
rationalization agreements might erase part o f the demand, which might even lead to the 
destruction o f entire highly specialized industries. It must again be determined in the single 
case whether the respective agreements would substantially eliminate competition on a certain 
market.711
ee) Conclusion
The above considerations show that there might be agreements between employers underlying 
collective agreements that fulfill the conditions of Art. 81 (3) EC and are exempted from the 
prohibition o f Art. 81(1) EC. But the analysis also shows that in most cases agreements 
between the employers cannot be exempted, because the requirements o f Art. 81(3) EC are 
not fulfilled.712 The application o f Art. 81(3) EC cannot therefore constitute a general solution 
for the collision between collective bargaining and competition law.713
708 Guidelines on the application o f Art 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ C I01/97, para. 106.
709 Guidelines on the application of Art. 81(3) o f  the Treaty, (2004) OJ CI 01/97, para. 107 seq.; H. SAUTER in 
IMMENGA, MESTMÄCKER, EG-iVettbewerbsrecht Kommentar, supra note 475, A rt 85 Abs. 3 C.( para.28 
seq.
7.0 Contra KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 116 seq.
7.1 Compare also VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at p. 190.
7.2 See also KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 117.
7.3 See also VON WALL WITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 190 seq.
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d) The fundamental right to collective bargaining as a yardstick -  finding a trade-off 
under the ambit o f proportionality
As explained above,714 there is a fundamental right to  collective bargaining on the 
Community level for both trade unions and employers’ associations.715 Therefore the 
underlying agreements between the employers can be protected by this fundamental right. 
This means, on the one hand, that competition law cannot simply interfere with this right, but 
it also means that the guarantee o f collective bargaining is not limitless.716 The limits o f 
fundamental rights are consistently defined in case-law in the following terms: “ ...it is well- 
established case-law o f the Court that restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those 
rights (fundamental rights -  added by the author), in particular in the context o f  a common 
organization o f  a  market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives o f 
general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim 
pursued, disproportionate and unreasonable interference undermining the very substance o f 
those rights.”717 This case-law has been codified by the Charter o f  Fundamental Rights in Art. 
52(1) (future Art. 11-112 of the Constitution): “Any limitation o f the rights and freedoms 
recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence o f  those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle o f  proportionality, limitations may be made only if they 
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms o f others.”
This means that a limitation o f the fundamental right o f collective bargaining is subject to a 
comprehensive test o f proportionality.718 Regarding the collision between collective 
bargaining and competition law, the following conclusions can be drawn:
714 See above at pp. 35-38.
715 See also BLANKE, supra note 205, at 29.
716 See Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 162 seq.
7,7 Case C-292/97, Karlsson and Others, (2000) E C R 1-2737, para. 45. See also, using a different wording, Case 
44/79, Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, (1979) ECR 3727, para. 23; Case 265/87, Schräder v Hauptzollamt 
Gronau, (1989) ECR 2237, para. 15; Case 5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt fu r  Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, 
(1989) ECR 2609, para. 18; Case C-62/90, Commission v Germany, (1992) ECR 1-2575, para. 23; Case C- 
404/92 P, X  v Commission, (1994) ECR 1-4737, para. 18.
718 See Karlsson and Others, supra note 717, para. 58. Contra VON WALL WITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 128- 
130, who interprets the case-law of the Court so that only the essence of a fundamental right is protected from 
interference. Yet even the wording of the judgments “ ...provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to 
objectives o f general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, 
disproportionate and unreasonable interference undermining the very substance of those rights.” (emphasis 
added by the author) does not necessarily support this conclusion. In particular the term “with regard to the aim 
pursued” must be interpreted as demanding a comprehensive test of proportionality between the different 
interests. Furthermore, every infringement of the essence of a fundamental right would be disproportionate per 
se, because it would completely deprive this right o f its meaning. Thus proportionality must have an additional
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1. The application o f competition law must respect the essence (or very substance) o f the right 
to collective bargaining. Because o f the different national scopes o f collective bargaining, it is 
not an easy task to define the essence o f  this right.719 But the above considerations720 have 
shown that, because o f its function to protect employees in the labor market and to strengthen 
their bargaining position against employers by cartelization o f the supply of labor, the 
following contents o f  collective bargaining at least belong to the essence of the fundamental 
right: wages, including pensions and other forms of remuneration,721 and working conditions, 
including working time, holidays, seniority rules and safety at the workplace.
2. If competition law collides with collective agreements which do not deal with the essence 
of the right to collective bargaining, any limitation of this right is subject to a strict and 
comprehensive test o f  proportionality. There is no doubt that such limitations by competition 
law are provided for by law (even primary Community law -  Art. 81 seq. EC). Furthermore, a 
free market with undistorted competition is one of the most fundamental objectives o f general 
interest pursued by the Community.722 7234It is also submitted that the prohibition of restrictive 
agreements by Art. 81(1) and (2) EC is necessary to meet the objective o f a free market with 
undistorted competition. Yet the limitation o f the right of collective bargaining must also be 
proportionate in a narrow sense. This means that in the single case a trade-off must be made 
between the fundamental right to collective bargaining and the “constitutional” principle of 
free competition, whereby each o f the colliding field must be granted its optimal effectiveness 
(this test is called practical concordance in German constitutional law) .
In the following discussion, different kinds of agreements between employers, leading to 
collective agreements, will be analyzed according to the above principles.
significance. The codification of the case-law in Art. 52(1) of the Charter, even though not legally binding, 
supports the view that both the essence o f fundamental rights is protected and any limitations must be strictly 
proportional. VON WALLWITZ, on the other hand, at pp. 130 and 177, wants to conduct the test of 
proportionality in the framework of Art. 81(3) EC. It was shown above, pp. 11-14, that Art. 81(3) EC deals with 
economic efficiencies, and not with other public policies, thus being the wrong place for a comprehensive test of 
proportionality.
19 Compare above at pp. 29 seq.
720 See above at pp. 29-34.
721 For pensions as a form of remuneration see Case C-262/88, Barber, (1990) ECR 1-1889, para. 21-30; Albany, 
supra note 2, para. 63 and KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 181.
722 For the legal rank o f competition law in EC law, see above pp. 14 seq. See also Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
Albany, supra note 2, para. 162.
723 For the principle o f practical concordance in German constitutional law, see, for example, B. PIEROTH, B. 
SCHLINK, Grundrechte Staatsrecht //, 16th ed., C.F. Möller Verlag, Heidelberg 2000, para. 325-329.
724 BLANKE, supra note 205, at 30. Such a test o f  proportionality is also proposed by KORDEL, supra note 
182, atpp. 178-182, who wants to conduct it in the framework of the Wouters doctrine.
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First there are agreements fixing wages, individual working hours and working time, 
conditions o f  the workplace (especially safety at the workplace), rules o f termination of the 
labor contract and rules of seniority. These agreements constitute cartels of the employers 
with regard to the costs of production. Yet they can be considered to belong to the essence o f 
the right to collective bargaining, since they deal with wages and working conditions. Hence 
they are protected by the employers’ fundamental right to collective bargaining and are 
immune from competition law.723 *25 *
Secondly, there are agreements which fix the opening hours o f shops. The treatment o f these 
agreements has been very controversial, especially in Germany, because it eliminates the 
freedom o f  wholesalers and retailers to compete after a certain hour.727 Yet it must be taken 
into consideration that shopkeepers can compete in many other respects, including price, 
variety and quality o f  products and service. The end of daily opening hours directly affects the 
working time o f  the employee. He only has to work until, for example, 18.00 every day and 
can then go home. This is an essential working condition and the employee has a legitimate 
interest in regular leisure-time, especially with regard to his family life. It can hence be 
considered to belong to the essence o f collective bargaining.728 729Therefore agreements between 
employers leading to collective agreements about fixed opening hours are immune from 
competition law.
The third kind o f  agreements is agreements leading to the establishment o f sectoral social 
insurance schemes, for example in the Albany cases730 731and in van der Woude.73! It is 
unproblematic that employers grant their employees minimum pensions or contributions to
723 Kordel arrives at a similar result: KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 182-184, who argues with efficiency gains
of multi-employer bargaining and proposes an exemption under Art. 81(3) EC.
726 For the situation in Germany, see supra note 469. For a comparable case in the United States, see Meat
Cutters Union v Jewel Tea Co., 7 June 1965 381 U.S. 676.
727 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 89 and p. 200; VON WALL WITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 140-142.
728 The Berlin Kammergericht arrives at the same result with regard to the German fundamental right to 
collective bargaining (Art. 9 III of the basic law) -  KG, judgment o f21,02.1990 Kart U 4357/89, WuW/E OLG 
4531, at 4534-4537.
729 Contra KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 201-203, who considers the fixing o f opening hours 
disproportionate, because there are less restrictive alternatives like fixing daily working hours for members of 
the trade unions or by clauses fixing the amount o f  working hours, not the exact time of work, which is kept 
flexible. Against the first argument, it can be pointed out that not all workers in the undertaking profit from it 
and that in practice the trade unions cannot effectively supervise whether their members are not pushed by the 
employer to work longer and take evening shifts. Against the second argument, it can be argued that the fixing of 
daily or weekly hours does not protect the workers’ interest in regular working hours.
730 Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken, supra note 2.
731 Van der Woude, supra note 436.
health insurance in collective agreements, because these benefits can be considered 
remuneration,732 thus being covered by the essence of the fundamental right of collective 
bargaining. Yet a  problem arises where the collective agreement sets up a sectoral pension 
fund by the employers (in the form o f  a joint venture) or entrusts the sectoral insurance to 
(only) one provider and if the employers commit themselves to conclude insurance contracts 
only with the respective fund (this was allegedly not the case in Albany)733 and agree to 
launch a request to the competent minister to make affiliation to these funds compulsory for 
the entire sector.
This problem brings into play the test o f proportionality in the narrow sense. The clauses in 
question have as their object and/or effect the restriction of competition. They (aim to) restrict 
the freedom of the employers to conclude insurance agreements for their employees with 
other insurance companies, which offer better conditions and/or higher benefits. They also 
exclude third providers o f insurance from a relevant market734 and hinder market integration, 
because sectoral agreements are nationally bordered. On the other hand, they may have pro- 
competitive effects, since they might lead to productive efficiency, especially because of 
actuarial risk calculation and the lowering of administrative costs.735
It was shown above in the framework o f Art. 86(2) EC,736 i.e. with regard to exclusive rights 
granted by the State, that monopolization and compulsory affiliation to schemes in the social 
insurance sector can be indispensable in order to maintain their financial equilibrium. This is 
the case where the funds in question exhibit certain features o f solidarity. Here the situation is 
different, because the underlying agreement of the employers is a private action and not a 
State measure as in Art. 86(2) EC. Nevertheless, the argument can be transferred to this case. 
The parties to the collective agreement have a legitimate interest not only in providing 
insurance to the employees, but also in establishing a social insurance scheme with elements 
o f solidarity, so that the employees can be covered with insurance under socially acceptable 
conditions. In order to achieve this aim, monopolization and compulsory affiliation are 
necessary. Furthermore, the social partners are entrusted by national law with setting up
732 Barber, supra note 721, para. 2 1 -30; Albany, supra note 2, para. 63 and Opinion of AG Jacobs in Albany, 
supra note 2, para. 198.
733 Opinion o f AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 276-286.
734 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 89 and p. 195.
735 Compare Opinion o f  AG Jacobs in Albany, supra note 2, para. 267-270.
736 See above at pp. 87-89.
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supplementary insurance schemes in collective agreements,737 an especially important task 
nowadays due to the shift from the first to the second pillar. Thus both the fundamental right 
to collective bargaining and the fundamental right/principle o f access to social security can 
justify restrictions o f competition in this case. Art. 86 (2) EC’s test of proportionality cannot 
lead to a result different from the test o f  proportionality in the collision between competition 
law and fundamental rights: the restrictive agreements are protected by the fundamental rights 
to collective bargaining and social security, because they pursue the aim of providing social 
insurance through collective agreements, they are necessary for the financial equilibrium o f 
the schemes and the importance of providing supplementary social insurance outweighs the 
occurring restrictions of competition.738
The final kind o f agreements between employers that is to be analyzed here are agreements 
leading to so-called hot cargo clauses, which deal with outsourcing and rationalization. These 
clauses forbid the employer from maintaining business relations with certain undertakings, in 
order to prevent the use o f certain inputs in the productive process.739 Certain anti­
rationalization clauses forbid the introduction o f new technologies and machinery.740 Other 
clauses forbid the outsourcing of tasks to sub-contractors. The test o f whether these 
agreements can be prohibited by competition law focuses on the test of proportionality in the 
narrow sense.
The clauses in question have very negative effects on competition. In addition to restricting 
the freedom of the employers to compete on different methods o f  production, they also restrict 
the freedom of suppliers of technology and o f subcontractors to offer their goods and services. 
In the case of sectoral or national bargaining, these clauses may even lead to the destruction o f 
highly specialized upstream markets for technologies and other inputs741 and they might cause 
strong impediments to cross-border trade, thus being detrimental to market integration.742
737 As for example occupational pension schemes in the Netherlands, see Albany, supra note 2.
738 Contra KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 196-199, who considers the monopolization disproportionate and 
proposes as a less anticompetitive measure obliging the employers to pay part of the contributions and the setting 
of minimum requirements, no matter what insurance company is chosen by the employee. Kordel does not take 
into consideration the special features of the market of social insurance and the threat of the downward spiral.
739 KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 209.
740 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 89.
741 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 204 seq. and 211.
742 Compare KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 204; VON WALL WITZ, supra note 51, at pp. 136-139 with regard 
to clauses, which forbid outsourcing.
122
Furthermore, the aspect o f competition as a learning process, directly connected to innovation, 
is strongly impeded by anti-rationalization agreements.743
On the other hand, the effect o f these clauses on working conditions and the welfare of 
workers is only indirect. They contribute to securing jobs by forbidding the substitution of 
dependent human work with capital or independent services. Employees have a legitimate 
interest in securing their workplace as the very basis of their wages and working conditions. 
Yet the clauses in question can also destroy jobs on the upstream markets. The aim o f  job 
security can be reached by other, more proportionate means. Thus a job guarantee (at least for 
a certain period o f  time) can achieve the same aim. It is also positive from an economic point 
of view, because it provides an incentive to invest in plant-specific know-how and skills and 
avoids opportunistic behavior on the part of both employees and employers.744 A negative 
effect is, on the other hand, the lesser flexibility of the employer to react to negative shocks in 
demand with lay-offs.745 746This can eventually lead to a  market exit, which would also destroy 
jobs. Therefore job  guarantees must include hardship clauses. Job guarantees can also hinder 
the introduction o f  new technology and outsourcing, because it would not be cost-effective. 
But if a new technology strongly improves productive efficiency, job guarantees will not 
hinder its introduction in the long run, given that such guarantees are restricted in duration. 
The same is true where subcontractors are much more efficient than the employer’s own 
production lines. Thus job guarantees which are limited in duration are much more 
proportionate means of serving the same end as hot cargo clauses -  securing jobs.747 
Unlimited job guarantees, on the other hand, might have the same negative effects as hot 
cargo clauses. With regard to the negative effects on competition, innovation and 
employment (on upstream markets), both would be disproportionate with regard to the aim to 
create only indirect job safety for employees. The respective agreements between employers 
are thus forbidden under Art. 81 EC, if they do not fulfill the requirements o f Art. 81(3) EC.
743 See VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at p. 139.
744 See above at p. 113.
745 KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 206.
746 See KORDEL, supra note 182, at p. 206.
747 See also KORDEL, supra note 182, at pp. 212 seq.; VON WALLWITZ, supra note 51, at p. 139 points out 
that these agreements even belong to the essence o f the fundamental right to collective bargaining.
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e) Summary
While the application o f Art. 81(3) EC to the collision between competition law and collective 
bargaining only leads in certain cases to an exemption o f  collective agreements from 
competition law, the test of an infringement o f the fundamental right to collective bargaining 
by competition law provides a more appropriate and general tool to resolve the conflict. The 
fundamental right is subject to limitations which obey the principle o f proportionality. 
Similarly to the application of Art. 86(2) EC in the field o f  social insurance, the test o f 
proportionality facilitates a balanced trade-off between the colliding fields o f law and makes it 
possible to meet the interests o f both competition law and collective bargaining in a particular 
case.
Furthermore the application of the fundamental right o f  collective bargaining is in accordance 
with the Constitutional Treaty, which contains this right as directly applicable law in Art. II- 
88.
3. A general solution for the clash of competition law with other fields of law
The solutions found for the relationship between EC competition law and national social 
insurance law on the one hand, and EC competition law and national collective labor law on 
the other hand, might serve as a general example of how the relationship between competition 
law and other fields o f law can be dealt with. The starting point of this approach is the 
application o f competition law to every situation that can be subsumed under Art. 81 seq. EC. 
As in the case of social insurance, the application o f  competition law can itself provide a 
solution that meets the objectives o f both fields o f law and takes into consideration the 
specificities of the markets for social insurance. This goal is achieved by the test of 
proportionality conducted in the framework o f Art. 86(2) EC.
In the case o f collective bargaining, it was shown that competition law is not applicable to the 
collective agreements themselves, thus immunizing trade unions and employees from the 
wrath of competition law. Only the underlying agreement between the employers (or 
concerted practice or decision o f an employers’ association) can come within the ambit of 
competition law. Some o f these agreements are exempted under Art. 81(3) EC. Yet certain 
cases exist in which competition law and collective bargaining collide. In these cases the 
different fields of law, having the same legal rank, must be reconciled. The fundamental right 
o f collective bargaining embodies a fundamental decision of order for the labor market. Yet it 
might interfere with other markets, which are governed by the order o f  freedom and 
competition. Here a trade-off must be found in every single case. This can be attained by the 
fundamental legal principle o f proportionality (see Art. 5 EC and Art. 1*11(4) o f  the 
Constitutional Treaty) in the framework o f the fundamental right to collective bargaining, 
which ensures the optimal consideration o f  each colliding interest.
In summary, the method involves three steps:
1. Application of competition law.
2. If  there is a collision, the legal rank o f  the different fields o f  law in the hierarchy o f norms 
must be assessed. In particular Art. 2 EC can serve as a tool for this assessment. The higher 
norm will prevail.
3. I f  both fields of law are on the same constitutional level, a trade-off in the single case, 
subject to the principle o f proportionality, must be conducted.
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IV. Conclusion
The method o f applying EC competition law to every possible case and o f solving an 
unavoidable conflict with other fields o f  law, which have the same legal rank and importance 
as competition law, by a comprehensive test of proportionality allows a balanced trade-off 
between the colliding fields of law. The test o f proportionality facilitates the consideration of 
the objectives o f  both fields o f  law, in which each field will be given its optimal possible 
effect.
It was evident that in the relation between EC competition law and the -mainly national -  law 
of social insurance a real conflict does not exist. The application of competition law itself 
allows the consideration of the special features of social insurance because o f the test o f 
proportionality in Art. 86(2) EC. Hence social insurance schemes are not endangered by the 
application of competition law and only anti-competitive behavior and measures which are 
unnecessary to maintain the financial equilibrium o f the respective insurance scheme can be 
prohibited by competition law.
The relationship between EC competition law and the -  mainly national -  law o f  collective 
bargaining is more complicated. Here an application o f  competition law would in many cases 
lead to a  prohibition o f  the decisions o f  employers to join collective agreements and render 
the objective o f collective bargaining — the deliberate restriction of competition on the labor 
market to  protect employees -  impossible. However the recognition of a fundamental right o f 
collective bargaining at EC level makes it possible to establish the right balance between 
competition law and collective bargaining in an individual case. This is achieved by the test o f 
proportionality which every limitation o f  the fundamental right to collective bargaining by 
competition law is subject to.
In summary it can be concluded that neither the national systems of social insurance nor the 
national collective bargaining rights are endangered by the primacy of EC competition law. 
On the contrary, EC competition law contributes to social welfare by protecting the free 
market, which is the basis for material prosperity in Europe. Hence the fears o f an unbound, 
globalized laissez-faire capitalism, which is allegedly supported by the European common 
market with free competition, are unfounded. The same is true for the rejection of the 
Constitution because o f  social reasons. It could clearly be shown that the Constitution would
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not weaken, but would in fact strengthen the role o f social rights in the European Union by 
introducing o f a negative fundamental right/fundamental principle of access to social security 
and social protection and by providing definite legal confirmation of the fundamental right to 
collective bargaining.
Competition law protects economic freedom, the free and competitive market, economic 
integration and innovation. It is indispensable for the generation of wealth and the protection 
o f a free society. Social insurance covers large parts o f the population with insurance against 
social risks by a system based on solidarity and redistribution o f wealth. It is indispensable to 
generate social peace and justice. It also provides for the necessary material background and 
security to make use o f (economic) freedom. Collective bargaining empowers the employee 
against the superiority of employers, it prevents exploitation and makes a dignified life for 
workers possible. Hence it also generates social peace and justice. Collective bargaining 
creates material freedom for the employee towards the employer, because as an individual he 
would lack the necessary economic power to exercise his formal freedom against the 
employer.
Only the consideration of both competition law and social insurance and collective bargaining 
in the different cases can contribute to the ultimate goal: freedom and wealth for all 
Europeans.
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